Governance of emerging biomass-based value webs in Africa : case studies from Ghana by Poku, Adu-Gyamfi
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Governance of Emerging Biomass-Based Value Webs in Africa:    
Case Studies from Ghana  
 
Dissertation  
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
 “Doktor der Agrarwissenschaften”  
(Dr. sc. agrar./ Ph.D. in Agricultural Sciences)  
 
to the  
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences 
 
presented by 
 
Adu-Gyamfi Poku 
 
Born in Yaoundé, Cameroon 
 
November 2017 
 
 
University of Hohenheim 
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences 
 
Institute of Agricultural Sciences in the Tropics (Hans-Ruthenberg-Institute) 
Chair of Social and Institutional Change in Agricultural Development 
Prof. Dr. Regina Birner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was accepted as a doctoral dissertation in fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree “Doctor of Agricultural Sciences” (Dr. sc. agr.) by the Faculty of Agricultural 
Sciences at the University of Hohenheim. 
 
 
Date of oral examination: 18 July 2018 
 
 
Examination Committee 
Supervisor and Reviewer:             Prof. Dr. Regina Birner 
Examiner:      Prof. Dr. Steffen Abele 
Examiner:      Prof. Dr. Claudia Bieling 
Head of the examination committee:  Prof. Dr. Jens Wünsche  
 
 
 
 
 
i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am sincerely grateful first of all to Almighty God for His abundant and steadfast grace in 
my life. I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor, 
Professor Dr. Regina Birner, for her guidance and support throughout this PhD thesis. I 
would like to thank her not only for her invaluable and constructive feedback, but also for her 
constant encouragement. I equally wish to thank Dr. Saurabh Gupta for his insights, feedback 
and generous encouragement during my stay in Germany. He has been an integral part of this 
academic journey. My heartfelt thanks also go to Professor Dr. Felix Asante for all his 
suggestions and immense support.  
I would like to thank past and present team members of the division of Social and 
Institutional Change in Agricultural Development (490c), especially Lilli, Sandhya, Denise, 
Jonathan, Verena, Linn, Juliet, Thomas, Athena, Tilahun, Tania and Mary for all their 
support, useful discussions, positive feedback and for creating a pleasant and conducive 
working environment throughout my doctoral studies.  
I wish to express my deepest appreciation to the German Academic Exchange Service 
(DAAD) for their financial support for my research work and upkeep in Germany. I would 
also like to thank the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) for 
funding most of my data collection through the BiomassWeb project. I am grateful to all the 
respondents and resource persons of the study who helped make this research possible. 
Lastly, I would like to say a special thank you to my family. The unconditional love, support 
and encouragement of my wife, Anna, as well as my parents and siblings have been 
invaluable on this journey. I am especially grateful to them and dedicate this PhD thesis to 
them. 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... ii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... vii 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG ......................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................ xii 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. xiv 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. xv 
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1   The emerging bioeconomy ............................................................................................. 1 
1.2   Rationale of the thesis .................................................................................................... 3 
1.3   Problem background ...................................................................................................... 4 
1.4   Objectives of the thesis .................................................................................................. 6 
1.5   Research Questions ........................................................................................................ 7 
1.6   Conceptual Framework .................................................................................................. 7 
1.7   Methodology .................................................................................................................. 9 
1.8   Study context: Crop production in Ghana .................................................................... 12 
1.8.1   The Cassava sub-sector ......................................................................................... 13 
1.8.2   The Maize sub-sector ............................................................................................. 14 
1.9   Thesis layout ................................................................................................................ 16 
1.10   References .................................................................................................................. 16 
2. IS AFRICA READY TO DEVELOP A COMPETITIVE BIOECONOMY? THE CASE 
OF THE CASSAVA VALUE WEB IN GHANA ................................................................... 22 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ 22 
2.1   Introduction .................................................................................................................. 23 
2.2   The cassava sub-sector in Ghana ................................................................................. 25 
2.3   Conceptual Framework ................................................................................................ 27 
iii 
 
2.3.1   The biomass-based value web concept .................................................................. 27 
2.3.2   Applying the Diamond Model ............................................................................... 28 
2.4   Research Methods ........................................................................................................ 29 
2.4.1   Research Design .................................................................................................... 29 
2.4.2   Data Collection ...................................................................................................... 30 
2.4.3   Data analysis .......................................................................................................... 32 
2.5   Results .......................................................................................................................... 33 
2.5.1   The cassava value web .......................................................................................... 33 
2.5.2   Actors and their roles in the cassava value web .................................................... 34 
2.5.3   Institutional linkages in the cassava value web ..................................................... 36 
2.5.4   Challenges and opportunities in the cassava value web ........................................ 41 
2.6   Discussion .................................................................................................................... 45 
2.6.1   Underdeveloped factor conditions ......................................................................... 45 
2.6.2   Deficient demand conditions ................................................................................. 45 
2.6.3   Lack of innovative firm strategy, structure and rivalry ......................................... 46 
2.6.4   Inaccessible related and supporting industries ...................................................... 46 
2.6.5   Missing government policies ................................................................................. 47 
2.7   Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 48 
2.8   Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... 48 
2.9   References .................................................................................................................... 49 
3. MAKING CONTRACT FARMING ARRANGEMENTS WORK IN AFRICA’S 
BIOECONOMY: EVIDENCE FROM CASSAVA OUTGROWER SCHEMES IN GHANA .. 
  .......................................................................................................................................... 53 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ 53 
3.1   Introduction .................................................................................................................. 54 
3.2   Firm-farmer contract relations ..................................................................................... 56 
3.2.1   Output arrangement ............................................................................................... 57 
3.2.2   Quality standards ................................................................................................... 58 
iv 
 
3.2.3   Input arrangement .................................................................................................. 58 
3.2.4   Contract enforcement ............................................................................................ 59 
3.3   Data and methods ......................................................................................................... 59 
3.3.1   Data collection ....................................................................................................... 59 
3.3.2   Method of analysis................................................................................................. 61 
3.3.3   Profile of the schemes ............................................................................................ 64 
3.4   Results .......................................................................................................................... 67 
3.4.1   Descriptive analysis ............................................................................................... 67 
3.4.2   Firm motivations for scheme design features ........................................................ 74 
3.4.3   Empirical probit model estimates for the state outgrower scheme ........................ 77 
3.4.4   Empirical probit model estimates for private outgrower scheme .......................... 79 
3.5   Discussion .................................................................................................................... 81 
3.6   Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 85 
3.7   Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... 85 
3.8   References .................................................................................................................... 86 
4. WHY DO MAIZE FARMERS IN GHANA HAVE A LIMITED CHOICE OF 
IMPROVED SEED VARIETIES? AN ASSESSMENT OF THE GOVERNANCE 
CHALLENGES IN SEED SUPPLY ....................................................................................... 91 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ 91 
4.1   Introduction .................................................................................................................. 92 
4.2   Potential governance challenges of seed systems ........................................................ 94 
4.2.1   Overview of the seed system ................................................................................. 94 
4.2.2   Varietal development ............................................................................................. 96 
4.2.3   Seed multiplication and certification ..................................................................... 99 
4.2.4   Seed marketing and promotion ............................................................................ 101 
4.3   Ghana’s Commercial Seed Sector .............................................................................. 102 
4.4   Research Methods ...................................................................................................... 105 
4.4.1   Research Design .................................................................................................. 105 
v 
 
4.4.2   Data Collection .................................................................................................... 106 
4.5   Results ........................................................................................................................ 107 
4.5.1   Aggregated Process Net-Map .............................................................................. 107 
4.5.2   Actors and their roles in commercial maize seed supply .................................... 110 
4.5.3   Influence level of actors ...................................................................................... 113 
4.5.4   Governance challenges of the commercial maize seed system ........................... 113 
4.6   Discussion .................................................................................................................. 120 
4.6.1   Breeding strategies .............................................................................................. 120 
4.6.2   Managing seed multiplication ............................................................................. 121 
4.6.3   Quality assurance ................................................................................................. 122 
4.6.4   Varietal promotion efforts ................................................................................... 123 
4.7   Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 124 
4.8   Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... 125 
4.9   References .................................................................................................................. 125 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................... 132 
5.1   Summary of the main results ...................................................................................... 132 
5.2   Contribution to the literature ...................................................................................... 135 
5.3   Implications for governance of the bioeconomy ........................................................ 138 
5.3.1   The role of the public sector ................................................................................ 138 
5.3.2   The role of the private sector ............................................................................... 139 
5.3.3   The role of the third sector .................................................................................. 140 
5.4   Limitations of methods............................................................................................... 141 
5.5   Policy recommendations ............................................................................................ 142 
5.6   References .................................................................................................................. 145 
APPENDICES ....................................................................................................................... 149 
Appendix 2.1:   Centrality measures of Fund flows ........................................................... 149 
Appendix 2.2:   Centrality measures of Knowledge flows ................................................ 150 
vi 
 
Appendix 2.3:   Centrality measures of Business linkages ................................................ 151 
Appendix 2.4:   Net-Map Interview Guide for the Cassava Value Web ............................ 152 
Appendix 3.1:   Contract Farming Household Questionnaire ............................................ 153 
Appendix 4.1:   Process Net-Map Interview Guide for the Maize Seed Supply System ... 169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Rising global demand for food as well as for feed and biomass-based raw materials such as 
fuel and fibre crops has increased pressure on the agricultural sector, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The expected trend of increased demand for more diverse biomass-based 
produce from agricultural land effectively transforms the agriculture sector from just a food-
supplying to a biomass-supplying sector in the growing international bioeconomy. This 
transition is leading to the development of biomass-based value webs whereby there are 
complex systems of interlinked value chains in which food, fodder, fuels, and other raw 
materials are produced, processed, traded and consumed. Against this background, this thesis 
aims to evaluate the appropriate roles of the public, private and third (civil society) sectors in 
facilitating the transformation of the agricultural sector in the developing bioeconomy in 
Ghana. The study focuses on the emerging value webs of cassava (Manihot esculenta) and 
maize (Zea mays), which are the two most important staple crops in Ghana. 
Along biomass-based value webs there are a number of pre- and postharvest production, 
institutional and governance challenges that need to be addressed. This thesis focuses on 
three current problem areas of biomass-based value webs. These problem areas are related to 
the governance and institutional dimensions of the utilisation of bioeconomy crops, the 
sustainability of contract farming arrangements and the efficacy of commercial seed supply. 
Thus, the thesis explores the governance of biomass-based value webs from a broader 
perspective, before focusing on two specific aspects. This approach is used to understand the 
complexity of emerging value webs while also highlighting the importance of specific 
institutional arrangements to the effective functioning of these value webs. The findings are 
presented in three empirical chapters of the cumulative thesis (Chapters 2 to 4). 
Chapter 2 investigates the requisite policy and institutional environment needed to foster the 
development of competitive and sustainable biomass-based value webs. For this assessment, 
the case of cassava, a major staple crop with increasingly diverse utilisations in Ghana, is 
used for an empirical case study. Chapter 3 focuses specifically on the sustainability of 
contract farming arrangements for farmers and agribusiness firms as a key aspect of the 
institutional linkage between biomass production and processing in value webs. Contract 
farming arrangements for cassava in Ghana are investigated in the wake of its industrial uses. 
Chapter 4 probes the governance challenges of commercial seed supply, which is integral to 
increasing farm productivity and the critical mass of crop biomass in value webs. As maize is 
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the predominant crop in the commercial seed system and the most important cereal crop in 
Ghana, the commercial maize seed sector is used for an empirical case study. The thesis 
employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection for these 
three empirical studies. This entailed the use of participatory mapping tools, namely, Net-
Map and Process Net-Map as well as semi-structured in-depth interviews with experts and 
key informants, focus group discussions, direct observation and a household survey.   
The results from Chapter 2 show that despite the substantial opportunities for the utilisation 
of cassava biomass in Ghana, there are coordination problems between farmers, processors 
and industrial end-users. There is also the need for more support from the government in the 
form of local content policies. Chapter 3 finds that ad hoc or opportunistic investments that 
only address smallholders’ marketing challenges are not sufficient to ensure mutually 
beneficial and sustainable contract farming schemes in fast developing domestic value chains. 
There is the need for direct firm investment supporting outgrower operations. Public-private 
partnerships may be the best avenue to sustainably providing ideal contract conditions. 
Chapter 4 reveals that the well-known constraints caused by the dominance of public sector 
institutions in seed supply have not been overcome by reform efforts that aimed to promote 
increased private sector participation. Therefore, there is still a lack of complementary 
investments by the public sector, the private sector and the yet underdeveloped third sector at 
the various stages of the seed supply system to ensure that farmers get better access to 
improved seed varieties. Overall, the findings of these three chapters shed light on the roles 
public, private and third sector actors are playing along biomass-based value webs of the 
emerging bioeconomy. 
The thesis concludes that growth of the private and third sectors are critical to developing the 
bioeconomy. Gradual state withdrawal must coincide with the government creating an 
enabling environment in terms of a strong regulatory system and the adequate provision of 
public goods and services to propel private sector dynamism. Collective action among 
farmers must also be encouraged and strengthened through the promotion of farmer-based 
approaches. Accordingly, the driving force behind strategies for more efficient biomass 
production and utilisation in the emerging bioeconomy must come from private sector actors 
and community-based organisations in order to be sustainable. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
In Sub-Sahara-Afrika hat die steigende globale Nachfrage nach Nahrung, Futter, bio-
basierten Rohmaterialien, Kraftstoff- und Faserpflanzen zu einem zunehmenden Druck auf 
den Agrar-Sektor geführt. Die erwartete, zunehmende Nachfrage nach diverseren bio-
basierten Produkten von landwirtschaftlichem Land transformiert den Agrar-Sektor von einen 
Nahrung-bereitstellenden Bereich zu einem biomasse-bereitstellenden Bereich als Teil der 
wachsenden internationalen Bioökonomie.  
Diese Verwandlung führt zu der Entwicklung von auf Biomasse-basierten 
Wertschöfpungsnetzwerken (Value Webs), komplexe Systeme von miteinander verbunden 
Wertschöpfungsketten (Value Chains) in denen Nahrung, Futter, Kraftstoffe und andere 
Rohmaterialien produziert, weiterverarbeitet, gehandelt und konsumiert werden. In diesem 
Zusammenhang, versucht diese Thesis zu evaluieren welche Rolle öffentliche und private 
Akteure sowie Akteure des dritten (zivilgesellschaftlichen) Sektors mit Blick auf die 
Unterstützung der Transformation des Agrar-Sektors in der sich entwickelnden Bioökonomie 
Ghanas spielen. Die Studie fokussiert sich auf entstehende Wertschöfpungsnetzwerke von 
Cassava (Manihot esculenta) und Mais (Zea mays), die beiden wichtigsten 
Grundnahrungsmitteln in Ghana.  
Entlang von Biomasse-basierten Wertschöfpungsnetzwerke gibt es eine Reihe von 
Herausforderungen mit Blick auf Vor- und Nachernteproduktion sowie institutionellen und 
Governance, die adressiert werden müssen. Diese Thesis fokussiert sich auf drei aktuelle 
Problemfelder von biomasse-basierten Wertschöfpungsnetzwerke. Diese Problemfelder 
beziehen sich auf Governance und institutionelle Dimensionen der Nutzung von 
Bioökonomie-Pflanzen, auf die Nachhaltigkeit von Vertragslandwirtschaft und die 
Wirksamkeit von kommerziellen Saatgut-Angeboten. Damit erforscht diese Thesis die 
Governance von biomasse-basierten Wertschöfpungsnetzwerke aus einer weiteten 
Perspektive, bevor sie zwei spezifischer Aspekte betrachtet. Dieses Verfahren erlaubt es, die 
Komplexität von entstehenden Wertschöfpungsnetzwerken zu verstehen und gleichzeitig die 
Bedeutung von spezifischen institutionellen Arrangements mit Blick auf das effektive 
Funktionieren von diesen Wertschöfpungsnetzwerken zu unterstreichen.  
Die Ergebnisse werden also drei, empirische Kapitel einer kumulativen Thesis präsentiert 
(Kapitel 2 bis 4).  
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Kapitel 2 erforscht die notwendige politische und institutionelle Landschaft, um die 
Entwicklung von konkurrenzfähigen, nachhaltigen biomasse-basierten 
Wertschöfpungsnetzwerken zu fördern. Dazu wird eine empirische Fallstudie verwendet, die 
sich auf Cassava bezieht, eine bedeutende Hauptnahrungspflanze mit zunehmend diverser 
Nutzung in Ghana. Kapitel 3 fokussiert sich speziell auf die Nachhaltigkeit von 
Arrangements der Vertragslandwirtschaft für Landwirte und Agro-Business Unternehmen als 
Schlüsselaspekt der institutionellen Verknüpfung von Biomasse-Produktion und 
Weiterverarbeitung in  Wertschöfpungsnetzwerken. Arrangements der Vertragslandwirtschaft 
für Cassava in Ghana werden mit Blick auf die industrielle Nutzung von Cassava analysiert.  
Kapitel 4 widmet sich den Governance Herausforderungen von kommerziellen Saatgut-
Systemen. Diese sind integral für eine steigende Farm-Produktivität und die kritische Masse 
von Pflanzenbiomasse in Wertschöfpungsnetzwerken. Da Mais die dominierende Pflanze in 
kommerziellen Saatgut-Systemen ist und die wichtigste Getreidepflanze in Ghana, wird der 
kommerzielle Mais Saatgutsektor als Grundlage für die empirische Fallstudie verwendet. Die 
Thesis nutzt eine Kombination von verschiedenen qualitativen und quantitativen Methoden 
der Datenerhebung für alle drei empirischen Studien. Das beinhaltet die Nutzung von 
partizipativen Forschungsmethoden, namentlich, Net-Maps und Prozess Net-Maps sowie 
semi-strukturierte Tiefeninterviews mit Experten und Schlüssel-Informanten, 
Fokusgruppendiskussionen, Direktbeobachtungen und eine Haushaltsbefragung.  
Die Ergebnisse aus Kapitel 2 zeigen, dass es, trotz hohen Potenzialen zur Nutzung von 
Cassava-Biomasse in Ghana, Koordinationsprobleme zwischen Landwirten, Prozessoren und 
Industrie-Endkunden gibt. Es gibt einen Bedarf nach mehr Unterstützung durch die 
Regierung in Form von Politkmaßnahmen, welche Anforderungen nach einem lokalen Anteil 
entsprechen (local content policies). Kapitel 3 findet, dass ad hoc oder opportunistische 
Investitionen, die lediglich kleinbäuerliche Vermarktungsherausforderungen adressieren, 
nicht ausreichen, um gegenseitig vorteilhafte und nachhaltige Vertragslandwirtschafts-
Modelle in sich schnell entwickelnden lokalen Wertschöfpungsketten zu fördern. Direkte 
Firmeninvestitionen müssen Vertragsanbau-Modelle (Outgrower Schemes) unterstützen. 
Öffentlich-private Partnerschaften sind wohl die beste Option, um nachhaltig ideale 
Vertragsbedingungen sicherzustellen. Kapitel 4 zeigte, dass wohlbekannte Hindernisse, 
aufgrund der Dominanz von Institutionen aus dem öffentlichen Bereich im Saatgut-Bereich, 
durch Reformanstrengungen, die den privaten Bereich einschließen sollen, nicht 
überkommen werden konnten. Damit gibt es immer noch fehlende, komplementäre private 
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und öffentliche Investitionen sowie Investitionen des bislang kaum entwickelten dritten 
Sektors an mehreren Stellen des Saatgut-Angebotssystem, die sicherstellen könnten, dass 
Landwirte besseren Zugang zu verbessertem Saatgut bekämen. Zusammenfassend beleuchten 
die Ergebnisse der drei Kapitel die Rolle von öffentlichen und privaten Akteuren und sowie 
von Akteuren des dritten (zivilgesellschaftlichen) Sektors für biomasse-basierte 
Wertschöfpungsnetzwerken einer entstehenden Bioökonomie.  
Die Thesis beschließt damit, dass privater und zivilgesellschaftlicher Sektor entscheidend für 
die Entwicklung der Bioökonomie sind. Ein gradueller Rückzug des Staates muss mit 
Maßnehmen korrelieren, mit denen der Staat ein befähigendes Umfeld mit Blick, auf starke 
regulatorische Systeme und der adäquaten Bereitstellung von öffentlichen Gütern und 
Dienstleistungen, schafft, das hilft, um Dynamiken des Privatsektors anzustoßen.  Kollektive 
Aktionen zwischen Landwirten müssen ebenso gefördert und gestärkt werden. Die treibende 
Kraft hinter Strategien zur effizienteren Biomasse-Produktion und Nutzung in einer 
entstehenden Bioökonomie, müssen Akteure des privaten Bereichs und gemeinschaftsbasierte 
Organisationen seien, damit diese Strategien nachhaltig sind.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the policy and institutional environment needed to foster the 
development of biomass-based value webs in Ghana in the emerging bioeconomy. Biomass-
based value webs are complex systems of interconnected agricultural value chains in which 
food, feed, fuels and other biomass-based raw materials are produced, processed, traded and 
consumed (Virchow et al., 2016). The study investigates the governance and institutional 
challenges related to the development of the emerging value webs of two major staple crops 
in Ghana, namely cassava (Manihot esculenta) and maize (Zea mays). In this introduction, 
the background and research topics are presented together with the objectives of the thesis. 
This is followed by the conceptual framework and methodology that guided the empirical 
research. The study context is also described.    
1.1   The emerging bioeconomy  
The contribution of agriculture to food security, employment and wealth creation in Sub-
Saharan Africa make the sector critical to both economic and social development on the 
continent (Diao et al., 2007). However, agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa 
continues to lag considerably behind that of other continents, as well as the region’s own 
potential. The annual increase of productivity in food production in Africa is less than the 
estimated 1.7 per cent needed to feed Africa’s rapidly growing population (Global Harvest 
Initiative, 2016). Additionally, increasing global demand for crop biomass not only for food, 
but also for non-food uses has also risen markedly in the past decade (Timilsina et al., 2012). 
This is putting pressure on Africa’s agricultural sector to transition from just a food-
supplying to a biomass-supplying sector in the growing international bio-based economy 
(bioeconomy).  
Given African countries’ endowment of natural resources, there is a high potential to produce 
plant biomass (Krausmann et al., 2008). This transition therefore presents a unique 
opportunity to stimulate economic development (Abass, 2014). Ostensibly, non-food biomass 
production competes with food production for land and other resources (Deininger, 2011). 
This can also lead to higher food prices (Rosegrant et al., 2013). Non-food biomass uses are 
mainly classified as biomass utilisation for feed, fuel and industrial raw materials. Evidence 
from several Asian countries however demonstrates that many crops can be used 
interchangeably for both food and non-food purposes in response to shifting demands       
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(e.g. see Waramit, 2012; Lam et al., 2009). Furthermore, the non-food uses of crop biomass 
can help generate income that improves access to food (Lynd & Woods, 2011). Agricultural 
systems that focus on the production, processing and utilisation of the entire biomass of 
locally adapted crops for both food and non-food uses can thus offer pathways to a number of 
economic benefits. These include food security; income and employment, particularly in rural 
areas; a reduction in a country’s non-food import bill; export earnings; and environmental 
sustainability (Poulton et al., 2006). Consequently, an increasing number of countries, 
including a few African countries, have started adopting bioeconomy-related strategies and 
policies (see BÖR, 2015).    
The concept of a bioeconomy essentially encompasses the knowledge-based system of 
producing and transforming biomass resources into economically competitive products in 
new, sustainable and eco-efficient ways so as to capture an increasing share of added value 
across all economic sectors (Global Bioeconomy Summit, 2015; OECD, 2008). The concept 
captures both the ‘biotechnology innovation perspective’ which stresses the importance of 
biotechnology for sustainable development, and the ‘resources substitution perspective’ 
which emphasises the use of crops as renewable industrial feedstock (EU, 2007). One of the 
main justifications for the resource substitution perspective was the concept of ‘peak oil’ 
which posits that oil extraction will eventually reach its peak and begin to decline thereafter, 
while oil prices continue to rise (Bardi, 2009). Rising oil prices increases the comparative 
advantage of using biomass as a source of energy or material use. This perception was 
reaffirmed by the oil price crisis of 2007/08. However, the ensuing use of food crops for 
biofuels also contributed to spikes in food prices (Heady & Fan, 2008). These developments 
highlighted two important implications for the bioeconomy. First, the potential tension 
between ensuring food security and the use of crop biomass as a source of energy in the 
bioeconomy became an important topic in the public policy debate (see Enciso et al., 2016; 
Koizumi, 2015). Second, there has been increased attention on the need to improve the 
productivity of biomass production and to develop viable options for producing and using 
biomass that do not comprise food security. Such options include second generation 
technologies and the use of by-products and waste products in place of fossil-based resources 
(see Dimitriadis & Bezergianni, 2017; Gupta & Verma, 2015).     
The cascading effect of utilising and reutilising biomass effectively interlinks existing 
agricultural value chains in complex systems of closed material cycles, forming value webs. 
These ‘biomass-based value webs’ are therefore an integral aspect of the emerging 
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bioeconomy (Virchow et al., 2014). The value web concept was developed by Virchow et al 
(2016) as an extension to Porter’s (1985) classical linear value chain concept to capture the 
multiple pathways and uses of biomass in the bioeconomy. However, as Scheiterle et al. 
(2017) point out, the term ‘value web’ has already been applied in the business literature, 
although in a different sense. In this literature, the concept was used to analyse the 
collaboration between enterprises in a range of industries including internet service 
provisioning and e-commerce (e.g. see Cartwright & Richard, 2000; Andrews & Hahn, 
1998). In terms of the bioeconomy, the concept integrates social, economic and 
environmental perspectives and is therefore an effectively means of pinpointing the potential 
for sustainable productivity increases across the whole value web of defined local, national or 
international systems (Virchow et al., 2014). 
1.2   Rationale of the thesis 
Along emerging biomass-based value webs there are a number of pre- and postharvest 
production, institutional and governance challenges that need to be addressed. This study is 
part a of a larger collaborative research project across Ethiopia, Ghana and Nigeria known as 
“BiomassWeb- Improving food security in Africa through increased system productivity of 
biomass-based value webs.” The project aims to improve food security in Sub-Saharan Africa 
through harnessing productivity and efficiency gains in the entire biomass producing, 
processing and trading system of locally adapted crops. This is to be achieved by focusing on 
increased integration of all value web components as well as the cascading utilisation of crop 
biomass (ZEF & FSC, 2013).  
Within the context of the BiomassWeb project, this thesis is motivated by the need to explore 
the prevailing governance and institutional challenges of emerging biomass-based value webs 
in Ghana. Thus, it focuses on three current problem areas of biomass-based value webs. 
These problem areas are related to the governance and institutional dimensions of the 
utilisation of bioeconomy crops, the sustainability of contract farming arrangements and the 
efficacy of commercial seed supply. The pertinence of this enquiry lies in the critical role of 
the policy and institutional environment of the agricultural sector in ensuring food security 
while also meeting new biomass demands to promote economic development. 
Comprehensive studies on the governance of the bioeconomy, particularly in Africa, are still 
scarce. In the context of Ghana, there is a dearth of empirical studies analysing the 
transformation of the agricultural sector in the emerging bioeconomy. Thus, the thesis seeks 
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to explore the governance of emerging biomass-based value webs from a broader perspective, 
before focusing on two specific aspects. This approach is used to understand the complexity 
of emerging value webs while also highlighting the importance of specific institutional 
arrangements to the effective functioning of these value webs. 
First, the study investigates the requisite policy and institutional environment needed to foster 
the development of competitive and sustainable biomass-based value webs. For this 
assessment, the case of cassava, a major staple crop with increasingly diverse utilisations in 
Ghana, is used for an empirical case study. Second, the thesis focuses specifically on the 
sustainability of contract farming arrangements for farmers and agribusiness firms as a key 
aspect of the institutional linkage between biomass production and processing in value webs. 
Contract farming arrangements for cassava in Ghana are investigated in the wake of its 
industrial uses. Third, the study probes the governance challenges of commercial seed supply, 
which is integral to increasing farm productivity and the critical mass of crop biomass in 
value webs. As maize is the predominant crop in the commercial seed system and the most 
important cereal crop in Ghana, the commercial maize seed sector is used for an empirical 
case study. Holistically, this thesis aims to evaluate the appropriate roles of the public, private 
and third (civil society) sectors in facilitating the transition of the agricultural sector from a 
food-supplying to a biomass-supplying and processing sector in the emerging bioeconomy. 
1.3   Problem background 
The emerging bioeconomy in Africa does not necessarily guarantee that smallholders and the 
informal economy will effectively be linked with the formal economy. Adequate policies, 
governance structures and institutional arrangements are essential for fostering this process 
(Dufey et al., 2007). The transition from a food-supplying to a biomass-supplying agricultural 
sector will require millions of small-scale farmers to adopt new technologies, agronomic 
practices as well as engage in new institutional arrangements with other agricultural actors 
within a conducive regulatory and policy environment (World Bank, 2007). Three critical 
aspects of the governance and institutional challenges of this transition are highlighted below. 
The need for diversified biomass utilisation 
In spite of the increasingly efficient and diversified utilisation of biomass generated from 
agricultural production in the international bioeconomy, biomass-rich African countries tend 
to only focus on the primary production of biomass (Börner et al., 2017). The cascading use 
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and crucial value addition of biomass occurs in high-income biomass-dependent countries 
that reap most of the benefits of novel high-value bio-based products (Erb et al., 2009; 
Charles et al., 2007). Widely grown bioeconomy crops like oil palm, maize and cassava are 
therefore currently underutilised in Africa. Many recent studies related to the development of 
Africa’s emerging bioeconomy tend to focus more on the needed agronomic or technological 
innovations of biomass production and utilisation (see eg. Adekunle et al., 2016; Batidzirai et 
al., 2016; Tui et al., 2015). However, a sustainable bioeconomy development strategy is not 
confined to these types of innovations alone but equally requires a conducive policy and 
institutional environment. This is currently lacking in most African countries and yet, has 
received less attention in the literature.  
Improving marketing arrangements 
The link between biomass production and processing also requires efficient market systems 
to satisfy the increasingly differentiated demand for biomass products in the emerging 
bioeconomy. This is resulting in modernised procurement systems such as contract farming 
by agribusiness firms, even for agricultural commodities that have traditionally been 
dominated by spot market exchanges between small-scale farmers and traders (Reardon & 
Barrett, 2000). Some empirical studies on contract farming have found that small-scale 
farmers actively participate in these schemes and have improved farm productivity as well as 
higher income as a result (Barrett et al., 2012; Bellemare, 2012). Conversely, other studies 
have reported evidence of smallholder exclusion, high default rates, delayed payments and a 
lack of compensation for crop losses in contract farming schemes (Simmons et al., 2005; Key 
& Runsten, 1999). These divergent findings underscore the importance of contract design to 
the performance and impacts of contact farming schemes. Despite the win-win potential of 
contract farming, there is a paucity of studies, particularly in the African context, examining 
which institutional arrangements and contract conditions are sustainable for both farmers and 
agribusiness firms in such schemes.  
Improving input supply systems 
The development of effective supply systems for agricultural inputs such as high quality 
improved seed is essential for increasing agricultural productivity and biomass production in 
Africa (World Bank, 2007). However, the commercial seed sector in Africa has been very 
slow to develop. Only a few countries such as Kenya and Mozambique provide evidence of 
successful commercial seed sector development (World Bank, 2016). A major cause of the 
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sector’s poor performance has been the weak capacity of the public sector organisations that 
monopolise seed supply (Tripp & Rohrbach, 2001). Recent efforts by many African 
governments to liberalise their seed sectors, particularly for cereal crops, has generally 
resulted in increased private sector participation. Nonetheless, deficiencies persist in the 
institutional linkages between the various stages of seed production, from breeding to 
commercial seed delivery (Langyintuo et al., 2010). Consequently, most small-scale farmers 
in Africa still obtain their seed from informal sources such as farmer-saved seed, seed 
exchanges among farmers and purchases from local seed markets (McGuire & Sperling, 
2016; Louwaars & De Boef, 2012). Most empirical studies have focused on the socio-
economic and agro-ecological factors that influence farmers’ decisions to adopt improved 
seed varieties (Khonje et al., 2015; De Groote et al., 2013; Ragasa et al., 2013; Lunduka et 
al., 2012; Langyintuo & Mungoma, 2008). There is however a dearth of in-depth studies that 
investigate the governance challenges of seed supply systems.    
Overcoming these governance and institutional challenges of emerging biomass-based value 
webs by addressing the identified knowledge gaps is critical to fostering the development of 
Africa’s bioeconomy. This would enable African countries to ensure food security for 
smallholder farmers as well as fully exploit the potential to produce high-value biomass 
products for domestic, regional and international markets.   
1.4   Objectives of the thesis 
The overall objective of the study is to analyse the current governance and institutional 
challenges of emerging biomass-based value webs in Ghana, and derive strategies for needed 
policy and institutional reforms. The thesis focuses on cassava and maize which are the two 
most important staple crops in Ghana. Accordingly, the thesis has three specific objectives: 
1) To assess the policy and institutional environment needed to foster the development 
of a competitive and sustainable cassava value web.  
2) To examine which contract conditions are sustainable for both farmers and 
agribusiness firms in cassava contract farming. 
3) To analyse the governance challenges of the commercial maize seed supply system. 
Each objective constitutes a separate empirical chapter of the thesis. 
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1.5   Research Questions 
The three broad research objectives of the thesis each have specific research questions. 
The objective of assessing the policy and institutional environment needed to foster the 
development of a competitive and sustainable cassava value web is realised by addressing the 
following research questions: 
a. Who are the stakeholders in the emerging cassava value web?  
b. Which institutional arrangements exist between the different groups of stakeholders in 
the value web? 
c. What are the challenges and opportunities of utilising cassava biomass for both food 
and non-food uses?  
For realising the objective of examining which contract conditions are sustainable for both 
farmers and agribusiness firms in cassava contract farming, the research questions are as 
follows: 
a. What are the prevailing models of contract farming for cassava in the wake of its 
industrial uses? 
b. Which contract design features influence smallholders’ participation in contract 
farming? 
c. What are contracting firms' motivations for scheme design features? 
The research questions for the objective of analysing the governance challenges of the 
commercial maize seed supply system are as follows: 
a. Are there enough productive maize varieties currently available in the seed system? 
b. What are the institutional factors accounting for the low dissemination of improved 
maize varieties? 
c. What is the extent of collaboration between the public sector and private sector in 
commercial seed supply under the new seed law?  
1.6   Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework displayed in Figure 1.1 presents a guide for analysing the 
governance of biomass-based value webs in the emerging bioeconomy. The lower domain of 
the framework illustrates the cascading utilisation of crop biomass in a complex system of 
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interlinked agricultural value chains across the various stages of input supply, biomass 
production, biomass trading and processing, and finally consumption. This forms the biomass 
value web. The upper domain of the framework depicts the governance system which 
encompasses the institutions, processes and actors that are relevant for the development of a 
biomass value web. The framework distinguishes between different types of international, 
public, private and civil society actors that play a role in the governance system. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework of the governance of biomass value webs 
 
Supranational organisations and donors are international actors that are depicted separately in 
view of their respective roles in influencing policy formulation and funding various research 
and development activities. The government, comprising ministries, public agencies and 
parastatals, plays a critical role in fostering the development of the biomass value web. This 
is done by the implementation of policy instruments, strategies and regulation targeted at 
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developing specific stages of the biomass value web or the system as a whole. The 
government can also become an economic actor that participates in activities at the various 
stages of the biomass value web, particularly through state parastatals. Knowledge 
institutions such as research institutions, extension services and educational institutions are 
typically public sector organisations. However, they are categorised separately on account of 
the specific role they play in fostering innovation and strengthening the knowledge-base of 
the system. Private sector actors such as agro-input dealers, farmers, processors, traders, 
industrial end-users and households are the main economic actors at the various stages of the 
value web. Financial institutions also provide support to some private sector actors to carry 
out their activities. There is therefore the direct provision of products and services between 
these actors along the value web. Civil society organisations, also known as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), play an important role in complementing and 
supporting the activities of public and private sector actors through advocacy and capacity 
building.  
The development and functioning of the biomass value web depends on the various 
interactions among the different actors in the governance system. These interactions include 
policy processes, regulation, funding, knowledge transfer, exchange of goods and services as 
well as lobbying. 
1.7   Methodology 
The thesis employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. 
This entailed the use of Net-Map, Process Net-Map, semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
experts and key informants, focus group discussions, direct observation as well as a 
household survey.   
For the first objective of assessing the policy and institutional environment needed to foster 
the development of a competitive and sustainable cassava value web, the case of cassava in 
Ghana is used for an empirical case study. Case studies are considered as an effective means 
of comprehensively capturing the complexities of phenomena (Yin, 2009). A three-step 
approach was used to collect data for the study. In the first step, the cassava value web was 
visually mapped out with purposively sampled experts. These respondents were selected 
based on their extensive experience and knowledge of Ghana’s cassava value web. The 
visualisation of the value web involved identifying all the existing products and cascading 
uses of cassava biomass in Ghana as well as potential future derivatives from the crop 
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biomass. This information was cross-checked from the existing literature and through direct 
observation (e.g., of various processing activities). The map produced was also used as the 
initial means of identifying the actors in the cassava value web. In the second step, the Net-
Map tool was applied. Net-Map is a participatory social network mapping tool based on the 
visualisation of networks within multi-stakeholder systems by respondents (Schiffer, 2007). 
The tool was used to identify all the actors in the cassava value web and to assess how they 
are linked. Guided by the mapping exercise in the first step, the Net-Map exercise was carried 
out with purposively sampled respondents who had an in-depth understanding of how the 
entire cassava value web operates. The final step involved in-depth interviews with selected 
experts from all the identified stakeholder categories from the Net-Map exercise using 
purposive sampling. These respondents were selected on the basis of having a high level of 
experience and expertise in carrying out specific functions in the cassava value web. 
Additional in-depth interviews were conducted using chain-referral sampling to ensure 
exhaustive expert information. The respondents included donors, public research institutions, 
government agencies, processors, farmers and other stakeholders across the country. Each 
interview was semi-structured and open-ended with the aim of best capturing the 
respondent’s expert opinion on the challenges and opportunities of a cassava based 
bioeconomy. Member checks in the interview process involved paraphrasing or restating 
responses from respondents for clarification where necessary (see Guba & Lincoln, 1989). 
All the interviews of the study were audio-recorded with the expressed permission of the 
respondents. The three-step research design was complemented with an extensive review and 
synthesis of relevant policy documents and project reports. The document review served as 
triangulation to validate the reliability of the findings. 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was used to analyse the data collected. 
The recorded in-depth interviews were inductively analysed using content analysis to identify 
recurring and unique themes (see Berg et al., 2004; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The networks 
identified during the Net-Map exercises were analysed quantitatively using social network 
analysis.  
For the second objective of examining which contract conditions are sustainable for both 
farmers and agribusiness firms in cassava contract farming, a comparative case study 
approach of a public and private cassava outgrower scheme in Ghana was used. Data 
collection was done in three stages using a complementary combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. First, in-depth interviews were conducted with government officials, 
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management personnel and staff of the two selected processing companies, some of their off-
takers as well as with ten purposively sampled outgrowers in each scheme who have supplied 
the companies from the inception of the schemes. This was to fully understand how the 
schemes operate and how they may have evolved overtime. Secondly, two focus group 
discussions were carried out for each scheme. The first set was done with ten purposively 
selected outgrowers (five males and five females) of each scheme identified from the 
companies’ supply ledgers for the year under review, which was 2015. In both cases this was 
followed by focus group discussions with ten non-participating smallholder farmers from the 
same communities as the outgrowers. These focus groups also had the same gender profile of 
five males and five females each. This was to gain contextual insight into farmers’ 
understanding and experiences in the schemes. Specifically, the groups were asked to 
elaborate on their evaluation of the output and input arrangements, quality standards and 
contract enforcement mechanisms of the schemes. In the final stage, a pre-tested 
questionnaire designed on the basis of the first two stages of data collection was administered 
to a total of 315 famers using a multistage sampling process. For the state-led outgrower 
scheme, the supply ledger for 2015 was used to identify the four highest supplying 
communities. Proportional random sampling based on supply was used to select 100 
outgrowers from these communities to participate in the survey. Fifty (50) non-participating 
cassava growing farmers were similarly sampled from these communities from lists provided 
by community leaders. Subsequently, for the privately-run outgrower scheme, the supply 
ledger for 2015 revealed 65 active outgrowers all of whom were selected for the survey. 
These outgrowers were distributed across five communities. Twenty (20) non-participating 
farmers growing cassava were randomly sampled from each of these communities from lists 
provided by community heads. The questionnaire collected a wide range of information on 
respondents’ socio-economic characteristics as well as their experiences and perceptions of 
the contractual details of the schemes. The interviewers overtly presented themselves as 
researchers with no affiliation to either agribusiness firm. Neither firm was involved in the 
selection process of the respondents.  
A probit model was used to estimate the factors that influence a given farmer’s decision to 
participate in the outgrower scheme in each case. The regressors included socio-economic 
characteristics such as gender, education, farming experience, farm size and off-farm 
employment. Additionally, the importance of the contract design features to farmers’ 
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participation decision was included in the models as dummy variables. This approach was 
used to validate the qualitative information collected on farmer perceptions. 
For the third objective of analysing the governance challenges of the commercial maize seed 
supply system, Ghana’s commercial maize seed sector is used for an empirical case study. 
The study employed a two-step data collection procedure. In the first step, the participatory 
mapping technique based on in-depth interviews and visualisation known as Process Net-
Map was conducted with an array of purposively sampled experts in the seed supply system. 
The respondents were selected based on their extensive experience and understanding of how 
the entire commercial maize seed system operates. Process Net-Map is a variant of the Net-
Map method that was developed to identify governance challenges in processes of policy-
making and implementation (see Raabe et al., 2012). In this study, the tool was used to gain 
detailed insights into the process of commercial maize seed supply in Ghana. At the same 
time, the tool made it possible to identify the relevant stakeholders. Guided by the Process 
Net-Maps, the second step involved in-depth interviews with selected experts from all 
identified stakeholder categories using purposive sampling. These respondents were selected 
based on their high level of experience carrying out specific activities in the seed system. 
Additional in-depth interviews were conducted using snowball sampling to ensure exhaustive 
expert information. The respondents included agricultural researchers, public officials and 
regulators, donors, seed producers (individual seed growers), local private seed companies, 
input dealers, extension agents, maize farmers and other stakeholders throughout the country. 
Direct observation of seed supply activities, such as maize seed processing, certification, 
storage and sale was also conducted. Each interview involved a series of open-ended 
questions and follow-up questions to best capture the respondent’s expert opinion on the 
governance challenges in the commercial maize seed system and his views on how these 
challenges may be overcome. The two-step research design was complemented with an 
extensive review and synthesis of relevant policy and legal documents as well as project 
reports. The document review served as triangulation to validate the findings. All the 
interviews, including those from the Process Net-Map exercises, were audio-recorded with 
the expressed permission of the respondents to enable an effective content analysis. 
1.8   Study context: Crop production in Ghana 
As one of the three countries of the BiomassWeb project, Ghana was chosen for the study 
because of its high potential for biomass production and its relatively large investments in 
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agribusiness (Duku et al., 2011; OECD, 2008). Similar to many other African countries, 
agriculture is the mainstay of the Ghanaian economy and employs over 50 per cent of the 
labour force. It accounted for an average of 32 per cent of GDP between 2000 and 2014 
(MoFA, 2015a). The crops sub-sector constitutes the largest activity in the economy. Cocoa 
is Ghana’s most important cash crop as it is the country’s largest export earner. The most 
widely grown food crops include cassava, maize, yam, rice, cowpea and plantain (MoFA, 
2015b). These crops are typically grown on small landholdings of less than two hectares with 
infrequent use of inputs and basic agronomic practices. Approximately 90 per cent of farmers 
in Ghana are smallholders (MoFA, 2015a).  
On the policy front, the second phase of the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy 
(FASDEP II), which was implemented in 2007, serves as the sector-wide policy for the 
agricultural sector. The objectives of the policy include; food security and emergency 
preparedness; improved growth in incomes; increased competitiveness and enhanced 
integration into domestic and international markets; sustainable management of land and 
environment; science and technology applied in food and agriculture development; and 
improved institutional coordination (MoFA, 2007: 22). FASDEP II emphasises 
commercialisation of the agricultural sector as the principal means by which these set 
objectives will be achieved. 
1.8.1   The Cassava sub-sector 
Cassava (Manihot esculenta) is the most important root crop in Ghana in terms of quantity 
produced. It is grown in eight out of the ten regions of Ghana (Angelucci, 2013). Cassava 
accounts for approximately 50 per cent of all roots and tubers production in the country and is 
second only to maize in terms of area planted (MoFA, 2015a). The crop has the advantage of 
being able to produce economic yields even under marginal production conditions. This has 
made it a preferred crop among small scale resource poor farmers (Polson & Spencer, 1991). 
Ghana has been the third largest producer of cassava in Africa over the last decade behind 
Nigeria and DR Congo (FAOSTAT, 2017). As shown in Figure 1.2, national annual 
production of cassava steadily rose between 2000 and 2014. 
Fresh cassava roots and traditionally processed food products are widely sold in domestic 
markets. Cassava leaves and tuber peels are mainly used as supplementary animal feed in 
Ghana. However, cassava leaves are also consumed by some segments of the population 
(Opoku-Nkoom et al., 2013). The stem of the crop is used as planting material          
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(Hillocks, 2002). There has also been increased recognition of cassava’s potential as a 
bioeconomy crop (Koyama et al., 2015). Derivatives like high quality cassava flour (HQCF) 
have gained traction in some industries (Abass et al., 2011). Bakeries and institutions such as 
secondary schools and hotels have been using HQCF as a compliment to wheat flour for 
baking bread and other bakery products (Kleih et al., 2013). Plywood companies are similarly 
using industrial grade cassava flour, which is of lower quality than food-grade HQCF, as a 
glue extender in place of wheat flour (Koyama et al., 2015). Cassava is also being used to 
brew beer for the domestic market (MoFA, 2015b).  
 
Figure 1.2: Cassava production, cropped area and annual yield, 2000-2014 
Source: MoFA (2014; 2015a) 
 
1.8.2   The Maize sub-sector 
Maize (Zea mays) is Ghana’s most important cereal crop and is grown by the vast majority of 
rural households in all agro-ecological zones in the country (Angelucci, 2012). It accounts for 
about 55 per cent of total grain production (MoFA, 2015a). Ghana is one of the major maize 
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producers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, the national annual average yield between 2000 and 
2014 was only 1.7 metric tons per hectare (Figure 1.3). Based on on-station and on-farm 
trials, achievable yields could be between 5 and 8 metric tons per hectare (Ragasa et al., 
2013). This represents a significant yield gap in maize production in Ghana. 
The majority of maize grain produced in Ghana is of the white variety and is used mainly for 
human consumption. It is mostly consumed directly by the farming households. The 
remaining production is traded domestically for traditional foods, processed food products 
and as a substitute or compliment to sorghum in the brewery industry (Andam et al., 2015; 
WABS, 2008). Some maize grain is also recycled, exchanged or sold as seed in local markets 
(MoFA, 2015c). The grain of yellow maize varieties are predominately used as animal feed in 
the poultry industry (Andam et al., 2017). Most of this maize is imported (Angelucci, 2012). 
The rest of maize biomass, namely the stalk, leaves, husks and cobs, are typically left on the 
farm after harvesting or burnt (Duku et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 1.3: Maize production, cropped area and annual yield, 2000-2014 
Source: MoFA (2014; 2015a) 
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1.9   Thesis layout 
The thesis is made up of five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 
presents an in-depth case study of the challenges and opportunities of developing a 
competitive and sustainable cassava value web in Ghana in the emerging bioeconomy. 
Chapter 3 examines the contract conditions of a public and private cassava outgrower scheme 
in Ghana to investigate which contract farming arrangements are equitable and sustainable 
for both farmers and agribusiness firms. Chapter 4 presents an empirical case study of the 
governance challenges of commercial maize seed supply in Ghana following reform efforts in 
the seed sector. The final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 5, collates the insights from the 
previous three chapters in the form of a general discussion that is guided by the theoretical 
framework presented above. The key results of the thesis are discussed against the 
background of the existing literature. The limitations of the study are also presented. The 
chapter ends with the overall conclusions of the study as well as recommendations for policy 
and institutional reforms based on the findings. 
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Abstract 
The increasing global demand for diverse biomass-based products such as food, feed and fuel 
can transform African agriculture from a food-supplying to a biomass-supplying and 
processing sector in the growing international bioeconomy. This study addresses the requisite 
policy and institutional environment needed to foster the development of a competitive and 
sustainable bioeconomy in Africa. The paper uses the case of cassava in Ghana for an 
empirical case study. The novel concept of biomass-based value webs, that is, interlinked 
agricultural value chains, is combined with Porter’s Diamond model to analyse the extent to 
which Ghana is positioned to develop a competitive cassava value web. Empirical data 
collection involved mapping the physical biomass flows, applying the ‘Net-Map’ tool to 
identify all the actors in the emerging value web and their linkages, as well as in-depth 
interviews with the identified actors. The study finds that despite the huge opportunities for 
cassava biomass in Ghana, there are coordination problems between farmers, processors and 
industrial end-users. This has hindered the potential for increased cassava production, 
processing and utilisation. There is also generally a lack of private sector initiatives in the 
development of new cassava based products. Accordingly, industrial end-users tend to 
depend on imported alternatives. Unsuccessful government initiatives and the absence of 
legislation such as a composite flour policy or a biofuel blend policy have also been major 
contributing factors to the unrealised industrial potential of cassava in Ghana. The findings 
therefore suggest that competitive cassava utilisation in the emerging bioeconomy hinges on 
stronger institutional linkages between value web actors and government support mainly in 
the form of local content policies that encourage the use of cassava based products.   
 
Keywords: Bioeconomy; Value web; Diamond Model; Cassava; Africa; Ghana 
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2.1   Introduction 
The primacy of food security in crop production in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be denied. 
However, there is also increasing global demand for other biomass-based products such as 
feed, fuel and fibre (Timilsina et al., 2012). This trend can transform African agriculture from 
a food-supplying to a biomass-supplying and processing sector in the growing international 
bio-based economy (bioeconomy) (Virchow et al., 2016). Biomass-rich African countries, 
most of which are agrarian-dominated economies, are gradually beginning to recognise the 
economic potential and sustainability of such a transition. Development of a bioeconomy in 
Africa can promote economic growth by diversifying the markets for agricultural 
commodities whiles also reducing dependence on imports of oil and intermediate inputs. This 
would generate employment and income, particularly in rural areas. The demand-pull would 
also stimulate increased agricultural productivity thereby ensuring food security (Abass, 
2014). Countries like Malawi, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Ghana have started engaging in some 
bioeconomic activities based on various feedstock crops (see Acheampong & Campion, 
2014; De Groote, 2013; Jumbe et al., 2009). However, the existing institutional framework in 
African countries often does not enable the optimal and sustainable exploitation of these 
emerging and potential opportunities.  
This paper addresses the requisite policy and institutional environment needed to foster the 
development of a competitive and sustainable bioeconomy in Africa. Currently, many studies 
related to the development of the emerging bioeconomy in Africa tend to focus more on the 
needed agronomic or technological innovations (see eg. Adekunle et al., 2016; Batidzirai et 
al., 2016; Tui et al., 2015). However, a sustainable bioeconomy development strategy is not 
confined to these types of innovations alone but equally requires a conducive policy 
environment and broad-based institutional innovations.   
The augmented diversity of activities in the evolving bioeconomy strengthens the 
interlinkages between the production, processing, utilisation and trading of both food and 
non-food biomass. This includes the cascading use of biomass as well as the use of by-
products. This leads to complex systems of merged or interlinked biomass value chains 
(Virchow et al., 2014). For instance, sugarcane biomass in Brazil is used for a wide range of 
bio-based products, including food (sugar and related products), bioenergy (ethanol, 
bioelectricity), bio-based bulk materials (bio-plastic) as well as bio-based high value products 
(e.g. flavours and fragrances) (Scheiterle et al., 2018). Hence in such a system, the 
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conventional product-focused linear value chain approach is not sufficient to analyse the 
complex pathways of biomass flows. To better understand the development of the 
bioeconomy, there is therefore the need to utilise new tools and concepts. 
Using the case of cassava (Manihot esculenta) in Ghana as an empirical example, the paper 
makes two contributions to the bioeconomy literature. First, the paper applies the novel 
‘biomass-based value web’ concept to provide a more holistic analytical approach to 
understanding the linkages between several agricultural value chains and how they are 
governed (Virchow et al., 2016). This concept is combined with Porter’s (1990) Diamond 
model of national competitive advantage to identify the policies and institutional factors that 
are relevant for developing an internationally competitive value web. Second, the study 
highlights the potential of cassava as an important crop in the emerging bioeconomy. Cassava 
is a perennial starchy crop that has the advantage of being able to grow under marginal 
production conditions (Pandey et al., 2000). The potential high yields of starch and total dry 
matter even under such conditions make cassava one of the most attractive bioeconomy crops 
with multiple usages (Abass et al., 2011; Jansson et al., 2009). Yet, it has received less 
attention in the literature than other bioeconomy crops like maize, oil palm and sugarcane 
(e.g. see Scheiterle et al., 2018; Umar et al., 2013; Goldemberg & Guardabassi, 2009).  
In Ghana, cassava biomass is increasingly serving as a raw material for bio-based products 
such as starch, industrial flour, ethanol and feed formulations (see Poku et al., 2018). Ghana 
has been the sixth largest producer of cassava globally and the third largest in Africa over the 
last decade (FAOSTAT, 2017). Cassava is a major food crop in Ghana, as in other parts of 
Africa. Fresh cassava roots and traditionally processed products are widely sold in domestic 
markets. Cassava leaves are also consumed in some parts of the country. However, there has 
recently been increased recognition of the industrial potential of cassava biomass (Kleih et 
al., 2013). The country’s annual food balance sheet consistently shows approximately 30% 
surplus in cassava production (MoFA, 2015a; MoFA, 2014). Most of this produce goes to 
waste (Naziri et al., 2014). This presents a viable starting point for establishing alternative 
value chains without affecting food security.   
Three data collection methods were combined for the empirical application of the concepts of 
the biomass-based value web and the Diamond model: mapping the physical biomass flows, 
the relatively new participatory mapping tool known as Net-Map (Schiffer, 2007) and expert 
interviews. Social network analysis and content analysis are used to analyse the data. The 
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study finds that despite the huge opportunities for cassava biomass in Ghana, there are 
coordination problems between farmers, processors and industrial end-users. This has 
hindered the potential for increased cassava production, processing and utilisation. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2.2 highlights the development of the 
cassava sub-sector in Ghana. Section 2.3 develops the conceptual framework used for the 
study. Section 2.4 describes the research methods. The empirical results are presented in 
Section 2.5 and subsequently discussed in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes by summarising 
the study’s main findings.   
2.2   The cassava sub-sector in Ghana 
Cassava is a major staple crop in Ghana that has seen a steady increase in annual production 
since the 1990s. Ghana is self-sufficient in cassava production and the crop is very important 
in terms of caloric intake and per capita consumption in the country (Angelucci, 2013). As 
shown in Table 2.1, Ghana was the sixth largest producer of cassava globally and the third 
largest in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2014. However, Ghana was the fourth most 
productive producer over the period, behind Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam where cassava 
is mainly grown as an industrial crop. 
 
Table 2.1: Top cassava producers globally, 2000-2014 
Country 
Average Annual Production 
(1000 t) 
Average Annual Yield 
(t/ha) 
Nigeria  41,824 9.91 
Brazil  24,208 13.91 
Thailand  23,412 20.20 
Indonesia  20,696 17.29 
Democratic Republic of the Congo  15,027 8.10 
Ghana  11,640 14.27 
Angola 9,678 12.16 
Vietnam  7,319 16.17 
Source: FAOSTAT (2017) 
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The early 1980s marked a shift in the image of cassava in Ghana from a famine-reserve crop 
to a staple crop due to its food security benefits. This shift was facilitated by government 
investment in the dissemination of disease-resistant improved cassava varieties developed by 
the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) to increase productivity (Nweke, 
2004). More recently, the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP) 
developed in 2002 and revised in 2007 signalled continued commitment from the government 
to increase farm productivity in the sub-sector for food security. These efforts have been 
greatly supported by donor-funded programmes such as the Root and Tuber Improvement 
and Marketing Programme (RTIMP) and the West African Agricultural Productivity Program 
(WAAPP). As of 2010, twenty-one improved cassava varieties had been developed and 
released in Ghana (Alene et al., 2015). However in 2001, a Presidential Special Initiative 
(PSI) on industrial cassava starch production for export was also introduced. This was one of 
similar initiatives undertaken in other cassava producing countries in Africa, supported by the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Pan-African Cassava Initiative (see 
Anga, 2008). The initiative involved the establishment of the model government-owned 
starch processing factory, Ayensu Starch Company. This PSI was ultimately unsuccessful at 
tapping into foreign markets due to numerous operational challenges of the factory 
(Angelucci, 2013). Nonetheless, the PSI raised awareness of the commercial and industrial 
potential of cassava.  
Approximately 50% of all harvested cassava roots are still consumed as freshly cooked tubers 
(FRI, 2012). However, there are an increasing number of small and medium scale enterprises 
that are now producing packaged forms of traditional foods like gari (granulated roasted 
cassava) for both the urban domestic and foreign markets (van Rheenen et al., 2012). The use 
of high quality cassava flour (HQCF), the development of which was spearheaded by IITA, 
has also gained traction in some industries (Abass et al., 2011). Bakeries and institutions such 
as secondary schools and hotels have been using HQCF as a compliment to wheat flour for 
baking bread and other bakery products (Kleih et al., 2013). Plywood companies are similarly 
using industrial grade cassava flour, which is of lower quality than food-grade HQCF, as a 
glue extender in place of wheat flour (Koyama et al., 2015). Cassava is also being used to 
produce beer for the domestic market (MoFA, 2015b).  
Cassava leaves and tuber peels are mainly used as supplementary animal feed in Ghana. 
However, cassava leaves are also consumed by some segments of the population, most 
notably in Northern Ghana (Opoku-Nkoom et al., 2013). In the pig industry, concentrated in 
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the forest zone of the country, cassava roots are also increasingly being used in feeding 
rations in various forms such as dried chips and grits, flour and cooked roots (Kleih et al., 
2013).  
The diverse use of cassava biomass and the derived products and by-products have high 
potential utility in different end-user markets. The development of these new cassava value 
chains demonstrates the growing importance of cassava in Ghana to food security, 
employment and wealth creation.  
2.3   Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework of the study consists of two parts. First, the concept of biomass-
based value webs is explained. Subsequently, the Diamond model is applied to guide the 
empirical investigation of the competitive advantage of Ghana’s cassava value web.  
2.3.1   The biomass-based value web concept 
Biomass is a term used to describe organic matter that is derived from plants and animals.  
Agricultural crops and their residue are therefore a rich source of biomass. A bio-based 
economy or bioeconomy is a knowledge-based system of producing and transforming such 
biomass resources into economically competitive products in new, sustainable and eco-
efficient ways so as to capture an increasing share of added value across all economic sectors 
(Global Bioeconomy Summit, 2015; OECD, 2008). These processes effectively strengthen 
the link between biomass production, utilisation and trading. Accordingly, ‘biomass-based 
value webs’ are complex systems of interlinked value chains in which food, feed, fuel and 
other biomass-based raw materials are produced, processed, traded and consumed (Virchow 
et al., 2016).   
The value web concept was developed by Virchow et al (2016) as an extension to Porter’s 
(1985) classical value chain concept to capture the multiple pathways and uses of biomass in 
the bioeconomy. The web perspective serves as a multidimensional framework that facilitates 
exploration of both the synergies and bottlenecks in and between interrelated value chains 
(Smith et al., 2000). This approach also importantly accounts for recycling processes and the 
cascading effects of biomass utilisation which not only merges value chains but also closes 
material cycles in a system of ‘zero waste’ biomass (Virchow et al., 2016). This emphasises 
the synergies between different biomass uses. Scheiterle et al. (2018) aptly used this approach 
to assess the multiple uses of sugarcane biomass in Brazil’s bioeconomy. Similarly, the value 
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web concept is used in this study to analyse the physical flow of biomass as well as the actors 
involved in production, processing, trade and use of the biomass and the products and by-
products that are derived from it. 
The biomass-based value web concept therefore provides a holistic analytical approach to 
understanding the increasingly complex pathways of cassava biomass flows in Ghana and 
how this system is governed, whiles also highlighting the potential for innovation. 
2.3.2   Applying the Diamond Model 
In order to develop a sustainable and efficient biomass-based value web in the emerging 
bioeconomy, the production, processing and utilisation of biomass must be competitive. 
Therefore, Porter’s (1990) Diamond model is applied to analyse the national competitiveness 
of the cassava value web in Ghana. 
The Diamond Model defines four broad attributes that determine the competitive advantage 
of nations or industries. The framework allows for the assessment of why certain industries 
based in some countries are able to innovate faster than other industries as well as 
international competitors. As shown in Figure 2.1, the four interrelated determinants of 
competitive advantage proposed by the Diamond Model are factor conditions, demand 
conditions, firm structure and strategy, and related and supporting industries. The model also 
considers the role of the government in acting as a catalyst to improve a country's position in 
a globally competitive economic environment. The dynamics of national competitive 
advantage also effectively creates clusters of competitive industries that are linked by 
different types of interactions (Porter, 1990). The Diamond model has been appropriately 
used in analyzing the national competitiveness of different agricultural industries and value 
chains (see Sterns & Spreen, 2010; Neven & Dröge, 2001).  
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Figure 2.1: Porter’s Diamond model of national competitive advantage 
                Source: Porter (1990) 
 
In this paper, the Diamond Model is combined with the concept of biomass-based value webs 
to identify the linkages between all the actors involved in the value web and thereby analyse 
the competitive advantage of Ghana’s cassava value web. The financial, knowledge and 
business interactions between the different stakeholders are therefore assessed. The analytical 
goal is to identify the extent to which Ghana is positioned to make use of new opportunities 
and develop a competitive cassava value web in the emerging bioeconomy.   
2.4   Research Methods  
This section presents the research design of the study followed by the data collection methods 
used for the study. 
2.4.1   Research Design 
A three-step approach was used to collect data for the study. In the first step, the cassava 
value web was visually mapped out with purposively sampled experts. These respondents 
were selected based on their extensive experience and knowledge of Ghana’s cassava value 
web. The visualisation of the value web involved identifying all the existing products and 
cascading uses of cassava biomass in Ghana as well as potential future derivatives from the 
crop biomass. This information was cross-checked from the existing literature and through 
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direct observation (e.g., of various processing activities). The map produced was also used as 
the initial means of identifying the actors in the cassava value web. 
In the second step, the Net-Map tool was applied. Net-Map is a participatory social network 
mapping tool based on the visualisation of networks within multi-stakeholder systems by 
respondents (Schiffer, 2007). The tool was used to identify all the actors in the cassava value 
web and to assess how they are linked. Guided by the mapping exercise in the first step, the 
Net-Map exercise was carried out with purposively sampled respondents who had an in-depth 
understanding of how the entire cassava value web operates. A detailed description of how 
this tool was applied is explained in Section 2.4.2. 
The final step involved in-depth interviews with selected experts from all the identified 
stakeholder categories from the Net-Map exercise using purposive sampling. These 
respondents were selected on the basis of having a high level of experience and expertise in 
carrying out specific functions in the cassava value web. Additional in-depth interviews were 
conducted using chain-referral sampling to ensure exhaustive expert information. The 
respondents included donors, public research institutions, government agencies, processors, 
farmers and other stakeholders across the country. A total of 47 respondents were involved in 
the study (see Table 2.2). Each interview was semi-structured and open-ended with the aim of 
best capturing the respondent’s expert opinion on the challenges and opportunities of a 
cassava based bioeconomy. Member checks in the interview process involved paraphrasing 
or restating responses from respondents for clarification where necessary (see Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989). The three-step research design was complemented with an extensive review 
and synthesis of relevant policy documents and project reports. The document review served 
as triangulation to validate the reliability of the findings.  
2.4.2   Data Collection  
Data collection was carried out between October 2015 and April 2017. The exercise of 
mapping out the physical flow of cassava biomass and its products was carried out with three 
respondents. These respondents represented government agencies, public research institutions 
and medium and large scale processors.   
The Net-Map tool was applied with six respondents from different stakeholder categories in 
the cassava value web. The respondents included those from the initial mapping exercise. The 
application of Net-Map involved four steps: (1) The respondents were asked to identify all 
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the actors involved in the cassava value web and their respective roles. These actors were 
recorded on a large sheet of paper. (2) The respondents were asked to identify the fund flows, 
knowledge flows and business linkages between the different actors. One-sided arrows were 
used for linkages that were unidirectional while double-sided arrows were used for two-way 
linkages between actors. Different colors were used to distinguish the three types of linkages. 
Fund flows were defined as money or financing meted out for particular activities; 
knowledge flows were considered as linkages involving the transfer of information, technical 
know-how, training and capacity building; business linkages were defined as transactions 
involving the exchange of goods and services (service delivery). (3) After completion of the 
map, respondents were asked to review whether all the actors and linkages in the value web 
had been included. (4) Finally, follow-up questions were asked on the challenges and 
opportunities in the cassava value web. This included asking respondents to identify any 
additional actors who had not been considered in the Net-Map that could potentially play an 
important role in the development and production of cassava based bioeconomy products. 
The visualisation of the stakeholders of the value web in the form of the Net-Map in front of 
the respondent facilitated the identification of these challenges and opportunities.  
The subsequent interviews mainly focused on the challenges and opportunities related to 
respondents’ specific activities in the value web. The interviews also served as a means of 
validating the fund flows, knowledge flows and business linkages of the actors established 
from the Net-Map exercises. The Net-Map exercises and in-depth expert interviews were 
conducted in person on a one-on-one basis at the convenience of the respondents. All the 
interviews of the study were audio-recorded with the expressed permission of the 
respondents. 
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Table 2.2: Overview of expert interviews 
Stakeholder Category 
Number of 
Value Web 
maps 
Number of 
Net-Maps 
Number of Interviews 
(including Value Web 
maps & Net-Maps) 
Development Partners/Donors   1 
Government agencies 1 1 6 
Public research institutions 1 2 8 
Financial institutions   1 
Industrial end-users   7 
Supporting actors  1 5 
Micro-processors   3 
Medium & large scale processors 1 2 7 
Farmers   6 
Traders   3 
Total 3 6 47 
 
2.4.3   Data analysis  
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was used to analyse the data collected. 
The recorded in-depth interviews were inductively analysed using content analysis to identify 
recurring and unique themes (see Berg et al., 2004; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
The networks identified during the Net-Map exercises were analysed quantitatively using 
social network analysis. There were no contradictions in the information provided by the 
respondents in the Net-Map exercises. However, some of the Net-Maps varied in the level of 
detail in terms of the number of stakeholders and linkages. The lack of contradictions 
facilitated aggregation of the 6 Net-Maps. The UCINET software (Borgatti et al., 2002) was 
used to derive statistical measures of centrality (degree, closeness and betweenness) among 
the actors.  
Degree centrality shows the number of links an actor has compared to other actors in a 
network (Borgatti, 2005). Therefore, an actor with a higher value has a larger number of 
interactions with other actors in a given network and is considered more influential. In the 
estimations of degree centrality, outgoing and incoming links from an actor are presented as 
(Out)Degree and (In)Degree respectively. 
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Closeness centrality measures the average number of links an actor needs to reach other 
actors in a network (Freeman, 1978). Thus, actors who were unconnected were not included 
in this calculation. A higher value depicts the more central or interlinked an actor is in a 
network and the closer that actor is to all other actors. In the estimations of closeness 
centrality, outgoing and incoming links from an actor are presented as (Out)Closeness and 
(In)Closeness respectively. 
Betweenness centrality quantifies the number of times an actor acts as an intermediary along 
the shortest path between two other actors in a network. A higher value indicates a higher 
frequency of an actor’s role as an intermediary between two other actors (Borgatti, 2005). 
2.5   Results 
This section begins by presenting the graphical representation of biomass flows in the 
cassava value web. Afterwards, the empirical findings of the social network analysis and the 
challenges and opportunities of developing a competitive cassava value web are presented.  
2.5.1   The cassava value web 
The map of the cassava value web illustrated in Figure 2.2 identifies all the cascading uses of 
cassava biomass in Ghana. The map also considers the most realistic potential uses of the 
crop biomass as envisaged by industry experts. 
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Figure 2.2: Biomass flows in the cassava value web 
 
2.5.2   Actors and their roles in the cassava value web 
The results from the Net-Map exercises revealed that the World Bank, the International 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD) are the main funding institutions of projects and 
programmes in the value web. 
Smallholder farmers serve as the main source of cassava biomass. However more recently, 
there are a few commercial cassava producers in Ghana. Micro-processors specialise in 
processing cassava into traditional foods. Medium and large scale processors on the other 
hand are involved in processing both food and industrial products. Traders are the main outlet 
for the sale of fresh cassava roots and processed traditional foods. Most micro-processors are 
also traders. 
The Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) is the primary government agency responsible 
for the growth and development of the cassava sub-sector in Ghana. The Ghana Regional 
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Appropriate Technology Industrial Service (GRATIS) is also a public institution that designs 
and manufactures cassava production and processing equipment. 
Public research institutions are the driving force of innovation in the value web. The Crop 
Research Institute (CRI) and the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) are 
mandated to breed improved cassava varieties suitable for the different agro-ecologies. The 
Institute of Industrial Research is responsible for scientific and technological research into 
industrial equipment and processes. The Soil Research Institute focuses on the utilisation and 
management of the soil resources of Ghana for increased and sustainable cassava production. 
The Food Research Institute is responsible for market oriented research of cassava’s various 
food uses. All of these institutions fall under the umbrella of the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR). The public universities collaborate and complement the output of 
these public research institutions. For instance, 3 improved cassava varieties have been bred 
by public universities.     
The main financial institutions involved in the cassava value web are commercial banks and 
microfinance institutions which offer short and medium term financing to farmers and 
processors. The Outgrower and Value Chain Fund on the other hand is a German funded 
programme for outgrower schemes that offers long term financing. EximBank is a public 
development bank that funds enterprises in the export business.  
There are a number of end-users that are increasingly utilising and selling cassava based 
products. They include bakeries, piggeries, plywood manufactures, packaging companies and 
breweries. Finally, there are other supporting actors such as input suppliers that mainly sell 
herbicides to cassava producers; aggregators buy fresh roots from numerous dispersed 
smallholders and sell in bulk to medium and large scale processors; fabricators are private 
entities that compete with GRATIS in designing and manufacturing cassava processing 
equipment; the industrial cassava stakeholders’ platform is a platform of actors in the value 
web that aims to link farmers and processors to industrial end-users and advocates for 
favourable government policies to support industrialising cassava in Ghana.  
The 29 institutions identified in the cassava value web can be grouped into 7 clusters as 
shown in Table 2.3.  
 
36 
 
 Table 2.3: Clusters of actors in the cassava value web 
Clusters Institutions 
Development Partners/ Donors 
World Bank 
IITA 
FAO 
BMGF 
IFAD 
Cassava sub-sector 
Farmers 
Micro-processors 
Medium & large scale processors 
Traders 
Government agencies 
Ministry of Food & Agriculture 
GRATIS 
Public research institutions 
CRI/ SARI 
Institute of Industrial Research 
Food Research Institute 
Soil Research Institute 
Universities 
Financial institutions 
Outgrower & Value Chain Fund 
EximBank 
Banks & microfinance institutions 
Industrial end-users 
Bakeries 
Piggeries 
Supermarkets 
Breweries/ Distilleries 
Plywood manufacturers 
Packaging companies 
Supporting actors 
Stakeholders' platform 
Fabricators 
Input suppliers 
Aggregators 
 
2.5.3   Institutional linkages in the cassava value web 
The results of the social network analysis display the institutional linkages between the actors 
in the cassava value web in terms of the fund flows, knowledge flows and business linkages. 
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2.5.3.1   Fund flows  
Figure 2.3 shows the network of fund flows in the cassava value web. It is evident that the 
network is highly dependent on donor funds. MoFA serves as the focal institution that 
directly receives and disperses most donor funds to other actors in the value web. Therefore, 
MoFA controls most of the funds in the network. Public research institutions such as the 
Food Research Institute and CRI/SARI are the only other actors that receive direct funding 
from development partners. However, these institutions also receive funds from MoFA. 
Apart from MoFA, banks and microfinance institutions as well as medium and large scale 
processors are the only two other actors who play an intermediary role in the funding 
network. Interestingly, farmers do not receive any direct funding from banks and 
microfinance institutions in the network. They rather depend on medium and large scale 
processors and MoFA. These findings are also indicated by the centrality measures (see 
Appendix 2.1). 
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2.5.3.2   Knowledge flows  
Figure 2.4 shows that knowledge flows are significantly dispersed among public and private 
institutions in the value web. Most of the actors in the network both transfer and receive 
knowledge. It must however be noted that a number of actors including banks and 
microfinance institutions, traders and some industrial end-users are isolated in the network 
(see Appendix 2.2). 
The Food Research Institute is the most connected actor in the network, followed by MoFA 
and the universities respectively. These public institutions serve as the main sources of new 
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Caption: 
Figure 2.3: Network of Fund flows 
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knowledge for other public and private sector actors. Conversely, private sector actors such 
as bakeries, plywood manufacturers and packaging companies share the least amount of 
knowledge with other actors. Indeed, fabricators do not transfer any knowledge in the 
network. IITA is also the only international institution that transfers and receives knowledge 
in the network.  
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Figure 2.4: Network of Knowledge flows 
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2.5.3.3   Business linkages 
The network for business linkages is dominated by private sector actors as expected (see 
Figure 2.5). Medium and large scale processors are the most influential actor in controlling 
the flow of business in the cassava value web. Accordingly, medium and large scale 
processors have the most number of business linkages in the network, followed by farmers 
and micro-processors. These actors have the easiest access to other actors in establishing 
business collaborations. For instance, all industrial end-users deal directly with medium and 
large scale processors in the network.  
Conversely, the only public sector actor in the network, GRATIS, has little influence in 
controlling the flow of business in the network. The structure of the network is reflected in 
the centrality measures of the business linkages (see Appendix 2.3).  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregators 
Farmers 
Traders 
Input Suppliers 
Micro-processors 
GRATIS 
Fabricators 
Piggeries 
Medium & Large scale processors 
Bakeries 
Supermarkets 
Plywood manufacturers 
Packaging companies 
Breweries/ Distilleries 
       Public institutions 
       Private institutions 
       International institutions 
Caption: 
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2.5.4   Challenges and opportunities in the cassava value web  
A summary of the main findings from the expert interviews on the challenges and 
opportunities in the cassava value web are presented in Table 2.4 using the Diamond model 
framework to categorise the themes.  
2.5.4.1   Challenges 
The expert interviews confirmed that a factor condition such as the predominance of 
subsistence-based smallholder cassava production in Ghana has meant minimal use of inputs 
and rudimentary agronomic practises in the cassava value web. This has contributed to 
relatively low yields. Respondents also pointed out the major challenge of poor road 
networks. 
The interview information collected for this study as well as direct observation of various 
facilities suggests that in terms of demand conditions in the value web, processors tend to 
have inconsistent demand for cassava roots because they usually operate below installed 
capacity. According to interview information, this serves as a disincentive for farmers to 
increase yields or production volumes. 
Respondents of the study observed that there is generally a lack of private sector initiatives in 
the development of new cassava based products in Ghana, with very few exceptions. Most 
processors and industrial end-users refrain from investing in the development of innovative 
ways of utilising the crop biomass. 
Respondents emphasised that the public extension system, a supporting institution of the 
value web, is understaffed and under-resourced in its role of promoting new technologies 
among farmers.1 This has contributed to low adoption rates of improved technologies among 
cassava farmers in Ghana. According to interview information, commercial banks and 
microfinance institutions also tend to be wary of agricultural investments given the high level 
of risk and unpredictability associated with such investments.  
Respondents of the study pointed out that currently, Ghana does not have a cassava 
development policy. The government has however recognised cassava’s economic potential 
by supporting several programs and projects as well as by way of the PSI on cassava starch 
introduced in 2001. Yet, these efforts have largely proved to be either unsustainable or 
                                                          
1 The extension-farmer ratio in Ghana is currently 1:1,500 (MoFA, 2015b). 
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unsuccessful in most cases. Beyond that, interview information also emphasised the lack of 
legislation in the form of a composite flour policy or a biofuel blend policy that would 
mandate the use of cassava based products such as HQCF or bio-ethanol. 
2.5.4.2   Opportunities 
Respondents pointed out that most parts of Ghana have the climatic conditions conducive for 
growing cassava. However, there is still a lot of unutilised farm land available for large scale 
commercial investments. Nonetheless, despite widespread subsistence cultivation, there is 
commonly significant surplus produce of cassava which is wasted or remains unharvested 
because farmers are unable to find off-takers. Respondents noted that there is therefore a 
huge potential for the industrial use of cassava in Ghana without food security being 
adversely affected. 
According to the information collected for this study, there is growing domestic demand for 
cassava based products such as processed food products and alcoholic beverages. There is 
also rising demand across other countries in the West African sub-region. Consequently, the 
pharmaceutical, textile and food and beverage industries, among others, are becoming 
increasingly aware of the industrial applications of cassava. 
The expert interviews confirmed that medium and large scale processors have started 
employing outgrower and contract farming models to help secure a reliable supply of cassava 
roots from farmers in adequate volumes. Another strategy being employed by processors is 
the diversification of their production portfolios. According to interview information as well 
as direct observation, most processors hedge their risk of making losses by producing more 
than one cassava product.  
Respondents noted that public research institutions have been effective in supporting the 
growing cassava value web. CRI and SARI have bred twenty-four improved cassava 
varieties. The Food Research Institute has also been instrumental in the development and 
application of new products such as HQCF and industrial grade cassava flour in Ghana. 
Furthermore, respondents confirmed that local fabricators are becoming more proficient in 
manufacturing processing equipment.  
Cassava has been earmarked as one of Ghana’s food security crops in the government’s 
sector-wide policy (FASDEP). Respondents observed that this has resulted in increased focus 
on research on improving cassava productivity. According to the expert interviews, another 
43 
 
notable initiative by the government has been an excise duty concession for local content 
beers announced in 2012.2 This tax incentive policy has encouraged the introduction of two 
cassava beers in Ghana. Respondents also noted that Ghana has a draft National Biofuel 
Policy which aims to accelerate the development and use of second-generation biofuels 
(using the non-edible parts of food crops) when enacted.  
   
                                                          
2 This is a tiered reduction in excise tax for beers that contain more than 30% of locally sourced content.  
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Table 2.4: Matrix of themes from expert interviews 
Themes from Expert Interviews 
Interview number 
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 
C
h
a
ll
en
g
es
 
Factor conditions 
>90% subsistence-based smallholder cultivation  
      
X 
Limited labour available for harvesting  
 
X 
    
 
Poor road networks  
      
X 
Demand conditions 
Inconsistent demand for cassava roots from processors  
    
X 
 
 
Reluctance of industrial end-users to use cassava products due to supply and quality concerns  
     
X  
Firm strategy, structure and 
rivalry 
Lack of private initiatives in the development of new cassava based products  
  
X 
   
 
Dependence on imported inputs  
     
X  
Related and supporting 
industries 
Weak public extension system to support farmers in adopting new technologies   
   
X 
  
 
High cost of credit and loan facilities from financial institutions  
      
X 
Lack of continuous supply of electricity from the state   X 
     
 
Government policies 
Lack of a cassava development policy like for cocoa  
      
X 
The unsustainability of projects and initiatives such as the PSI on cassava starch  
  
X 
   
 
Lack of a composite flour policy  
     
X  
Lack of a biofuel blend policy X 
      
 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s 
Factor conditions 
Availability of land  
      
X 
Good climatic conditions  
 
X 
    
 
Surplus cassava production in excess of subsistence needs  
  
X 
   
 
Demand conditions 
Growing local and regional markets for cassava-based products  
   
X 
  
 
Latent demand for the industrial applications of cassava  
   
X 
  
 
Firm strategy, structure and 
rivalry 
Outgrower/contract farming models for sourcing cassava  
      
X 
Diversification in processing cassava based products  
  
X 
   
 
Recognition of the zero waste potential of cassava biomass  
 
X 
    
 
Related and supporting 
industries 
Good research institutions involved in breeding and product development  
     
X  
Growing capacity in the manufacturing of processing equipment by local fabricators  
  
X 
   
 
Establishment of an industrial cassava stakeholders’ platform   X 
     
 
Government policies 
Cassava a priority crop for food security (FASDEP)  
    
X 
 
 
Excise duty concession for local content beers  X 
     
 
One-District-One-Factory Programme  
    
X 
 
 
Draft National Biofuel policy X 
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2.6   Discussion  
This study aimed to identify the potential of Ghana’s cassava value web in contributing to the 
emerging bioeconomy. From the application of the Diamond Model, it is evident that despite 
opportunities to develop a competitive value web, critical challenges remain. Deficiencies in 
the institutional linkages between actors and a less than conducive policy environment appear 
to be hampering innovation and development of the value web. The reasons are discussed in 
the following sub-sections. 
2.6.1   Underdeveloped factor conditions 
Cassava cultivation is dominated by small scale subsistence-based farmers in Ghana. At that 
scale, farmers make use of limited chemical and technical inputs in the production, harvesting 
and post-harvest handling of the crop. The findings of the study indicate that there are 
deficiencies in the institutional linkages (funding, knowledge and business interactions) 
within the cassava sub-sector. This leads farmers to believe that there is insufficient demand 
for their produce, even when demand exists among certain processors. A major contributing 
factor to this problem has been poor road infrastructure which causes inaccessibility and 
raises the logistical costs of processors acquiring and transporting cassava from widely 
dispersed smallholders. These conditions in turn serve as a disincentive for farmers to 
increase their planted area or adopt new technology and agronomic practices to increase their 
productivity. This is consistent with the findings of Acheampong et al. (2017) and Onumah et 
al. (2008) that marketing challenges contributed to the reluctance of smallholders in Ghana to 
increase their cassava production. 
2.6.2   Deficient demand conditions 
The study’s findings indicate that medium and large scale processors are very often faced 
with the challenge of securing sufficient volumes of fresh cassava when demand arises. This 
is due to low farm productivity and lack of accessibility. Thus, most processors are forced to 
operate below installed capacity. Similarly, Kleih et al. (2013) found that since the Ayensu 
Starch factory was established in 2002 under the PSI, it has never operated at full capacity 
mainly due to insufficient supply of cassava roots. This affects the quantity of cassava 
products like starch or flour that are processed to meet the demand of end-users. As shown in 
the network of business linkages (Figure 2.5), medium and large scale processors are the 
main source of cassava products for various end-users. Inconsistent supply of these cassava 
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products has created reluctance among industrial end-users to replace their current inputs. 
Many processors are also unable to meet the quality standards of industrial end-users, leading 
to rejections. Thus, high rejection rates and low confidence in processors’ ability to supply 
the required volumes has led to low demand for cassava products by industrial end-users. As 
a result, a vicious cycle is created because processors in turn do not have sufficient demand to 
consistently buy cassava from farmers.  
2.6.3   Lack of innovative firm strategy, structure and rivalry 
Potential end-users of cassava products such as the pharmaceutical and textile industries in 
Ghana appear to lack initiative in developing cassava products suitable for their production 
processes. Locally produced medical-grade starch and ethanol for instance could replace 
imports of these products for pharmaceutical companies. The results of the study indicate that 
this is a task that has been left to public research institutions which are solely dependent on 
donor funds as evidenced by the networks of knowledge and fund flows (Figures 2.3 and 
2.4). The Food Research Institute, for example, has been instrumental in the development and 
application of HQCF, a major intermediate product, in Ghana (see Dziedzoave et al., 2006; 
Dziedzoave et al., 2003). In some industries, there is still a low level of awareness of the 
potential of cassava products to substitute imported goods. However in industries where there 
is awareness, most end-users are unwilling to commit resources to develop the needed supply 
chain in terms of ensuring that requirements of supply volumes, quality standards and 
competitive pricing are met. There might also be additional costs associated with switching 
inputs such as installing new equipment. Moreover, it must be noted that cassava products are 
not always cheap enough to warrant producers switching from imported alternatives. Koyama 
et al. (2015) found that biscuit companies in Ghana rely on wheat flour imports from Turkey 
which is cheaper than HQCF. Abass et al. (2011) reported a similar situation in Nigeria. 
2.6.4   Inaccessible related and supporting industries 
The primary crop breeding institutions in Ghana, CRI and SARI, as well as the public 
universities have been effective in developing improved cassava cultivars. However, uptake 
among farmers has remained relatively low. Alene et al. (2015) found that the area planted to 
improved cassava varieties in Ghana only increased from 25% in 1998 to 36% in 2009. The 
study found that the limited number of agricultural extension agents to promote these 
technologies has been a contributing factor to the low adoption rate. The poor coverage and 
low extension-farmer ratio have primarily been caused by staff attrition and a lack of 
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replacements and recruitments by MoFA. This is in line with a freeze on public sector hiring 
in an attempt to reduce the government wage bill.   
Access to formal sources of financing for farmers and processors also remains a critical 
challenge in Ghana as confirmed by studies by Acheampong et al. (2017) and Essegbey 
(2009). Banks and microfinance institutions offer high interest rates of between 18-25% per 
year for loans and credit facilities, making them inaccessible to most enterprises. The 
network analysis confirms the weak interaction between financial institutions and the cassava 
sub-sector. For instance, Figure 2.3 shows that banks and microfinance institutions do not 
have direct interaction with farmers and micro-processors. Similarly, medium and large scale 
processors tend to struggle to compete with the price of imported goods due to these high 
costs of finance. Available value addition technologies are also underutilised by processors 
because of financial constraints. Furthermore, persistent challenges with state supplied 
electricity have compelled processors to invest in alternative sources of power generation like 
generators to stay in business. This has led to higher operating costs and a significant 
downturn in operations.  
These institutional challenges have inhibited the role these supporting institutions are 
supposed to play in facilitating much needed investments in ‘factor upgrading’ in cassava 
production and processing in Ghana. 
2.6.5   Missing government policies 
Cassava does not have a specific sub-sectorial policy like cocoa (see Poku, 2017). This 
invariably means government support tends to focus on specific aspects of the sub-sector 
rather than taking a more holistic approach. The study confirms that government policies 
supporting the development of the cassava sub-sector in Ghana thus far have mainly focused 
on improving productivity and food security. There has been less emphasis on 
commercialisation and industrial development. This is evidenced by the study’s finding of the 
lack of a direct institutional linkage between government agencies and industrial end-users 
(Figures 2.4 and 2.5). Koyama et al. (2015) point out that based on the success of Thailand 
and Vietnam, African countries must recognise the important role of government policies in 
stimulating demand and sustained market opportunities both locally and internationally for 
high value cassava products. Correspondingly, the study’s findings indicate that unsuccessful 
initiatives such as the PSI on cassava starch and the absence of legislation such as a 
composite flour policy or a biofuel blend policy have been major contributing factors to the 
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unrealised industrial potential of cassava in Ghana thus far. In this regard, companies with 
strong political connections might also have entrenched interests in maintaining the status 
quo of a system fully dependent on certain imports.   
Overall, the study’s findings show that a conducive policy and institutional environment are 
critical to realising the untapped potential of cassava and developing a competitive value web 
in Ghana.  
2.7   Conclusions 
In this paper, the policy and institutional environment required for developing a competitive 
and sustainable bioeconomy in Africa were analysed using the novel concept of biomass-
based value webs. Cassava in Ghana was used for an empirical case study. The analysis, 
which was based on a combination of social network analysis and content analysis of expert 
interviews, revealed the challenges and opportunities of developing a competitive cassava 
value web in Ghana. 
The findings indicate that overcoming the challenges of low farm productivity, low utilisation 
of cassava biomass by processors and low demand by industrial end-users hinges on 
improved coordination between value web actors. Outgrower or contract farming models can 
serve as an effective means of strengthening these institutional linkages. Supporting 
institutions such as financial institutions and public extension services also have critical roles 
to play in strengthening fund flows, knowledge transfer and business linkages between actors. 
Furthermore, government policies that actively support the use of local content across 
industries would incentivise end-users to adopt cassava products and thus give processors the 
assurance of a ready market for their products. This will incentivise increased farm 
productivity. 
The study concludes that there are important complementary roles that need to be played by a 
diverse set of institutions within an enabling environment in order to realise competitive 
biomass production and utilisation in Africa’s emerging bioeconomy.  
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Abstract   
This paper uniquely focuses on rapidly-developing domestic value chains in Africa’s 
emerging bioeconomy. It uses a comparative case study approach of a public and private 
cassava outgrower scheme in Ghana to investigate which contract farming arrangements are 
sustainable for both farmers and agribusiness firms. A complementary combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods is employed to assess the sustainability of these 
institutional arrangements. The results indicate that ad hoc or opportunistic investments that 
only address smallholders’ marketing challenges are not sufficient to ensure mutually 
beneficial and sustainable schemes. The results suggest that firms’ capacity and commitment 
to design contracts with embedded support services for outgrowers is essential to smallholder 
participation and the long-term viability of these arrangements. Public-private partnerships in 
outgrower schemes can present a viable option that harnesses the strengths of both sectors 
and overcomes their institutional weaknesses.  
Keywords: Contract farming; Contract design; Cassava; Bioeconomy; Ghana 
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3.1   Introduction        
Rapid agro-industrialisation in sub-Saharan Africa is leading to the development of high-
value supply chains for agro-food systems (Henson & Reardon, 2005). Additionally, there is 
increasing demand for feed and other biomass-based raw materials such as fuel and fibre 
crops in Africa’s emerging bioeconomy (Timilsina et al., 2012). This has meant a transition 
towards modernised procurement systems even for agricultural commodities that have 
traditionally been dominated by spot market exchanges between small scale farmers and 
traders (Reardon & Barrett, 2000). Consequently, contract farming (CF)— the institutional 
arrangement wherein processors enter into formal or informal contractual agreements with 
farmers to produce and supply them with agricultural commodities— has increasingly been 
embraced by agribusiness firms in developing countries as an efficient approach for 
coordinating supply chain activities (Schipmann & Qaim, 2011; Barrett et al., 2012; 
Bellemare, 2012; Saenger et al., 2013).     
CF, however, remains a highly contested institutional arrangement in terms of poverty 
alleviation and rural development. Empirical evidence from developing countries on 
smallholder participation in CF and its impact presents mixed results. Some studies have 
found that smallholders actively participate in CF schemes and earn higher income as a 
result. These farmers were found to have benefitted from better access to inputs and new 
technology leading to improved farm productivity (Warning & Key, 2002; Minten et al., 
2009; Rao & Qaim, 2011; Barrett et al., 2012; Bellemare, 2012). Conversely, other studies 
have reported evidence of smallholder exclusion, high default rates and various forms of 
opportunistic behaviour by firms such as delayed payments and a lack of compensation for 
crop losses in CF schemes (Key & Runsten, 1999; Singh, 2002; Simmons et al., 2005). These 
divergent findings shed light on how essential contract design is to the performance and 
impacts of CF schemes. However, there is a paucity of studies, particularly in the African 
context, examining which institutional arrangements and contract conditions are sustainable 
for both farmers and agribusiness firms in these schemes. Addressing this knowledge gap is 
even more pertinent considering the increased competition for the procurement of multi-
purpose crop biomass in rapidly developing domestic agricultural value chains. Such 
domestic value chains have previously been considered as less than suitable for CF 
arrangements (see TechnoServe & IFAD, 2011). Therefore, in the wake of numerous failed 
contract farming arrangements in Africa (Oya, 2012), this paper empirically investigates the 
role of contract design in facilitating sustainable contract farming arrangements between 
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farmers and agribusinesses, particularly for a staple crop. The study does not directly address 
the impacts of CF, but rather focuses on investigating which CF arrangements are sustainable 
for both farmers and agribusiness firms. Sustainability in this context refers to the long-term 
viability of CF arrangements for all the actors involved. The paper uses the empirical 
example of two cassava outgrower schemes (state operated and private operated) in Ghana. 
Cassava is a major staple crop in Ghana which has the advantage of being able to produce 
economic yields even under marginal production conditions. Cassava accounts for 
approximately 50% of all root and tuber production in the country and is second only to 
maize in terms of area planted (MoFA, 2015). It is, therefore, considered as a primary food 
security crop. This has made it a preferred crop among small-scale, resource-poor farmers 
(Polson & Spencer, 1991). Cassava is an annual crop that is mainly consumed in the form of 
cooked fresh roots and domestically processed products traded on the open market. However, 
it is slowly shedding its image as a “poor man’s crop” and overcoming its seasonal marketing 
challenges due to the economic potential and increasing industrial applications of cassava 
biomass for food, feed, and energy (Kleih et al., 2013). Therefore, there has been increasing 
commercial use of the crop due to rising urban demand for processed cassava products and 
increased recognition of its industrial potential in the emerging bioeconomy (Koyama et al., 
2015). This has led to the emergence of medium and large scale processors using various 
contractual arrangements to source cassava from farmers. Cassava roots are not as perishable 
as fruits and vegetables, which need to be harvested at a specific time to avoid losses. The 
roots can remain unharvested for some time after maturity. However, unlike grains that can 
be stored after harvest, cassava roots must be processed or consumed shortly after harvesting. 
Cassava roots begin to deteriorate within 24 to 36 hours after harvest (Iyer et al., 2010). This 
necessitates efficient procurement systems. 
CF in Ghana thus far has been dominated by a range of public and private large scale 
production arrangements of horticultural and tree crops mainly for export (Baumann, 2000; 
Amevenku et al., 2012). Many of these arrangements have been characterised by contract 
conditions that allow agribusiness firms to maximise their short term returns at the cost of the 
long term sustainability of the schemes. They therefore only operate for a few years before 
collapsing (see Harou & Walker, 2010). This study uniquely highlights the role CF is playing 
in strengthening the link between biomass production and utilisation as the agricultural sector 
in sub-Saharan Africa gradually transitions from a food-supplying to a biomass-supplying 
sector. Therefore, smallholders growing traditional staple crops are increasingly presented 
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with the opportunity of participating in CF schemes for the first time. Poorly designed 
contracts may however expose farmers to additional risks and exploitation by larger 
agricultural actors. These contractual arrangements have hardly been analysed in the 
literature.  
A complementary combination of qualitative and quantitative methods is employed to assess 
the sustainability of these institutional arrangements. First, in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions are used to elucidate the contract design features of the schemes as well as 
both the firms’ objectives and constraints, and farmers’ perceptions of these features. Second, 
probit analysis based on primary survey data is used to determine the contract design features 
that influence farmers’ decision to participate in each scheme. The paper draws on this 
comparative case study analysis to examine forms of CF that will promote the long term 
sustainability of viable firm-farmer contract arrangements. The study demonstrates that ad 
hoc or opportunistic investments that only address smallholders’ marketing challenges are not 
sufficient to ensure mutually beneficial and sustainable CF schemes in fast developing 
domestic value chains. There is the need for direct firm investment in supporting outgrower 
operations. Therefore, even for a staple crop like cassava that does not traditionally have an 
intense cultivation pattern, embedded support services such as input supply and technical 
assistance are critical to smallholder participation and the long term success of outgrower 
schemes. Public-private partnerships may be the best avenue to sustainably providing these 
conditions.  
The rest of the paper is organised into four sections: Section 3.2 briefly highlights prevalent 
contract design features of CF in developing countries. The data collection and analytical 
approach used in the study are described in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 the empirical results 
are presented. Section 3.5 discusses the empirical findings and Section 3.6 provides the 
conclusion.  
3.2   Firm-farmer contract relations 
The relationship between the agribusiness firm and the farmer in contract production can be 
conceptualised as a four stage process (Barrett et al., 2012). A firm first chooses a 
procurement location; offers farmers a contract; farmers decide whether or not to accept the 
offered contract; finally both the firm and farmers choose whether or not to honour the terms 
of the contract based on how equitable and sustainable the established relationship is for both 
parties. Agricultural contracts essentially differ based on their intent to transfer decision-
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rights and risks between the farmer and the contractor. Mighell and Jones, (1963) distinguish 
between three types of such contracts: Market specification contracts where there is a pre-
production agreement by both parties on the conditions governing future sale of the produce; 
resource providing contracts where in conjunction with marketing arrangements the buyer 
supplies the farmer with key inputs; production management contracts where the farmer 
additionally agrees to adhere to precise production methods and input regimes. Most 
contemporary agricultural contracts incorporate various elements of these contract typologies 
(Hueth et al., 2007). This invariably implies trade-offs in terms of coordination, motivation 
and the transaction costs associated with the design of contractual arrangements        
(Bogetoft & Olesen, 2002). The following sections abstract prevalent contract design features 
that govern crop production in developing countries.  
3.2.1   Output arrangement 
The nature of a CF arrangement is central in assuring farmers of a marketing outlet and firms 
of the supply of essential raw materials. Contracts can either take the form of an informal oral 
agreement or a formal written agreement. Written contracts provide superior enforcement 
possibilities and typically specify pricing, roles and responsibilities, quality and quantity 
requirements, and conflict resolution mechanisms (Barrett et al., 2012). However, most CF 
arrangements in developing countries remain as simple verbal agreements predicated on 
social capital such as reputation and relationship-specific incentives (Bijman, 2008). Such 
informal arrangements are less costly for agribusiness firms and provide both parties with the 
option to opt-out of the arrangement. Some case studies have found that such self-enforcing 
agreements can work effectively (Key & Runsten, 1999; Masakure & Henson, 2005; Guo et 
al., 2007). However, there remains insufficient evidence on smallholders’ preference for 
either oral or written agreements. 
Another key aspect of CF arrangements is the pricing mechanism which is meant to insure 
farmers against the uncertainty of spot market price volatility. The pricing alternatives used in 
CF range from fixed pricing, variable or incentive based pricing to formula pricing (see 
Alexander et al., 2007; Miyata et al., 2009). Empirical evidence from several studies reveals 
the common use of fixed contract prices in developing countries (see Warning & Key, 2002; 
Minten et al., 2009). Therefore, firms tend to bear the marketing risk while smallholders bear 
the production risk. Farmers effectively accept to pay a risk premium in the event that spot 
market prices rise above the contract price. Nonetheless, this pricing option generally 
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increases the firm’s risk exposure. Agribusiness firms can however employ risk management 
strategies that are not available to smallholders. This gives them a higher risk tolerance to 
market price fluctuations (Guo & Jolly, 2008). An important and yet often overlooked aspect 
of pricing arrangements is the extent to which farmers find the actual price determination 
mechanism equitable. 
3.2.2   Quality standards 
Agribusiness firms’ quality requirements are a major motivating factor for CF (Eaton & 
Shepherd, 2001). Contractual arrangements typically include either pre-specified minimum 
quality standards (see Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Berdegué et al., 2005) or variable quality 
standards for farmers’ produce (see Miyata et al., 2009).  Minimum quality standards may be 
suited to firms targeting single supply channels while variable quality levels may be 
appropriate for firms with different marketing outlets. From the farmers’ perspective, 
minimum quality standards offer little incentive for improving quality, although there is a 
higher risk of complete rejection of produce. Variable quality standards on the other hand 
expose farmers to potential quality measurement error or bias (Abebe et al., 2013). Indeed, 
contractors may be tempted to falsify quality testing in order to reduce the price paid to 
farmers (Minot & Ronchi, 2014). Beyond price differentiation based on quality, current case 
study evidence on contract farming does not provide much insight into the influence the 
credibility of quality verification procedures has on farmer participation, particularly for crop 
production.  
3.2.3   Input arrangement 
The interlinkage of input and output markets is a fundamental element of CF in developing 
countries (Dorward et al., 1998). Smallholders often have limited access to inputs and 
technical assistance as input markets are not well developed and the state tends to lack the 
capacity to adequately provide these services (Little & Watts, 1994; Bijman, 2008). Contracts 
regularly include seasonal inputs provided on credit and technical assistance to smallholders 
(see Key & Runsten, 1999; Winters et al., 2005; Barrett et al., 2012). Such interlocking 
contracts confer lending advantages on agribusiness firms through monitoring of input use 
and control over crop management decisions that might jeopardise farmers’ output quality or 
input repayment (Simmons et al., 2005). As a staple crop widely grown with low input use in 
sub-Saharan Africa, it is unclear whether input provision will effectively incentivise contract 
production of cassava among smallholders. 
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3.2.4   Contract enforcement  
Conflicts between agribusiness firms and farmers in CF arrangements often arise due to 
misunderstandings related to the operational aspects of agreements and contract non-
compliance (Glover & Kusterer, 1990; Grosh, 1994). Beyond firm-farmer dialogue or third 
party mediation of disputes, the main contract enforcement mechanism at the disposal of 
agribusiness firms in the case of oral arrangements is the termination or non-renewal of the 
contract with non-compliant farmers (see Warning & Key, 2002). Written contacts present 
both parties with the additional option of sanctions such as legal redress for contract breach. 
However, in developing countries legal institutions are often absent or ineffective in ensuring 
contract enforcement (Gow et al., 2000; Bellemare, 2010). In any case, smallholders typically 
lack the capacity to pursue legal action against firms. Even so, there is deficient empirical 
evidence on the extent to which farmers consider the means of contract enforcement in 
deciding whether to participate in CF. 
The study aims to contribute to the CF literature by investigating which combination of 
output and input arrangements, quality standards and contract enforcement mechanisms are 
attractive and sustainable for both farmers and agribusiness firms. Farmers’ evaluation of the 
contract design features that govern CF arrangements as revealed by their participation 
decision is an integral aspect of this empirical analysis.       
3.3   Data and methods 
This section presents a description of the data collection methods, followed by the method of 
analysis and profile of the outgrower schemes.  
3.3.1   Data collection 
At the time of data collection for this paper, five cassava outgrower schemes were identified 
throughout Ghana. The schemes ranged from informal oral arrangements to different forms 
of written agreements. The schemes studied in this paper are the two largest cassava 
outgrower schemes in Ghana. The first scheme is operated by a state owned agro-processing 
firm located in the Awutu Senya district of the Central region while the second scheme is run 
by a private agribusiness firm located in the Ho Municipal district of the Volta region (see 
Figure 3.1). Data collection was done in three stages for each scheme from July 2015 to 
December 2015, starting with the state-run scheme and subsequently with the privately 
operated scheme. First, in-depth interviews were conducted with government officials, 
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management personnel and staff of the two selected processing companies, some of their off-
takers as well as with ten purposively sampled outgrowers in each scheme who have supplied 
the companies from the inception of the schemes. This was to fully understand how the 
schemes operate and how they may have evolved overtime.  
Secondly, two focus group discussions were carried out for each scheme. The first set was 
done with ten purposively selected outgrowers (five males and five females) of each scheme 
identified from the companies’ supply ledgers for 2015.3 In both cases this was followed by 
focus group discussions with ten non-participating smallholder farmers from the same 
communities as the outgrowers. These focus groups also had the same gender profile of five 
males and five females each. Some of these farmers had previously taken part in the schemes 
and opted out. This was to gain contextual insight into farmers’ understanding and 
experiences in the schemes. Specifically, the groups were asked to elaborate on their 
evaluation of the output and input arrangements, quality standards and contract enforcement 
mechanisms of the schemes. All the interviews and focus group discussions were audio 
recorded with the expressed permission of the respondents. The qualitative data collection 
methods of the study are summarised in Table 3.1. 
In the final stage, a pre-tested questionnaire designed on the basis of the first two stages of 
data collection was administered to a total of 315 famers using a multistage sampling process. 
For the state-led outgrower scheme, the supply ledger for 2015 was used to identify the four 
highest supplying communities. Proportional random sampling based on supply was used to 
select 100 outgrowers from these communities to participate in the survey. Fifty (50) non-
participating cassava growing farmers were similarly sampled from these communities from 
lists provided by community leaders. Subsequently, for the privately-run outgrower scheme, 
the supply ledger for 2015 revealed 65 active outgrowers all of whom were selected for the 
survey. These outgrowers were distributed across five communities. Twenty (20) non-
participating farmers growing cassava were randomly sampled from each of these 
communities from lists provided by community heads.4 Non-participant farmers had a high 
level of awareness and understanding of the contract terms and conditions of both schemes. 
This was due to extensive community outreach by the firms and farmers’ interaction with 
outgrowers. Furthermore, some of the sampled non-participant farmers had previously been 
                                                          
3 This refers to the period from January 2015 to September 2015 when the focus group discussions were 
conducted. 
 
4 All sampled farmers also met the firm’s criteria of having a minimum of 2 acres of farmland. 
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outgrowers of the schemes. Overall, 70% of the farmers who participated in the survey had 
landholdings of 5 acres or less. The questionnaire collected a wide range of information on 
respondents’ socio-economic characteristics as well as their experiences and perceptions of 
the contractual details of the schemes. The interviewers overtly presented themselves as 
researchers with no affiliation to either agribusiness firm. Neither firm was involved in the 
selection process of the respondents. All responses were kept confidential.  
3.3.2   Method of analysis 
The study employs the probit model to analyse the survey data. The model is used to estimate 
the factors that influence a given farmer’s decision to participate in the outgrower scheme in 
each case. Considering the discrete nature of a farmer’s decision of whether or not to 
participate in CF arrangements, binary choice models such as the probit and logit models are 
most suitable (Scott & Freese, 2006). In most applications, the choice between the probit and 
logit models does not make much difference. However, the probit model was selected for this 
study because it can account for non-constant error variances in more advanced econometric 
settings (Greene & William, 2007). 
Consistent with the objectives of the study, a separate probit model was estimated for each 
outgrower scheme to account for the different production and marketing arrangements in the 
respective study areas. The regressors include socio-economic characteristics such as gender, 
education, farming experience, farm size and off-farm employment, having tested for the 
possibility of other socio-economic explanatory factors. Additionally, the importance of the 
contract design features to farmers’ participation decision is included in the models as 
dummy variables. Specifically, farmers were asked whether particular contract design 
features were important in their participation decision (dummy takes a value of 1) or not 
(dummy takes a value of 0). This approach was used to validate the qualitative information 
collected on farmer perceptions. 
The probit model is expressed as: 
                                                Yi = Xii + i                                                                   (1) 
where Yi is the dependent variable (a farmer’s decision of whether or not to participate), Xi is 
the vector of explanatory variables that influence a farmer’s decision of whether or not to 
participate in the outgrower scheme, i is the coefficients of the explanatory variables, and i 
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is the error term capturing all unmeasurable effects that influence a farmer’s participation 
decision. Specifically, the empirical probit model is specified as follows:   
 
Yi = 0 + 1NoC + 2PA + 3PS + 4PQ + 5Inputs + 6Assist + 7Delivery + 8Conflict 
 + 9Sanct + 10Edu + 11Gend + 12FarmExp + 13FarmSize + 14OffFarm + i                (2) 
where NoC denotes the nature of the contract for outgrowers, PA signifies the pricing 
arrangement, PS represents the payment system, PQ denotes the product quality specification, 
Inputs represents the input supply arrangement, Assist denotes the technical assistance 
arrangement, Delivery represents the crop delivery arrangement, Conflict denotes the conflict 
resolution procedure of the arrangement and Sanct signifies the sanctions to be meted out 
breach of contract. The a priori assumptions of these variables in the context of smallholder 
farming, such as cassava production in Ghana, have been addressed in Section 3.2. 
In terms of the socioeconomic variables in the empirical model, Edu denotes the number of 
years of education of the farmer. It is expected that the likelihood of participation in contract 
farming increases with more years of education due to a better understanding of the contract 
terms, as well as the benefits of contract farming. Gend represents the gender of the farmer. 
Cassava production in Ghana is a male-dominated activity (Kleih et al., 2013). A major 
contributing factor to this social dynamic is the fact that women are disadvantaged in terms of 
access to productive resources, such as farmland. Therefore, it is expected that male farmers 
are more likely to participate in cassava contract farming. FarmExp denotes farming 
experience. A farmer may become more or less averse to the risks of contract farming based 
on the amount of farming experience. Thus, this variable can either have a positive or 
negative effect on a farmer’s participation decision. FarmSize represents the total farm size of 
a farmer. As larger farm sizes are an indicator of wealth and influence, it is expected that 
farmers with larger farm sizes will be more likely to participate in contract farming. OffFarm 
denotes off-farm employment. A farmer with off-farm employment has a diversified risk 
portfolio with multiple income streams. Therefore, the expectation is that a farmer with off-
farm employment will be more likely to participate in contract farming.  
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                            Public Scheme                                                       Private Scheme 
Figure 3.1: Locations of case study outgrower schemes in Ghana 
Source: Ghana Districts Repository 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of qualitative data collection 
Method Public Scheme Private Scheme 
In-depth interviews (with stakeholders) 
  Company management & staff 7 8 
Government officials 5 2 
Breweries 1 1 
Food processing companies - 2 
Bakeries - 1 
Plywood manufacturing companies - 3 
Outgrowers 10 10 
   Focus Group Discussions (with farmers) 2 2 
 
 
64 
 
3.3.3   Profile of the schemes 
The state owned agro-processing firm being studied was commissioned in 2003 as part of a 
Presidential Special Initiative (PSI) aimed at developing industrial cassava starch production 
for both the domestic and international market and by so doing also better the socioeconomic 
conditions of smallholders in the area. However, the firm was plagued with high operational 
costs and technological challenges which culminated in it temporarily shutting down on two 
occasions. This necessitated a more focused and sustainable operational strategy. In 2012, the 
firm signed an exclusive supply agreement with Guinness Ghana Breweries Limited (GGBL) 
to supply food-grade starch from cassava. The brewery uses the starch to produce one of its 
brands of beer for the domestic market. This is in line with an excise tax break announced by 
the government in 2012 for local content beers. The Customs and Excise Act 855 is an excise 
duty concession on a sliding scale for breweries using greater than 30 per cent local raw 
materials for the manufacture of excisable goods. The state firm sources half of its feedstock 
from its firm-managed farm and the other half from about 400 outgrowers. These outgrowers 
are all members of a farmers’ association that represents their interests when dealing with the 
firm. There is a verbal agreement in place between the firm and its outgrowers based on trust 
and understanding. The outgrowers do not receive support from the firm in the form of 
technical assistance, credit or inputs. Supplied cassava roots must meet the firm’s set quality 
standards to be accepted.  The firm generates additional revenue from selling the by-products 
(the cassava peels and pulp) from the starch production process to local piggeries as feed.     
The privately owned agribusiness firm was established in 2006. The firm produces high 
quality cassava flour (HQCF) and industrial grade flour which is sold to Accra Breweries 
Limited (a local subsidiary of SABMiller Plc), food processing companies, bakeries and 
domestic plywood manufacturing companies. There were also advanced plans for the firm to 
commence bio-ethanol and biogas production from cassava biomass at the time of data 
collection for the study. The firm sources approximately 70 per cent of its feedstock from its 
firm-managed farm and 30 per cent from outgrowers. At the time of the survey there were 65 
outgrowers. The outgrowers are all members of a representative farmers’ association. There 
is a standard seasonal written contract between the firm and each of its outgrowers. The firm 
provides technical assistance and optional inputs in measured quantities to the outgrowers. 
The cost of inputs provided is deducted from the value of the delivered cassava roots with no 
interest. The cassava roots must be a healthy approved variety to be accepted. The firm also 
sells the cassava peels and pulp from its production process as animal feed. The main design 
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features of both outgrower schemes are summarised in Table 3.2. Both agro-processing firms 
are located in areas where cassava is the predominant crop grown and the spot market is the 
only other marketing channel for farmers’ produce.  
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        Table 3.2: Salient outgrower scheme design features for case study firms 
Scheme design features Public firm* Private firm** 
Output Arrangement   
Nature of the contract Oral contract communicated through the 
outgrower farmers’ association 
Written contract with individual outgrowers 
Farmer selection criteria No selection criteria A minimum of 2 acres of farmland contingent on farm 
inspection by the firm 
Contract duration Optional seasonal arrangement Binding seasonal arrangement 
Supply quota No specified quantity of produce to be supplied No specified quantity of produce to be supplied 
Outgrower quota Unrestricted number of outgrowers Maximum of 100 outgrowers 
Pricing arrangement Fixed seasonal price per ton whereby the amount 
paid is determined by a weighing bridge 
Fixed seasonal price per ton whereby the amount paid is 
determined by the number of delivered tractor trailer loads  
Payment procedure Weekly invoice payment system for delivered 
produce 
Cash payments upon delivery of produce  
Quality Standards   
Product quality specification 
and verification 
A minimum of 15% starch content of a 
recommended variety verified through laboratory 
testing of samples prior to delivery 
Healthy appearance of an approved variety verified by 
physical inspection of produce upon delivery 
Input Arrangement   
Input supply arrangement  No input supply arrangement  Supply of free planting material and agro-chemicals in 
measured quantities, the cost of which is deducted from 
final payment 
Technical assistance  No technical assistance  Technical assistance is provided  
Crop delivery arrangement  Specified delivery date without firm-provided 
transportation services  
Transportation of the produce from farm to factory by the 
firm 
Contract Enforcement   
Conflict resolution 
procedure  
No established conflict resolution procedure  Mediation between farmer association executives and the 
firm 
Sanctions  No sanctions Fines and Legal action 
     *   Based on firm and outgrower interviews, and direct observation 
     ** Based on written contract agreements, firm and outgrower interviews, and direct observation 
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3.4   Results 
This section begins with descriptive analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of the 
sampled farmers as well as an account of the contract design features in both schemes from 
the survey carried out. This is followed by an analysis of the firms’ motivations for scheme 
design features based on the in-depth interviews with staff of the firms. Finally, the results of 
the probit analysis of the determinants of participation in the schemes are presented.    
3.4.1   Descriptive analysis 
3.4.1.1   Socio-economic characteristics 
A comparison of the sampled groups of participating and non-participating farmers in both 
outgrower schemes is presented in Table 3.3. In the state-run outgrower scheme, both groups 
exhibited similar individual and household level characteristics in terms of age, household 
size, farming experience, land ownership and off-farm employment. However, outgrowers 
were found to have significantly higher levels of education on average. Although both groups 
were male dominated which reflected the gender profile of the scheme and cassava 
production in the area, there was a significantly larger number of males among the sampled 
outgrowers. With regards to income, there was not a significant statistical difference between 
the two groups. Outgrowers reportedly earned 18% higher total farm income compared to 
non-participating farmers for the year under consideration. Similarly, outgrowers earned 37% 
more non-farm income than non-participating farmers. With regard to the production 
characteristics, farmland showed the only significant difference between the two groups. 
Outgrowers had an average farmland size of almost 6 acres which was double that of non-
participating farmers. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 3.3, non-participating farmers had 
a higher average gross margin per acre for cassava production than outgrowers in the state-
run scheme. However there was not a significant statistical difference between the two 
groups’ gross margins. The gross margin per acre for cassava production is calculated by 
subtracting total variable costs per acre (wage labour and agro-chemical costs) from the 
revenue per acre obtained for cassava production.    
In the privately operated scheme, there was not a significant difference between the two 
groups in terms of average age, household size, farming experience, land ownership and off-
farm employment. Outgrowers were however significantly more educated than the non-
participating farmers. There were also significantly more males participating in the scheme 
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than among non-participating farmers. Outgrowers notably earned 50% higher total annual 
farm income than non-participating farmers. Non-participating farmers on the other hand 
earned marginally higher non-farm income, but the difference was not statistically 
significant. In terms of the production characteristics, outgrowers had an average of 6 acres of 
farmland whiles non-participating farmers had an average of 4 acres of farmland. Outgrowers 
were also found to have significantly higher yield for cassava production. As shown in Table 
3.3, outgrowers in the private scheme had a higher gross margin per acre for cassava 
production than non-participating farmers. The difference was statistically significant. 
It must be noted that the difference in the average set of prices between the two case study 
areas, as shown in Table 3.3, reflects the fact that the state scheme is located in a peri-urban 
area with a relatively higher cost of living. The private scheme on the other hand is located in 
a rural area with a lower cost of living. The Ghana Statistical Service (2014) provides a 
source of reference for the cost of living across Ghana. 
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Table 3.3: Socio-economic characteristics of sample farmers 
Variables 
Public Firm Private Firm 
Participant 
farmers (n=100) 
Non-participant 
farmers (n=50) 
Equality test 
Participant 
farmers (n=65) 
Non-participant 
farmers (n=100) 
Equality test 
Individual Characteristics  
Age (years) 44.05 (11.52) 43.94 (10.29) 0.06 49.85 (11.78) 47.47 (12.05) 1.25 
Household size (persons) 5.58 (2.39) 5.52 (2.18) 0.15 5.65 (1.80) 5.12 (2.50) 1.47 
Educational level (years) 8.4 (3.30) 6.56 (4.27) 2.91*** 9.14 (2.94) 7.45 (3.73) 3.08*** 
Gender (% of males) 78 60 2.31** 78 62 2.22** 
Farming experience (years) 18.71 (11.92) 19.03 (11.18) 0.16 21.26 (13.02) 20.99 (11.43) 0.14 
Land ownership                 
(% of owners) 
21 32 1.47 71 78 1.05 
Off farm employment       
(% yes) 
53 50 0.35 62 52 1.21 
Farm income                 
(GH¢ ’000) 
7.22a (13.40) 5.92a (13.64) 0.55 8.22a (17.51) 4.15a (4.65) 2.21** 
Non-farm income          
(GH¢ ’000) 
2.30a (4.55) 1.46a (2.39) 1.22 2.05a (2.41) 2.40a (5.77) 0.46 
Production Characteristics  
Farm size (ac.) 5.67b (6.23) 3.05b (2.92) 2.83*** 6.18b (3.20) 4.28b (3.22) 3.70*** 
Distance to market (km) 1.89 (1.87) 2.46 (2.35) 1.62 2.91 (1.75) 2.86 (1.89) 0.19 
Family Labour 
(mandays/ac) 
3.37 (7.86) 4.14 (9.86) 0.52 0.75 (3.35) 0.98 (4.11) 0.38 
Wage Labour (mandays/ac) 26.46 (27.76) 25.47 (32.38) 0.19 33.25 (35.98) 26.69 (28.53) 1.30 
Cassava yield (ton/ac) 5.20 (3.11) 5.72 (2.11) 1.05 8.40 (1.53) 5.62 (1.97) 9.63*** 
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Table 3.3 (continued): Socio-economic characteristics of sample farmers  
 
Variables 
Public Firm Private Firm 
Participant 
farmers (n=100) 
Non-participant 
farmers (n=50) 
Equality test 
Participant 
farmers (n=65) 
Non-participant 
farmers (n=100) 
Equality test 
Gross Margins for cassava   
Price (GH¢/ton) 220 222  120 150  
Revenue (GH¢/ac) 1,144 1,269.84  1,008 843  
Wage Labour (GH¢/ac) 470.95 496.02  335.66 300.42  
Fertiliser (GH¢/ac) 14.60 10.27  9.61 10.25  
Herbicides (GH¢/ac) 20.23 18.58  48.93 8  
GROSS MARGINS 
(GH¢/ac) 
638.22 744.97 1.26 613.80 524.33 1.91** 
 
 
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level 
a Exchange rate October 2015: 4 GH¢/$. 
b Farm size is calculated as the sum of a farmer’s respective acreages in the event that he/she cultivates more than one plot. 
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3.4.1.2   Contract design features      
In the state outgrower scheme, the average number of years of participation was four years 
among sampled outgrowers (Table 3.4). Outgrowers confirmed that their arrangement with 
the state firm was based on verbal commitments with no written proof. More than half (56%) 
of the outgrowers of the public firm reported receiving their invoices to be cashed at the rural 
bank within two weeks after delivering their produce while 21% complained of delayed 
payments within a month of produce delivery. The firm has mainly attributed this problem to 
intermittent financial challenges caused by delays in purchases from their sole off-takers. A 
small number (6%) however reported receiving their invoices at the time of sale as delivery 
coincided with weekly disbursements during periods when the firm had sufficient cash flow. 
Figure 3.2 shows the contract price offered by the public firm as compared to the variable 
spot market prices non-participating farmers in the survey received for their cassava roots. In 
terms of quality standards, 19% of the sampled outgrowers reported some of their produce 
(from at least one of their farmlands) being rejected for not meeting the product quality 
specification. Seven per cent of the outgrowers reported having conflicts with the firm about 
opportunistic behavior stemming from delayed payments and a lack of trust in the quality 
verification system following rejection of some of their produce. One outgrower reported a 
violation of contract terms after the firm approved delivery of the produce but later reneged 
on the purchase, citing technical challenges and the unreliability of the farmer’s contact 
information to be accordingly notified. 
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N (non-participating farmers) = 50 
Figure 3.2: Contract price for state scheme and open market prices for cassava roots 
  
 
In the private outgrower scheme, the average number of years of farmer participation was 
three years (Table 3.4). All the outgrowers confirmed that they each had a generic signed 
written contract with the firm which outlined the terms and conditions of the arrangement. 
Almost all the farmers (90%) confirmed cash payment at the time of produce delivery. The 
rest received their money within a week of delivering their produce. This was mainly due to a 
large number of coinciding deliveries whereby the firm ran out of available cash for 
immediate payments. Most farmers received their payments in the days that followed. Figure 
3.3 shows that the contract price offered by the private firm was low as compared to the 
variable prices non-participating farmers in the survey received for their cassava roots on the 
open market. Only two outgrowers reported some of their produce being rejected mainly for 
being physically damaged. With regards to the input supply arrangement, majority of the 
outgrowers (94%) reported the use of firm-provided inputs. The standard supply of inputs 
includes 20 bundles of stem cuttings per acre (for free) and 0.75 pounds of acid equivalent of 
glyphosate per acre. Outgrowers also had the opportunity to access funds for farming 
activities as part of this arrangement. However, all outgrowers received technical assistance 
from the firm. This mostly entailed monthly visits from technical staff of the firm. Technical 
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assistance included guidance on better agronomic practices such as planting in rows. The 
valuation of farmers produce was a source of conflict for some of the outgrowers (9%). The 
outgrowers complained that the firm would deliberately overload tractor trailers with cassava 
roots when transporting their produce, knowing that the amount paid to farmers is contingent 
on the number of trailers rather than the weight of the produce. Three of the outgrowers also 
complained of the firm violating the terms of the contract by deducting amounts higher than 
the cost of firm-provided inputs from their final payments. The firm in these instances 
insisted the farmers had miscalculated the cost of the inputs they had been advanced.  
 
 
N (non-participating farmers) = 100 
Figure 3.3: Contract price for private scheme and open market prices for cassava roots 
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Table 3.4: Contract characteristics 
 
Public Firm Outgrowers Private Firm Outgrowers 
Participation (mean years) 3.83 2.63 
Output Arrangement 
  Nature of the contract  
  Oral/informal  100% - 
Written/formal  - 100% 
   Time of Payment 
  At the time of delivery 6% 90% 
Within 1 week of sale 17% 10% 
Within 2 weeks of sale 56% - 
Within one month of sale 21% - 
   
Quality Standards   
Rejection of any produce 19% 3% 
   
Input Arrangement 
  Use of firm inputs - 94% 
Technical assistance from firm - 100% 
Number of visits 
  Once per month - 94% 
Several times per month - 6% 
Once per season - - 
Other - - 
   
Contract Enforcement 
  Conflict with the firm 
  Opportunistic  behaviour 7% 9% 
Violating contract terms 1% 5% 
   Number of Observations 100 65 
 
3.4.2   Firm motivations for scheme design features  
In-depth interviews with the management personnel of both firms revealed that while the 
private firm made a profit in the year under consideration, the public firm registered losses in 
its operations. Insufficient supply of cassava roots from outgrowers to supplement the firm’s 
own cassava production was a major contributing factor to this underperformance. In this 
regard, analysis of the interviews with the firms also revealed their motivations for the 
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various design features of the schemes. This captured some of the key differences between 
the schemes as shown below. 
First, the fixed pricing arrangement of the public firm is set based on firm negotiations with 
the executives of the outgrower association and representatives of GGBL. The firm takes into 
account farmers’ cost of production, transportation cost and market price trends in the 
catchment area as well as the price for starch offered by GGBL. The fixed price increases the 
firm’s exposure to price risk but also allows for planned budgeting. The private agribusiness 
firm also uses a fixed pricing arrangement. However, because costs such as crop delivery and 
technical assistance are paid for by the firm, the seasonal price mainly reflects the market 
value of the firm’s main product. These motivations are reflected in the following quotations 
from the in-depth interviews:   
“We set the price with their [outgrowers] executives and Guinness, so they 
know what goes into it. Unlike the unstable price on the open market, this gives 
the farmers a sense of financial certainty and allows both of us to plan well. 
[…]. We use a weighing bridge to determine the tonnage supplied by the 
outgrowers so there is no error or misunderstanding.” (Production manager, 
Public firm) 
 
“We give the farmers a lot of support so the price we pay is mainly based on 
the going rate for the flour we sell, the HQCF. We look at our selling price and 
try to be reasonable with the farmers in the price we offer. […]. Each tractor 
trailer we use in transporting the roots weighs 2.5 tonnes with a full load. That 
is how we know the quantity they [outgrowers] supply.” (Production manager, 
Private firm) 
 
In terms of quality standards, the public firm’s minimum starch requirement of 15% has been 
set in line with the firm’s exclusive supply arrangement with GGBL. Accordingly, farmers 
who approach the firm with the intention of supplying cassava are given a list of 
recommended varieties to grow. These improved varieties are intended to give farmers the 
highest probability of meeting the quality specification. The private firm on the other hand 
sells to different markets with different quality requirements. As such, the firm accepts 
cassava roots of variable quality, provided outgrowers supply healthy roots of an improved 
variety. These reasons are expressed in the following statements:   
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“Previously we didn’t demand any specific variety. But Guinness demands a 
high level of quality. That is why we now have specific varieties we 
recommend. In fact, 15% is still on the low side for us. At least 20% would 
have been ideal but we also accept that that would be difficult for a lot of the 
farmers to meet.” (General manager, Public firm) 
 
“Because we have different uses for the cassava, once they [outgrowers] grow 
an improved variety we have supplied them with we accept it. The only thing 
we look out for is that the roots are healthy and not damaged.” (Production 
manager, Private firm) 
 
In reference to inputs, the public firm does not have a supply arrangement with outgrowers. 
This is mainly due to the resource constraints of the firm and the size of the outgrower 
scheme. The private firm on the other hand provides outgrowers with stem cuttings and 
herbicides to ensure high output of the raw material supply. These motivations are reflected 
in the following interview excerpts: 
“We can’t afford to supply inputs. They [outgrowers] are too many. And 
supplying them with fertiliser or herbicides also comes with responsibility of 
monitoring how they use them to make sure they don’t divert them, and we 
don’t have the manpower to do that.” (General manager, Public firm) 
 
“We want the outgrowers to treat cassava as a cash crop. So we supply them 
with planting material and chemicals. This way, they can get more money and 
we can get more roots from them. […]. We go round and make sure every 
farmer uses the chemicals correctly because it is an investment we are 
making.” (Outgrower coordinator, Private firm) 
 
Concerning contract enforcement, the public firm has not seen the need to establish a conflict 
resolution procedure or sanctions given the informal nature of the arrangement. Conversely, 
the private firm resorts to fines for input diversion and legal action against outgrowers for 
contract violations such as side-selling. The firm views this as the most effective means of 
discouraging contract breaches by farmers. These reasons are supported by the following 
statements:  
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“Our arrangement is simple and straightforward so there are no sanctions. 
There is also no conflict resolution process in place per se. […]. Well, 
sometimes farmers complain about delays in payment because they always 
want instant cash but they are aware that that is how our system works. And 
they always get their money.” 
(Production manager, Public firm)  
“If we catch them [outgrowers] diverting inputs they pay for it with interest 
which we [the firm] decide on. […]. We have caught some of them side-selling 
and we have terminated their contracts and taken them to court to pay us back. 
Since we started doing that side-selling has gone down.” (Outgrower 
coordinator, Private firm)       
 
Information on the evolution of the schemes provided by the firms was consistent with that of 
the outgrowers who were interviewed. The public company initially provided outgrowers 
with inputs, technical assistance and instant cash payments until it run into financial and 
technical difficulties. The public scheme has been running in its current form since the 
company’s supply agreement with GGBL in 2012. The contract arrangements under the 
private outgrower scheme on the other hand have not changed since its inception in 2006. 
These interviews provide insight into the significance of the probit model results for both 
schemes. 
Two separate models were estimated for the state and private outgrower schemes due to the 
difference in their marketing arrangements and management structures, as revealed by their 
contract designs. Thus, merging them in a pooled dataset would fail to provide robust 
findings of how independent variables affect the participation decision of farmers in the 
schemes. 
3.4.3   Empirical probit model estimates for the state outgrower scheme  
The estimates derived from the probit model for the state outgrower scheme are presented in 
Table 3.5. The results indicate the factors that either positively or negatively affected 
smallholder participation in the scheme. The oral contract with the firm increased the 
likelihood of farmer participation in the outgrower scheme. The state firm has been operating 
in the study area for an extended period of time and has had an outgrower scheme from its 
inception. According to information from the focus group discussion with outgrowers, 
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farmers have a high level of trust in the relationship based on the firm’s reputation and 
recurrent transactions.  
The pricing arrangement also increased the likelihood of participation. This arrangement 
insures risk-averse farmers against volatile spot market prices for cassava. The outgrowers’ 
farmer association enjoys significant bargaining power in negotiations to set the seasonal 
price as a satisfactory price is the firm’s only guarantee of outgrower participation. Beyond 
that, the firm provides an objective and acceptable means of valuing farmers’ produce 
through the use of a weighing bridge, leaving little margin for error.    
Conversely, the payment procedure decreased the likelihood of participation. The weekly 
invoice payment system often led to delays in payment. While there does not appear to be 
any risk of non-payment by the firm, inefficiency in the payment system has been a major 
source of dissatisfaction for outgrowers and a deterrent to smallholder participation. 
Additionally, the payment system which required farmers to receive their money through a 
bank increased their transaction cost.  
The fixed product quality specification of the state firm also decreased the likelihood of 
participation. The minimum starch requirement increased the risk of complete rejection of 
farmers’ produce due to information asymmetry as farmers have no means of knowing or 
verifying the starch content of their produce. 
The lack of an input supply arrangement and a transportation arrangement similarly 
decreased the likelihood of participation in the outgrower scheme. As a traditional staple 
crop, cassava is generally viewed by most farmers as a crop that does not require a lot of 
inputs. However, the firm provides farmers with a more reliable marketing outlet for large 
quantities of cassava than spot markets. This has provided an incentive for farmers to 
improve their productivity through the use of improved planting material and agro-chemicals. 
Furthermore, although transportation is factored into the seasonal price, farmers complained 
that access to reliable transport services for bulk delivery was hard to come by at affordable 
prices. 
The individual characteristics of farmers did not significantly influence the decision to 
participate in the scheme. The age variable was found to be highly correlated to the farming 
experience variable and was therefore omitted from the model estimation. The reliability of 
the model estimation was confirmed using the uncentred variance inflation factor (VIF) test. 
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The result showed a mean of 2.34 which indicated that there was not a problem of 
multicollinearity.  
 
Table 3.5: Factors influencing participation in the state outgrower scheme 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. Marginal Effect 
Oral contract 1.394*** 0.316 0.203 
Fixed pricing arrangement 0.969*** 0.359 0.136 
Weekly payment system -1.128*** 0.367 -0.171 
Fixed product quality specification -1.103*** 0.418 -0.164 
Lack of input supply -0.926*** 0.330 -0.139 
Lack of technical assistance -0.167 0.451 -0.039 
Lack of crop delivery arrangement -1.048*** 0.342 -0.143 
Lack of conflict resolution procedure -0.485 0.439 -0.062 
Education 0.040 0.039 0.012 
Gender 0.352 0.313 0.033 
Farming experience -0.010 0.015 -0.001 
Farm size 0.036 0.040 0.005 
Off-farm employment -0.392 0.348 -0.048 
Constant 0.398 0.572  
Observations 150   
Wald chi2 52.82***   
Log pseudolikelihood -40.93   
Pseudo R2 57.13%   
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level 
State scheme; VIF, uncentred, 2.34. 
 
3.4.4   Empirical probit model estimates for private outgrower scheme  
Table 3.6 reports the probit model estimates for the private outgrower scheme. The results 
show that the written contract with the firm increased the likelihood of farmer participation in 
the outgrower scheme. Indeed, as contractual arrangements become more complex 
particularly with input supply and specialised production practices, written contracts become 
more beneficial to both firms and farmers. Conversely, the pricing arrangement decreased the 
likelihood of farmer participation. Price negotiations between the firm and outgrower 
association appear to be a formality rather than a collaborative process as the firm seems to 
focus solely on its profit margin. Furthermore, the biased valuation of farmers’ produce using 
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the number of trailers delivered rather than a weighing system has been a source of 
contention between outgrowers and the firm. 
The system of on-the-spot cash payments used by the private firm increased the likelihood of 
farmer participation. Smallholders tend to prefer immediate cash payments following 
delivery of their produce to satisfy their current household consumption requirements. 
Similarly, firm-provided inputs and technical assistance at the various stages of production 
also increased the likelihood of farmer participation. Smallholders believed such support 
would help improve their productivity significantly. 
The private firm’s provision of crop delivery services gave outgrowers access to dependable 
transport services that is well synchronised with the firm’s demand for their produce. This 
increased the likelihood of smallholder participation as an important post-production feature 
of the scheme especially given the highly perishable nature of cassava. Conversely, sanctions 
meted out for contract violations in the form of fines and legal redress in the private 
outgrower scheme decreased the likelihood of farmer participation as farmers found these 
sanctions to be excessively harsh. 
Similar to the state outgrower scheme, it was found that individual farmer characteristics did 
not significantly influence the decision to participate in the outgrower scheme. Again, the age 
variable was also found to be highly correlated to the farming experience variable and was 
omitted from the estimation. There was no concern of multicollinearity in the model as 
implied by the mean uncentred VIF test result of 2.62.  
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Table 3.6: Factors influencing participation in the private outgrower scheme 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. Marginal Effect 
Written contract 0.597** 0.268 0.095 
Fixed pricing arrangement -0.940*** 0.296 -0.144 
Instant cash payments 0.699*** 0.279 0.109 
Variable product quality specification 0.308 0.297 0.054 
Input supply arrangement 0.996*** 0.261 0.152 
Technical assistance 0.909*** 0.273 0.152 
Crop delivery arrangement 0.836*** 0.322 0.147 
Conflict resolution procedure 0.659 0.390 0.101 
Sanctions -0.871** 0.284 -0.134 
Education 0.052 0.045 0.013 
Gender 0.526 0.345 0.079 
Farming experience 0.017 0.014 0.003 
Farm size 0.082 0.055 0.011 
Off-farm employment 0.260 0.268 0.044 
Constant -3.041 0.585  
Observations 165   
Wald chi2 90.70***   
Log pseudolikelihood -49.74   
Pseudo R2 55.04%   
 * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level 
Private scheme; VIF, uncentred, 2.62. 
 
3.5   Discussion  
CF arrangements have great potential to simultaneously increase smallholders’ productivity 
and overcome marketing challenges. In this regard, smallholder participation in CF 
arrangements is widely viewed by policymakers as important for poverty reduction and rural 
development. However, the growing case study evidence on the impacts of CF in Africa pays 
little attention to the critical role contract design plays in the sustainability of these 
arrangements between agribusiness firms and farmers. The current analysis used a 
comparative case study approach to highlight contract conditions that will promote the long 
term sustainability and viability of outgrower schemes in the burgeoning cassava sub-sector 
in Ghana. The study uniquely focused on rapidly developing domestic value chains in the 
emerging bioeconomy. The findings add empirical weight to the argument that state-led 
contract farming schemes are generally not an effective government mechanism for 
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overcoming market failures that inhibit the commercialisation of agricultural production by 
smallholders. Indeed, the continued existence of inefficient state-led schemes often signals 
the lack of an enabling environment for the private sector to effectively take over these 
functions. 
The interviews conducted for the study reveal that the public firm’s outgrower scheme 
constitutes a low investment informal CF model. The firm does not invest resources in 
outgrowers’ cassava production and as such does not incur monitoring costs. 
Correspondingly, the quantitative results show that farmer participation is positively 
influenced by the oral and informal nature of the agreement. Farmers have the option to opt-
out of the arrangement at any point in time. This eliminates the issue of side-selling and 
allows farmers to take advantage of periods of high local spot market prices. The 
consequence, however, is limited control over the quantity and quality of produce supplied 
which increases the risk of the firm not meeting the specific needs of its off-taker. The firm 
must compete with other buyers who may offer higher prices. This is reflected in a pricing 
arrangement that farmers find favourable in terms of their collective bargaining power and 
the valuation of their produce. However, the empirical evidence suggests that the scheme, 
which initially aimed to improve the socioeconomic conditions of smallholders in the area, is 
ultimately not beneficial to either the firm or outgrowers. The firm receives an insufficient 
supply of cassava roots from outgrowers. Outgrowers’ productivity and revenue from cassava 
production also do not appear to have increased through the arrangement. 
 The private firm’s outgrower scheme represents a relatively more capital intensive and 
formalised CF arrangement as revealed by the interviews conducted with company staff. Due 
to the provision of inputs, technical assistance, and crop transportation, the firm retains more 
control over the quality and volumes of outgrowers’ output. This makes for more efficient 
sourcing of cassava roots. Consistently, the quantitative results show that these contract 
features along with instant cash payments positively influenced smallholder participation in 
the scheme. Interestingly, even though the firm offers a low contract price with a contestable 
price determination mechanism, they appear to be able to effectively enforce the contract and 
control side-selling. This goes contrary to the argument that agricultural commodities with 
well-developed local markets are not suitable for contract farming because they are 
associated with a high risk of pervasive side-selling (Minot, 2007; World Bank, 2014). The 
firm is able to earn a profit using the CF arrangement. Outgrowers also have high farm 
productivity and earn comparatively higher returns from cassava production. 
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Contrary, to the results past studies (Minten et al., 2009; Miyata et al., 2009; Maertens & 
Velde, 2017), individual characteristics such as education, farming experience and farm size 
which are considered critical to farming efficiency did not significantly influence the decision 
to participate in the schemes. This emphasised the importance of contract design to farmers’ 
participation decision as revealed by the study’s results. It must, however, also be noted that 
the use of different statistical models and data collection techniques may present a nuanced 
picture. Future studies may benefit from the collection of longitudinal data for richer analysis 
of farmers’ participation decision. 
The findings of the study further demonstrate that firm investment in supporting farm 
production is critical to the success of outgrower schemes. Cassava may not be an input-
intensive crop. Nonetheless, there is still the need for embedded support services in 
outgrower schemes. Farmers desire arrangements that address both production and marketing 
challenges. Abebe et al. (2013) found that smallholders’ decision to participate in CF is even 
more dependent on input market uncertainty than on output market uncertainty. In order for 
the public firm to improve the economic viability of its model, the scheme must facilitate the 
adoption of improved technologies to stimulate increased farm productivity among 
outgrowers through an input supply arrangement. The seed market for cassava in Ghana is 
missing. Public sector extension agents are the primary source of supply for vegetative 
propagules (stem cuttings) of improved varieties that have been developed by the research 
system. These stem cuttings are often distributed to influential farmers with the expectation 
that they will in turn be disseminated to smallholders. This is often not the case as most 
smallholders do not get access to improved cultivars. Alene et al. (2015) reported that the 
area planted to improved cassava varieties in Ghana only increased from 25% to 36% 
between 1998 and 2009. It is therefore a challenge for many smallholders to grow varieties 
recommended by the firm. As Wiggins and Sharada (2013) observed, smallholders are also 
susceptible to purchasing adulterated agro-chemicals because they are often more affordable. 
Likewise, access to reliable transport services for bulk delivery of produce is often 
inaccessible at affordable prices. The lack of suitable access routes to farms often means that 
drivers charge higher prices or refuse to transport produce. Firm involvement in providing 
such post-harvest logistical support is critical given the perishability of the crop, quality 
requirements and the poor state of the existing road infrastructure in rural areas. An 
alternative to the firm providing such services directly could be arrangements with 
84 
 
intermediaries such as aggregators or lead farmers who have closer proximity to smallholders 
and could facilitate bulking and crop delivery.  
Notably, the bargaining position of the firms in their respective value chains is also a 
determining factor of the contract features of the outgrower schemes. This is particularly 
important for quality standards which can often be one of the most contentious issues in 
contract arrangements as reported by  Henson et al. (2005). The differentiated marketing 
strategy of the private firm enabled a system of variable quality standards which reduced the 
risk of complete rejection of farmers’ produce. Comparatively, the fixed product quality 
specification of the public firm is a direct consequence of its exclusive supply agreement with 
GGBL. This uncertainty over complete rejection discouraged participation in the public 
scheme as it largely eliminated the incentive of a guaranteed market. Transparency in quality 
assurance systems is therefore imperative to maintaining smallholders’ trust in CF 
arrangements, especially as they adjust to stricter quality requirements in increasingly 
competitive value chains for high-value products. Barrett et al. (2012) found that firms appear 
more likely to fabricate quality testing or speciously reject perishable commodities on the 
grounds of quality when supply is guaranteed from a large pool of smallholders. Indeed, a 
study by  Torero and Viceisza (2011) showed that third party quality testing improved 
farmers’ trust in the validity of results as this was perceived to be a more objective system.  
Overall, the increased use of cassava biomass associated with commercialisation of the sub-
sector in Ghana’s emerging bioeconomy has necessitated more organised sourcing 
arrangements. Government policies like the PSI on cassava starch and the tax incentive 
policy for local content beers have also served as catalysts to these institutional arrangements. 
Results from the public scheme reveal that although cassava is a staple crop that has 
traditionally been cultivated with minimal inputs, ad hoc or opportunistic investments that 
merely provide a marketing outlet for smallholders are not sufficient to ensure the success of 
outgrower schemes. The evidence highlights the tendency of public sector schemes to be 
bureaucratic and lack financial autonomy. Private sector ventures, on the other hand, tend to 
adopt authoritarian management styles and can also be prone to opportunistic behaviour in 
contract arrangements with smallholders. Therefore, public-private partnerships in cassava 
outgrower schemes present a viable and sustainable remedy that harnesses the strengths of 
both sectors and overcomes their institutional weaknesses. These arrangements would allow 
schemes to take advantage of government support such as grants and input subsidy programs 
while also benefitting from the private sector’s financial autonomy, systems of accountability 
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and highly-trained and specialised staff. It is the recommendation of this paper that this 
approach should be pursued by policymakers. Ultimately, smallholder participation and the 
sustainability of cassava outgrower schemes in Ghana’s emerging bioeconomy are contingent 
on a fully-integrated and comprehensive farm-to-market approach within a conducive 
enabling environment for agricultural contracting.   
3.6   Conclusions 
The study’s findings highlight the point of divergence between the low investment model of 
the state outgrower scheme which has led to insufficient supply from outgrowers and the 
more capital intensive arrangement of the private firm that benefits from the productive 
capacity of smallholders. The state outgrower scheme, initially established to improve 
smallholders’ socioeconomic conditions, offers farmers some favourable contract conditions. 
However, a lack of embedded support services has not enabled outgrowers to increase their 
productivity and revenue from cassava production in the scheme. CF arrangements must, 
therefore, address both production and marketing challenges to be sustainable and mutually 
beneficial to farmers and firms.  
As competitive value chains continue to develop in Africa’s evolving agricultural sector, 
there is the need for equitable and transparent contract design features, as well as direct firm 
investment in supporting farm production activities within an enabling environment. Public-
private partnerships can provide these necessary conditions for ultimately unlocking the 
potential of CF in Africa’s bioeconomy. 
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Abstract 
The liberalisation of commercial seed systems has largely been seen as an essential means of 
improving agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, access to improved seed 
varieties has remained a major constraint in many countries in spite of liberalisation and other 
reform efforts. This paper analyses the governance challenges involved in seed systems from 
a theoretical and an empirical perspective. The paper applies theoretical concepts of New 
Institutional Economics to identify potential governance challenges involved in the different 
stages of the seed supply system. The commercial maize seed sector in Ghana is used for an 
empirical case study. Ghana has passed a seed law that aims to increase the availability of 
improved seed varieties to farmers by providing more opportunities to the private sector. 
However, there is still a chronic lack of varietal diversity, indicating that governance 
challenges in the seed system remain despite the reform efforts. For data collection, a 
participatory mapping technique known as Process Net-Map was applied, together with 
expert interviews involving a diverse set of stakeholders. The empirical evidence reveals that, 
in line with the theoretical considerations, governance challenges indeed affect all stages of 
the seed supply system. These challenges include limited involvement of smallholders in 
setting breeding priorities, restricted private sector participation in source seed production, 
limited ability of an under-resourced public regulatory body to ensure high seed quality 
through mandatory seed certification and overdependence on a weak public extension system 
to promote improved varieties. The paper discusses the policy implications of the findings.  
 
Keywords: Seed systems; Governance challenges; Varietal development; Seed production; 
Seed quality; Ghana  
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4.1   Introduction  
The use of improved crop varieties is essential for increasing agricultural productivity in 
Africa (Walker & Alwang, 2015; World Bank, 2007). Maize is the most important cereal 
crop in Sub-Saharan Africa and as such considerable attention has been paid to potential 
productivity gains through the use of improved varieties (Smale et al., 2013; Alene et al., 
2009; Hassan et al., 2001; Byerlee & Eicher, 1997). This desired outcome hinges upon an 
efficiently functioning seed system to ensure the delivery of these varieties to farmers 
(Langyintuo et al., 2008; Tripp, 2001; Morris, 1998). However, only a few African countries, 
such as Kenya and Mozambique, provide evidence of successful commercial seed sector 
development (World Bank, 2016). It is widely accepted that a major cause of the sector’s 
poor performance has been the combination of a public sector monopoly of seed supply and a 
weak capacity of the public sector organisations in charge (Tripp & Rohrbach, 2001). In 
recent years, many African governments have liberalised their seed sectors, though to a 
varying extent, which has generally resulted in increased private sector participation. 
Nonetheless, the transition to an effective private sector-driven seed system has been 
hampered by a lack of complementarities in public and private investments, leading to 
deficiencies in the institutional linkages between the various stages of seed production, from 
breeding to commercial seed delivery (Langyintuo et al., 2010). These governance challenges 
of seed supply systems have only been partly addressed in the literature (see Langyintuo et 
al., 2010; Tahirou et al., 2009; Tripp, 2000). Countries like Ghana have sought to overcome 
the problem of farmers having poor access to improved seed varieties by reforming the 
institutional framework of the commercial seed sector.   
Ghana passed a new seed law, the Plants and Fertiliser Act, in 2010. The Act entailed a 
commitment by the state, supported by the donor community, to relegate responsibility for 
seed multiplication and marketing to the private sector. The main aim of liberalising the 
sector was to increase the availability of improved seed varieties to farmers by providing 
more opportunities for the private sector.5 The most noteworthy aspects of the law are that it 
authorises both the development of varieties by the domestic private sector as well as access 
to foreign varieties produced by both public and private organisations. The law also permits 
the production of any class of seed by any approved entity (public or private) and leaves the 
                                                          
5 The new law repealed the Plant Quarantine Act of 1965 and the National Redemption Council Decree 100 of 
1972 (Alhassan & Bissi, 2006). Although the new law was already in force at the time of submitting this article 
in early 2017, the attendant seed regulations were at an advanced stage for ratification by Parliament following 
amendments to fit regional seed regulations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).  
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door open for the possibility of privatised seed certification (GoG, 2010). These changes have 
enabled the emergence of domestic private seed companies. By 2013, their number had 
reached ten (Tripp & Mensah-Bonsu, 2013). However, a chronic lack of varietal diversity has 
still remained a major concern of Ghana’s maize seed system. One open pollinated variety 
(OPV) released in 1992 called Obatanpa continues to overwhelmingly dominate commercial 
seed production. This is a concern because maize is the most important cereal crop in Ghana, 
accounting for 55 per cent of total grain output in Ghana (MoFA, 2015a). Maize is important 
for food security as it is widely consumed in all regions of the country and covers the largest 
area among the food crops produced in Ghana. Apart from its traditional food uses, maize 
grain is also used in the food processing industry, breweries and in the poultry industry as a 
primary source of feed. Due to industrialisation and urbanisation, demand for maize from 
these sectors is also rising (Andam et al., 2017; Andam et al., 2015). Yet, productivity of 
maize has been low. Average yields reached only 1.7 metric tons per hectare in 2014 (MoFA, 
2015a). As further detailed in Section 4.3, 60 per cent of the maize area was planted to 
improved varieties in 2012, and Obatanpa accounted for almost 70 per cent of the area under 
improved varieties (Ragasa et al., 2013). Even though 18 improved maize varieties have been 
developed and officially released since Obatanpa was introduced in 1992, only a few of these 
varieties are produced as commercial seed. Hence, they are mostly not available to farmers. 
A large number of technology adoption studies on maize in Africa have focused on the socio-
economic and agro-ecological factors that influence farmers’ decisions to adopt improved 
varieties (see, e.g., Khonje et al., 2015; De Groote et al., 2013; Lunduka et al., 2012; 
Langyintuo & Mungoma, 2008; Feleke & Zegeye, 2006; Alene et al., 2000; Nkonya et al., 
1997). For the case of Ghana, Morris et al. (1999) and Ragasa et al. (2013) analysed the 
constraints and incentives of farmers that have contributed to the dominance of Obatanpa. 
There is, however, a dearth of in-depth studies that investigate the supply-side factors 
accounting for the observed lack of varietal diversity. Accordingly, the analytical question 
pursued in this paper is: Why do maize farmers in Ghana have a limited choice of improved 
seed varieties? The paper aims to address this gap in the literature by analysing the 
governance challenges that affect the performance of Ghana’s maize seed system in 
delivering improved varieties. The paper also addresses the question of why these challenges 
persist in spite of the institutional changes introduced by the reform of the seed law in 2010.    
Using Ghana as a case study, the paper makes two contributions to the literature on seed 
systems in Africa: First, based on the theoretical concepts of economics, particularly New 
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Institutional Economics, the paper provides a comprehensive overview of the potential 
governance challenges in each component of the seed supply system. Second, the paper 
applies Process Net-Map to empirically analyse these governance challenges. Process Net-
Map is a relatively new empirical method that has been developed to identify governance 
challenges in processes that involve multiple actors. The tool is used to identify the 
influential actors in seed delivery and examine the systemic and yet often neglected 
governance challenges affecting seed supply. This approach unravels the complexities of 
multi-stakeholder governance where very often actual processes differ from formally 
prescribed procedures. As such, this study is not only instructive for Ghana but also for other 
countries in Africa with evolving commercial seed sectors. The study finds that the well-
known constraints caused by the dominance of public sector institutions in seed supply, have 
not been overcome by reform efforts that aimed to promote the private sector. By analysing 
the governance challenges that occur at the different stages of seed supply, the study 
identifies the reasons why the strategy to increase access to improved seed varieties by 
facilitating private sector participation has not been successful in Ghana, so far. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents potential governance 
challenges of seed supply based on economic theory and the literature on seed sector 
development in Africa. Section 4.3 outlines the current state of Ghana’s maize seed system. 
The research design and data used for the analysis are described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 
presents the results of the Process Net-Maps and expert interviews. Section 4.6 discusses the 
empirical findings and Section 4.7 concludes and derives policy implications.   
4.2   Potential governance challenges of seed systems    
4.2.1   Overview of the seed system 
In the literature on seed systems, a distinction is usually made between “formal seed 
systems,” which involve modern techniques of plant breeding and government certification of 
varieties and “informal” or “traditional seed systems,” which involve traditional forms of 
breeding and seed exchange by farmers and local communities. While informal seed systems 
remain important (Sperling & McGuire, 2010), the focus of this paper is placed on formal 
seed systems and their governance challenges.  
A formal seed system, in this paper also referred to as commercial seed system, encompasses 
a series of interdependent activities, which can be grouped into three major stages, as shown 
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in Figure 4.1. (1) Varietal development; (2) seed multiplication and certification; (3) seed 
marketing and promotion. The first step, the development of new varieties, requires breeding, 
which is a research activity. To ensure that farmers get access to new varieties that indeed 
have advantages over existing ones, the testing of new varieties is required, which is typically 
part of a variety release procedure.  To make the new varieties available to farmers on a large 
scale, several stages of seed multiplication are necessary. These are typically referred to as 
the production of (a) breeder seed (the first generation of seed), (b) foundation seed (the 
second generation of seed) and (c) commercial seed (the final product used by farmers). In 
each stage of seed production, quality must be assured, which is typically achieved through 
seed certification. Marketing and promotion activities are then required to ensure that farmers 
have knowledge of the improved seed varieties and can purchase them.  
For an analysis of governance challenges that may occur in the different stages of seed 
supply, it is useful to distinguish three sectors, or types of governance structures (cf. World 
Bank, 2007): The private sector (the market), the public sector (the state), and the third sector 
(non-governmental and community-based organisations). All three governance structures are 
prone to their own governance challenges which can be referred to as market failure, state 
failure and community failure respectively (Birner & Anderson, 2007). Market failure occurs 
if the market system, which is based on private sector governance, leads to an allocation of 
resources that is not optimal from the society’s perspective (Bator, 1958). As further detailed 
below, market failure is inherent at various stages of the seed supply system, which has 
stimulated government intervention. However, public sector institutions are confronted with 
their own challenges, which may be referred to as “state failure.” Third sector organisations 
can also play an important role at the different stages of the seed supply system to overcome 
market and state failures. Nonetheless, they also face their own challenges, which, in analogy, 
can be labelled “community failure.” In this paper, these “failures” of the public, the private 
and the third sector are referred to as “governance challenges.”  
The following sections examine the underlying reasons for these governance challenges in 
the case of seed supply. Maize is used as an example. For maize, both OPVs and hybrid 
varieties are available. As further detailed below, the governance challenges involved in the 
supply of OPVs, which farmers can reproduce themselves, differ to some extent from the 
governance challenges involved in the supply of hybrid varieties. Figure 4.1 gives an 
overview of these governance challenges.  
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Figure 4.1: Overview of governance challenges affecting seed supply 
 
4.2.2   Varietal development 
4.2.2.1   Market Failure 
Varietal development is capital intensive as it requires access to germplasm, trial fields, 
physical equipment and the scientific expertise that is necessary to undertake an effective 
breeding program. Moreover, varietal development is a long-term process. Thus, economies 
of scale may deter private sector investment in varietal development or allow one firm to 
monopolise this activity especially in very small markets (Jaffee & Srivastava, 1994). Most 
emerging seed companies are therefore dependent on varieties that were developed by the 
public sector. High capital requirements are also one reason for the dominance of large 
multinational seed companies in private sector varietal development and explain recent 
takeover bids among these companies. Secondly, the payoff for this long term investment can 
be uncertain depending on the nature of the variety. Farmers can recycle the seed of OPVs for 
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several planting seasons. OPVs also facilitate seed exchanges among farmers, allowing some 
farmers to benefit from new seed varieties without ever having to purchase them (Alene et 
al., 2000). This public good characteristic of non-excludability constitutes a disincentive for 
private companies to invest in the development of OPVs. An institutional solution would be 
restricting the rights of farmers to multiply their own seeds. However, such a provision is 
difficult to enforce and involves high transaction costs, especially in developing countries 
where the number of smallholders is large and infrastructure is not well developed. 
Accordingly, the sustained dominance of OPVs in West and Central Africa has perpetuated 
the lack of private sector involvement in maize varietal improvement in the sub-region 
(Alene et al., 2015).6 Hybrids are a technical solution to the non-excludability problem as 
seed must be purchased every season to achieve undiminished yields. Seed companies are 
therefore able to fully realise the returns from their investment in developing hybrids. Thus, 
the widespread diffusion of hybrids among small scale farmers in Eastern and Southern 
Africa has led to considerable private sector investment in maize breeding (see De Groote et 
al., 2015).7  
Variety development also involves market failure that results from information asymmetry. If 
a new variety does not have significant advantages over existing varieties, or if it is even 
inferior, a private seed company that developed such a variety has no incentives to disclose 
this information. This creates a disincentive for farmers to purchase seeds of new varieties 
unless the government (or another independent organisation) tests new varieties and ensures 
that inferior varieties do not enter the market.  
4.2.2.2   State Failure 
The market failures described above provide the rationale for government involvement in 
varietal development. The non-excludability problem of OPVs has been a major reason for 
government-supported crop breeding programs (Minot et al., 2007). The focus of such 
programs has usually been placed on major crops that are important for food security and 
export. The state-run programs mostly rely on the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) for improved germplasm, but this is only useful if it can be 
                                                          
6 Premier Seed Ltd in Nigeria was the only private seed company in West and Central Africa that invested in 
maize research with about six full-time equivalent researchers working on maize breeding in 2009 (Alene et al., 
2015). 
 
7 The private sector was responsible for 53% of the maize variety releases in Eastern and Southern Africa 
between 2000 and 2010 (De Groote et al., 2015). 
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incorporated into a well-functioning domestic breeding program. In the case of maize, many 
African countries remain fully reliant upon public sector breeding programs as the only 
source of improved varieties adapted to local conditions, even after liberalisation efforts in 
the seed sector. However, governance problems facing the public sector affect the 
effectiveness of such programs. The low capacity of public research organisations and 
missing linkages between research and extension result in inadequate feedback from farmers. 
Such feedback would be essential to inform the system about farmers’ objectives for varietal 
development. This deficit often leads to a considerable mismatch between the type of 
varieties produced by breeders and those required by farmers (Louwaars, 2005; Cromwell et 
al., 1992).  
The information asymmetry problem regarding new varieties is typically addressed by state 
regulation – all new varieties of major crops, be they produced by the public sector or the 
private sector, are typically subject to a process of testing and release. This regulatory 
approach involves its own governance challenges. Low capacity of the institutions in charge 
leads to protracted processes that limit the range of improved varieties available to farmers 
(Tripp et al., 1997).  
4.2.2.3   Community Failure 
Informal seed systems rely entirely on local communities, but as outlined above, they are not 
the focus of this paper. Communities can also play an important role in formal systems to 
address the problems of market and state failure identified above. “Participatory Plant 
Breeding” (PPB) approaches have become rather common, and they are often part of formal 
seed systems (Sperling et al., 2001). Depending on the type of PPB approach, communities 
may be involved in all stages of the formal seed system displayed in Figure 4.1.  
With regard to varietal development, government breeding programs often use PPB to 
involve farmers in setting breeding priorities, develop breeding strategies and in selecting 
breeding lines. The nature of participation in these approaches is consultative and the aim is 
to achieve a better match between government breeding programs and farmers’ demands 
(Sperling et al., 2001). A governance challenge facing this approach is “elite capture”, a well-
known problem of participatory development approaches (Platteau & Gaspart, 2003). The 
farmers involved in PPB may be those who already have a connection to the research system 
because they are better educated and better off, and they may not necessarily represent the 
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perspectives of poorer, marginalised and female farmers unless the programs make specific 
efforts to reach these groups.   
In principle, the role farmers or farmer-based organisations (FBOs) play in variety 
development can be more far-reaching than just a consultative role. However, a review of 
participatory breeding in CGIAR-supported programs found that farmers lack the skills and 
resources to conduct with adequate precision the extensive operations required in early stages 
of variety development, such as making crosses and growing large segregating populations 
(CGIAR/TAC, 2001: 23). Moreover, FBOs face the classical free rider problem of collective 
action (Ostrom, 1990): There is a disincentive to incur the transaction costs of participating in 
PPB programs or otherwise exert pressure on the public sector to develop desired varieties, 
because the benefits of such efforts will also accrue to those who did not participate. 
4.2.3   Seed multiplication and certification 
4.2.3.1   Market Failure 
The market failure that is caused by the problem of non-excludability in the use of OPVs 
extends to seed multiplication. Seed companies will find it difficult to successfully sell OPVs 
if the seed price is substantially higher than that of commercial grain. Seed enterprises may, 
therefore, prefer to concentrate on the production of hybrids where annual seed sales are 
assured (Tripp & Ragasa, 2015). This can lead to a commercial seed system devoid of OPVs. 
Indeed, deregulation of the maize seed sector in Africa has seen the introduction of an 
increasing number of both foreign and domestic private sector companies involved in 
commercial seed multiplication, which focus particularly on hybrids (ACB, 2015).  
Information asymmetry is not only a problem for variety development, but also for seed 
multiplication. Seed producers invariably have more information than farmers about the 
origin and quality of commercial seed (Byerlee et al., 2007). By visual inspection, farmers 
can detect some aspects of seed quality (such as obvious damage), but they cannot assess 
important aspects such as genetic purity. Akerlof (1970) demonstrates how information 
asymmetry about product quality and potential fraud adversely affects market performance. 
This problem of market failure can also be observed with regard to seed multiplication. 
Farmers may opt to use seed saved from their own harvests or utilise more familiar informal 
seed distribution channels rather than purchase seed of unknown quality from a seed 
company. The majority of small scale farmers in Africa obtain their seed from these informal 
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sources (McGuire & Sperling, 2016; Louwaars & De Boef, 2012). Seed certification can 
address this challenge, but it involves its own governance challenges, as discussed below. 
4.2.3.2   State Failure 
If public sector institutions carry out variety development, they need to produce breeder seed, 
which can then be multiplied by private companies. Breeder seed production is confronted 
with incentive problems because the public research institutions in charge of breeding are 
seldom separately funded for carrying out this task. Therefore, they must determine the 
amount to be invested in seed production as opposed to further breeding activities. As 
incentive systems are based on the number of newly released varieties rather than seed 
multiplication, there is a disincentive for public sector organisations to produce sufficient 
quantities of breeder seed (Tripp & Rohrbach, 2001).  
Due to the market failure problems discussed above, public sector organisations have not 
only been involved in breeding and the production of breeder seed, but also in further steps of 
seed multiplication and seed marketing. For these activities, governments have often set up 
parastatal seed companies, which have experienced the typical governance challenges of 
public sector management, such as understaffing and lack of funds. As a consequence, public 
seed companies in Africa typically produced insufficient foundation seed for a limited range 
of varieties such that commercial seed supply has been dictated by foundation seed 
availability rather than actual market demand (Erenstein et al., 2011).  
Governments have also set up seed certification systems to address the market failure of 
quality assurance discussed above. These systems also face governance challenges due to 
resource constraints. Spatially dispersed seed production fields must be repeatedly inspected 
at specific stages of the growing season. The inability to mobilise these resources often 
causes costly delays and losses. This invariably encourages rent-seeking and collusion 
between influential seed producers and officials. Most African countries operate mandatory 
and highly centralised government-funded seed certification systems for food crops like 
maize that are confronted with these challenges (Tripp & Louwaars, 1997).  
4.2.3.3   Community Failure 
In principle, communities could play an important role in seed multiplication to overcome the 
market and government failures pointed out above. They may especially be involved in the 
multiplication of OPVs since producing seed for hybrid is more difficult to manage given the 
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requirement of larger field isolation distances and the increased difficulty of detecting off-
types (Monyo et al., 2004). However, the governance problems affecting community 
involvement in varietal development are also relevant for seed multiplication. The formation 
of FBOs for community-based seed production can be hindered by the collective action 
problem. Farmers may have limited incentives to join such groups as they largely rely on 
farmer-saved seeds or acquire seed varieties through the traditional practice of seed 
exchanges (see Beyene, 2010). Secondly, farmer-led seed multiplication programs are prone 
to production capacity challenges. Farmer groups can find it difficult to effectively manage 
production activities such as seed selection, post-harvest handling and seed quality control on 
a commercial scale (see Osman, 2008). Furthermore, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) that support local-level seed production schemes often face problems of financial 
sustainability. Consequently, Tripp and Rohrbach (2001) reported the absence of sustainable 
community-based seed production in Africa as group activities invariably ceased once the 
implementing organisation withdrew support. 
4.2.4   Seed marketing and promotion 
4.2.4.1   Market Failure 
Market failure in seed marketing and promotion can occur for a number of reasons. First, the 
public good feature of non-excludability arising with OPVs tends to lead to a preference for 
only promoting and marketing hybrid seed. While seed marketing is a particularly weak point 
in Africa’s commercial seed sector development, dominant seed companies in a number of 
African countries have fairly well established distribution networks for their hybrid maize 
seed (Tripp, 2000). Second, private companies lack the incentive to invest in the promotion 
of public varieties as this may prove beneficial to competing companies (Tripp & Byerlee, 
2000). This is an indication of the free rider problem where those benefitting from a service 
are not paying for it, which results in an under-provision of the service. Third, information 
asymmetry about the actual content of packaged commercial seed results in the common 
problem of seed adulteration by seed retailers (Langyintuo et al., 2010). In addition, the high 
transaction cost of marketing seed to spatially dispersed smallholders in remote and low 
potential areas also serves as a deterrent to seed companies and agro-dealers.  
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4.2.4.2   State Failure 
Due to the market failure explained above, governments have been involved in seed 
marketing and promotion through public seed companies as well as public agricultural 
extension services.  The challenges faced by public seed companies involved in these tasks 
have already been described above. Public agricultural extension are also facing numerous 
governance challenges which are well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Feder et al., 
2010). With regard to seed promotion, the scale and complexity of extension service 
provision commonly presents the biggest problem (cf. Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004). The 
budgetary and practical considerations of reaching large numbers of geographically dispersed 
heterogeneous smallholders in Africa have rendered public extension services rather 
ineffective in promoting the adoption of new varieties (Tahirou et al., 2009; Langyintuo et al., 
2008). Moreover, public seed distribution programs can crowd out private investment by 
discouraging the development of wholesale and retail seed trade networks because farmers 
become accustomed to the government distributing subsidised or free seed (Kelly et al., 2003; 
Tripp, 2000). 
4.2.4.3   Community Failure 
The creation of sales cooperatives or community seed banks can be an effective approach to 
resolving the market and state failures in seed marketing and promotion (Thijssen et al., 
2008). However, the sustainability of such approaches requires skills in management and 
marketing, which members often lack. Witcombe et al. (2010) observe that the lack of a 
business-oriented approach to the development of seed trade networks has been a major 
reason accounting for lack of sustainability of community-based organisations. NGOs could 
play an important role in seed promotion, as well. However, they typically have limited 
coverage due to their size, limited geographic coverage and financial constraints (cf. Birner 
and Anderson, 2007). 
4.3   Ghana’s Commercial Seed Sector   
Ghana’s evolving commercial seed sector supplies only a small percentage of the total 
demand for seed. About 80 per cent of the seed used in the country is sourced from the 
informal sector, which entails farmer-saved seed, seed exchanges among farmers and 
purchases from local grain or seed markets (MoFA, 2015b). Similar to most African 
countries, maize is the predominant crop in the commercial seed system. The average annual 
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certified maize seed production between 2001 and 2014 was 2,230 metric tons. This 
represents 60 per cent of all commercial seed production. Between 1970 and 2010, twenty-
seven improved maize varieties were released in Ghana. Table 4.1 shows that Ghana’s 
varietal output is average as compared to other countries in West and Central Africa. Yet, one 
OPV, Obatanpa, accounts for 96 per cent of maize seed production while newer varieties 
have failed to have significant commercial seed production (PPRSD, 2002-2015). These 
unsuccessful varieties have included several hybrids (Tripp & Ragasa, 2015). A comparison 
of the studies by Morris et al. (1999) and Ragasa et al. (2013) indicate that the total maize 
area planted to improved varieties in Ghana increased marginally from 54 per cent in 1997 to 
60 per cent in 2012. However, the share of Obatanpa more than doubled over this period. In 
1997, Obatanpa accounted for 30 per cent of the maize area planted to improved varieties. In 
2012, the share of Obatanpa increased considerably to approximately 70 per cent of the maize 
area planted to improved varieties. It must be noted that the annual certified seed production 
of Obatanpa is insufficient to cover this area with fresh seed every year, given the average 
seed rate of 20 kilograms per hectare (Ragasa et al., 2013). 
 
Table 4.1: Improved maize varieties released in West and Central Africa, 1970-2010 
Country Number of varieties released 
Nigeria 111 
Cameroon 44 
Benin 36 
Burkina Faso 32 
Ghana* 27 
Mali 21 
Togo 13 
Guinea 12 
Côte d’Ivoire 11 
Senegal 10 
DR Congo 10 
Total 327 
   Source: Alene et al. (2015) 
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Obatanpa is a medium maturity white OPV. This quality protein maize variety (QPM) was 
developed by the public research system in Ghana under the Ghana Grains Development 
Project (GGDP) and promoted extensively by the Sasakawa Global 2000 (SG 2000) 
program.8 The variety has not only been widely adopted in Ghana but also across a number of 
other African countries (Badu-Apraku et al., 2004). Although Obatanpa is an improved 
variety,9 it was released over two decades ago and is therefore unlikely to play a significant 
role in any further commercial seed sector development (Tripp & Mensah-Bonsu, 2013). The 
national annual average yield for maize over the past decade is 1.7 metric tons per hectare 
(MoFA, 2015c). Based on on-station and on-farm trials, achievable yields of newer OPVs 
and hybrids could be between 5 and 8 metric tons/hectare. The low adoption of improved 
technologies such as improved varieties is a major reason accounting for this yield gap 
(Ragasa et al., 2013). Thus, the availability of new and higher yielding improved varieties in 
the seed system is vital to increased maize productivity.  
The seed sector reform opened the door for international companies to get involved in seed 
supply. So far, two multinational seed companies, DuPont Pioneer and Pannar, have had local 
representatives in Ghana since 2012. They were exclusive importers of the hybrid maize seed 
varieties of these companies. There has been no in-country seed production of foreign maize 
varieties. The imported seeds had limited over-the-counter sale and were mainly used by 
large scale contract farming schemes (Ragasa et al., 2018). In mid-2015, the importation of 
commercial maize seed was banned by the government, which argued that this measure was 
necessary to foster growth of the local seed industry (Tripp & Ragasa, 2015). The new law 
appears to be ambiguous on this matter. It allows access to foreign varieties, yet it is not clear 
on whether the commercial seed necessarily has to be produced in Ghana (GoG, 2010: 20). 
As a consequence, foreign maize seed companies are no longer present in Ghana. 
 
 
                                                          
8 This was an outcome of a joint institutional effort to improve the nutritional value of maize grain protein aimed 
at overcoming malnutrition in the large population of low-income groups who depend on maize as the main 
component of their dietary protein intake (Sallah et al., 2003). 
 
9 Obatanpa has a potential yield of 4.6 metric tons/hectare based on on-station and on-farm trials (Ragasa et al., 
2013). 
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4.4   Research Methods  
This section first explains the research design used for the study, followed by a description of 
the data collection methods. 
4.4.1   Research Design 
The study employed a two-step data collection procedure. In the first step, the participatory 
mapping technique based on in-depth interviews and visualisation known as Process Net-
Map was conducted with an array of purposively sampled experts in the seed supply system. 
The respondents were selected based on their extensive experience and understanding of how 
the entire commercial maize seed system operates. Net-Map is a participatory mapping 
method developed for analysing how complex systems with multiple actors function 
(Schiffer, 2007). Process Net-Map is a variant of the method that was developed to identify 
governance challenges in processes of policy-making and implementation (see Raabe et al., 
2012). In this study, the tool was used to gain detailed insights into the process of commercial 
maize seed supply in Ghana. At the same time, the tool made it possible to identify the 
relevant stakeholders. A detailed description of this method is presented in Section 4.4.2 
below. Guided by the Process Net-Maps, the second step involved in-depth interviews with 
selected experts from all identified stakeholder categories using purposive sampling. These 
respondents were selected based on their high level of experience carrying out specific 
activities in the seed system. Additional in-depth interviews were conducted using snowball 
sampling to ensure exhaustive expert information. The respondents included agricultural 
researchers, public officials and regulators, donors, seed producers (individual seed growers), 
local private seed companies, input dealers, extension agents, maize farmers and other 
stakeholders throughout the country. In total, 71 stakeholders were involved in this study (see 
Table 4.2). Direct observation of seed supply activities, such as maize seed processing, 
certification, storage and sale was also conducted. Each interview involved a series of open-
ended questions and follow-up questions to best capture the respondent’s expert opinion on 
the governance challenges in the commercial maize seed system and his views on how these 
challenges may be overcome. The two-step research design was complemented with an 
extensive review and synthesis of relevant policy and legal documents as well as project 
reports. The document review served as triangulation to validate the findings. 
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4.4.2   Data Collection    
Data collection was carried out between July 2015 and January 2016. The Process Net-Map 
technique was applied with eleven respondents, each of whom represented stakeholders 
involved in different activities in the seed supply system, including crop breeding, seed 
production, seed inspection and extension services. The application of Process Net-Map 
involved three steps: (1) The respondents were first asked to list all the actors involved in the 
seed system. These actors were recorded on a large sheet of paper. (2) Subsequently, the 
respondents were asked to describe the sequence of activities of maize seed supply and to 
identify the respective roles of all participating actors. This process was mapped out using 
numbered arrows to denote each step, hence revealing how the actors are linked. (3) In the 
third step, respondents ranked the influence level of the actors on a scale of 0-8. The level of 
influence was defined as the stakeholders’ level of importance in achieving the desired 
outcome of seed supply, which was that farmers widely adopt a new maize variety through an 
efficiently functioning seed system. To visualise the influence levels in a way that facilitated 
the discussion, poker chips were stacked up next to the respective actor to form “influence 
towers”. The height of these “towers”, i.e. the number of chips, represented the influence 
level assigned by an actor to the respondent. Thus, actors assigned an influence level of 8 
were perceived to be the most influential and were given the highest influence tower. After 
visualising the respective influence level, the respondents were asked to explain why they 
assigned this influence level to the respective actor. Follow-up questions were then asked 
about the governance challenges in the seed system. The visualisation of the seed system in 
the form of the Process Net-Map in front of the respondent facilitated the identification of 
these challenges.  Digitalised copies of the Net-Maps were later shared with the respondents 
for verification.  
The subsequent interviews focused on the governance challenges related to respondents’ 
specific seed system activities. The Process Net-Map exercises and interviews were 
conducted in person on a one-on-one basis at the convenience of the respondents. All the 
interviews, including those from the Process Net-Map exercises, were audio-recorded with 
the expressed permission of the respondents to enable an effective content analysis. Some of 
the respondents were contacted again during data collection to clarify responses that had 
remained unclear.   
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Table 4.2: Overview of Process Net Maps and expert interviews 
Stakeholder Category 
Number of 
Net-Maps 
Number of Interviews 
(including Net-Maps) 
CGIAR Centres 1 1 
Research Institutions  1 4 
Universities  1 
Government Agencies (policy, regulation, 
extension) 
4 16 
Development Partners/Donors 1 5 
Non-Governmental Organisations  2 
Agricultural Consultants 1 1 
Local Private Seed Companies 2 8 
Seed Producers (individual seed growers) 1 8 
Agro-Input Dealers (Seed Dealers)  9 
Agro-processing companies  1 
Maize Farmers  15 
Total 11 71 
 
 
4.5   Results  
This section presents the findings of the Process Net-Maps in the form of an aggregated map 
and details the actors, their roles and perceived levels of influence. Afterwards, the empirical 
findings of the governance challenges affecting the seed supply system are presented. 
4.5.1   Aggregated Process Net-Map  
The analysis of the eleven Process Net-Maps revealed the same basic steps for commercial 
maize seed supply in Ghana.  While there was no contradiction, respondents provided 
different levels of detail for the different stages of maize seed supply. The Process Net-Map 
in Figure 4.2 represents an aggregation of the most detailed number of steps and actors 
involved at each stage of the process based on the eleven maps produced.  The average 
influence levels were reported as there was minimal variation in the respondents’ perceptions 
of the influence of different actors (see Table 4.3). These influence levels were computed by 
summing the scores of the eleven respondents and dividing the sum by eleven. The mean 
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scores were rounded off to the nearest whole number. They are depicted in the form of circles 
next to the actors in Figure 4.2. The number in the circles displays the rounded mean score. 
The governance challenges in the system are depicted in the form of stars.  
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Figure 4.2: Aggregated Process Net-Map of commercial maize seed supply in Ghana 
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Table 4.3: Mean and Range of Influence Scores of Actors 
Actors  Mean Influence Level Range 
Public Extension Services 8 1 
Crops Research Inst./ Savannah Agricultural Research 
Inst./ Public Universities 
7 1 
Ghana Seed Inspection Division 7 1 
Certified Seed Producers  6 1 
Agro-Input Dealers (Seed Dealers) 6 2 
Grains & Legumes Development Board 5 2 
Local Private Seed Companies 5 2 
National Variety Release & Registration Committee 4 3 
Farmers 3 1 
Non-Governmental Organisations 3 2 
National Seed Council 2 1 
Note: The range is the difference between the highest and the lowest reported influence level of an actor 
 
4.5.2   Actors and their roles in commercial maize seed supply   
The results show that two national agricultural research institutes (NARIs) have been solely 
responsible for all locally developed improved maize varieties in Ghana: the Crop Research 
Institute (CRI) and the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (SARI). CRI has the 
mandate for crop research in the coastal savanna, the forest belt and the forest-savanna 
transition agro-ecologies of Ghana while SARI handles crop research for the Guinea savanna 
and the Sudan savanna agro-ecologies. Both NARIs belong to the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR). They determine breeding priorities to overcome current 
production and postharvest challenges in consultation with farmers as shown in Steps 1 and 2 
of Figure 4.2. Subsequently, they obtain germplasm from collaborating international research 
centres, particularly from the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center 
(CIMMYT) and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA). Indigenous 
landraces are also occasionally sourced from the Plant Genetic Resources Research Institute 
(which also belongs to CSIR) to address specific adaptability and utilisation issues. The Plant 
Genetic Resources Research Institute is the national genetic resources agency and operates a 
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national gene bank. Some public universities have established breeding programs as well, but 
they are yet to release any improved maize varieties. Under the new seed law, varieties 
developed by the private sector from both domestic and foreign sources are also permitted.   
For a period of two years, on-station trials are carried out at the experimental stations of the 
research institutions in all five agro-ecological zones of the country (Step 3). These trials are 
followed by two years of adaptive field trials carried out in all agro-ecologies because maize 
is grown in all the agro-ecologies of Ghana (Step 4). At this stage, farmers who are selected 
with the assistance of extension agents of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) 
assess a new variety together with the breeders on their own farms by comparing it to existing 
varieties. In addition, a sensory, physiochemical and economic analysis is carried out, before 
the variety is presented to the National Variety Release and Registration Committee 
(NVRRC) for a final evaluation (Steps 5 and 6). The sensory analysis to determine the 
suitability of the variety for its intended end uses is conducted by the Women in Agricultural 
Development Directorate of MoFA, and the physiochemical analysis is carried out by the 
Food Research Institute of CSIR. Economists at CRI and SARI conduct the economic 
analysis.  
The NVRRC, a technical committee comprising representatives of all major stakeholders in 
the commercial seed sector, visit the breeder seed fields at least twice during the growing 
season. The first field inspection is carried out at the flowering stage and the second at the 
harvesting stage. The release committee determines whether or not the variety release process 
should proceed based on these inspections and supporting data. The National Seed Council 
officially releases the variety based on the recommendation of the NVRRC (Step 7). The 
National Seed Council, which was formed under the new law, is the main oversight body in 
the seed sector. The Council consists of nine members; three ex-officio positions are held by 
the minister and two directors of MoFA, one position is held by a director of CSIR; three 
positions are held by representatives of the Seed Growers Association, the National Farmers’ 
Association, and the Biotechnology Research Institute respectively; and two members are 
nominated by the President. Under the new law, the released variety is registered in a national 
catalogue for crop varieties managed by the Crop Services Directorate of MoFA (Step 8).  
Upon initial approval of the variety by the NVRRC, the responsible research institution 
commences breeder seed production so that at the time of official release, breeder seed will 
be available (Step 9). Under the new law, all classes of seed must be certified by the Ghana 
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Seed Inspection Division (GSID) of the Plant Protection and Regulatory Services Directorate 
(PPRSD) of MoFA.10 This certification process starts with breeder seed certification (Step 
10). Certified breeder seed is supplied to the Grains and Legumes Development Board 
(GLDB), a parastatal of MoFA, as well as directly to local private seed enterprises (Step 11). 
Prior to the new law, GLDB was the only institution mandated to produce foundation seed.11 
As indicated above, ten domestic seed companies have emerged, which have started to 
produce the foundation seed they require for the production of commercial hybrid maize 
seed. GLDB still produces and processes the bulk of foundation seed using contract growers 
(Step 12). Foundation seed produced by GLDB and seed companies is inspected and certified 
by GSID (Step 13). 
Certified maize foundation seed is sold to private small-scale seed producers who are 
registered with GSID (Step 14). These seed producers (individuals and small cooperatives) 
produce commercial seed under the supervision of GSID (Step 15). Certified commercial 
seed is primarily sold through agro-input dealers (seed dealers) that are registered by GSID to 
sell seed (Steps 16, 17 and 18). Seed producers usually establish agreements or contracts with 
seed dealers to market their seed. Certified commercial seed can also be sold directly by the 
seed producers. Commercial seed is packaged in bags issued by GSID, which display a 
unique code assigned to each producer or cooperative. As product differentiation is 
permissible under the new law, the emerging seed companies have started to use their own 
seed packages. These seed companies are also highly dependent on the seed dealers to market 
their seed.   
The Agricultural Extension Services Department of MoFA is principally responsible for 
varietal promotion and all forms of seed extension (Step 19). Agricultural extension agents 
(AEAs) are tasked with informing farmers about the benefits, sources and proper use of 
improved seed. To a lesser extent, NGOs also engage in varietal promotion through field 
demonstrations and handing out free seed samples to farmers. Community-based 
organisations have not played a significant role in Ghana’s commercial maize seed system 
thus far. 
                                                          
10 The Plant Protection and Regulatory Services Directorate is the institution sanctioned to regulate and 
coordinate all plant protection services. It is subdivided into four divisions which includes the Ghana Seed 
Inspection Division. 
 
11 GLDB assumed the task of foundation seed production after the collapse of the government-owned Ghana 
Seed Company (GSC) in 1989. GLDB inherited some of its infrastructure (Lyon & Afikorah-danquah, 1998).  
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4.5.3   Influence level of actors 
As described above, the respondents were asked to score the influence of the actors on the 
desired outcome that farmers widely adopt a new maize variety. As shown in Figure 4.2, 
public extension services were perceived as having the highest influence on this outcome 
(influence level = 8). Public extension has the unique role of bridging the gap between 
research and farmers. Thus, the high score is based on the core function of extension to 
promote the use of improved seed varieties among farmers. Research institutions and the 
GSID were both assigned the next highest score (influence level = 7). As the respondents 
explained, this influence level was assigned because researchers are seen as the originators of 
a variety and are responsible for maintaining the genetic purity of the variety, while GSID is 
tasked with quality assurance at all stages of seed production as well as at all sales points. 
Certified seed producers were assigned an influence level of 6 as they are the main source of 
commercial seed of an improved variety. Similarly, seed dealers are seen as critical to the 
marketing of commercial seed (influence level = 6). Emerging local private seed companies 
had an influence level of 5 due to the fact that they also produce commercial seed, 
particularly for hybrid maize varieties. These companies also participate in an increasing 
number of activities in the seed supply system, such as foundation seed production and 
varietal promotion, though presently in a limited capacity. Correspondingly, GLDB was also 
assigned an influence level of 5 based on its pivotal role in foundation seed production. The 
NVRRC’s role in determining varietal superiority was perceived to have an influence level of 
4. The select group of farmers contacted by research institutions in setting breeding priorities 
was assigned an influence level of 3. This low level was attributed to the irregularity and the 
limited extent of farmer representativeness in this exercise. NGOs were equally assigned an 
influence level of 3. Their efforts in varietal promotion and seed distribution, though 
commendable, were perceived to have limited scope. Indeed, most seed sector activities by 
NGOs are concentrated in Northern Ghana. The National Seed Council had the lowest 
influence level on the outcome (influence level = 2) because the newly formed council was 
perceived as essentially following the recommendation of the NVRRC in releasing a new 
variety.   
4.5.4   Governance challenges of the commercial maize seed system 
This section presents the empirical analysis of the governance challenges affecting the 
different stages of the seed supply system. The theoretical considerations presented in Section 
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4.2 are applied here. Figure 4.2 highlights the identified governance challenges in the form of 
stars. 
4.5.4.1   Varietal development   
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, market failure in varietal development can stem from high 
entry costs. Concordantly, private investments by local seed companies in developing 
proprietary breeding programs in Ghana have mainly been hindered by the cost outlay of 
varietal development. The interviews revealed that the absence of a plant variety protection 
law is also an obstacle.12 Thus far, there has been no private sector involvement in maize 
varietal development in Ghana. Public breeding programs serve as the sole source of maize 
varieties, as depicted in Steps 1 through 8 of Figure 4.2. According to the information 
collected for this study, researchers in the NARIs’ breeding programs only involve farmers at 
the later stage of on-farm trials. At the initial planning stages of varietal development, farmer 
input is largely absent. A NARI maize breeder noted;  
“Participatory rural appraisals and focus group discussions with 
farmers are done with communities from time to time to determine 
farmers’ preferences for maize varieties. About every 5 to 10 years.” 
Research and Extension Linkage Committees (RELCs) were set up in 2001 to strengthen the 
linkages between research institutions and extension services. These regional platforms are 
meant to bring researchers, extension agents and farmers together to facilitate dialogue with 
the aim of making research more demand-driven. However, the research-farmer linkages in 
these committees have also proved to be weak, mainly due to poor representation of 
smallholder farmers. This points to state failure in setting breeding priorities, as mentioned in 
Section 4.2.2. A former MoFA official observed;  
“The RELCs produce priorities that are not necessarily what the farmers 
want because the committees are not representative of the everyday 
smallholder.”   
The NARIs seem to be unable to match the success of Obatanpa in satisfying farmers’ needs 
across the country’s varied maize production zones. There are instances where varieties have 
                                                          
12 At the time of submitting this article in early 2017, a draft plant breeders’ rights bill intended to provide 
ownership and protection for new varieties developed by any public and private entities is awaiting 
parliamentary approval.  
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failed to meet farmers’ preferences with regard to criteria such as grain size and milling 
quality. Furthermore, while many of the newer varieties are also quality protein maize 
varieties, almost all of the newer OPVs are early maturing (75-90 days to anthesis), which 
invariably results in comparatively lower yields.   
Consequently, the newer OPVs fail to have a yield advantage over Obatanpa. Moreover, 
Obatanpa has proved to have a remarkably stable performance, even when recycled seed is 
used. This is reflected in the following statement by a NARI social scientist;  
“Obatanpa is probably the most stable maize variety to have come out of 
our research system […] most farmers successfully reuse their seed for 
several seasons.” 
Questions have also been raised regarding the authenticity of the stated performance potential 
of some improved varieties developed by the NARIs. Needless to say, farmers’ agronomic 
practices are a critical factor that contributes to varietal performance. Nonetheless, these 
varieties are bred with cognisance of farmers’ prevailing agronomic practices (hence the 
importance of on-farm trials), and yet there tend to be significant discrepancies between 
stated and actual performance, particularly in terms of yield. A retired MoFA agronomist 
observed; 
“On the ground, the other varieties do not perform as well as Obatanpa, 
even some hybrids. On-farm tests are not sufficient proof of performance 
because the plots used are so small, so you don’t see the effect. The 
yields, storability and other desired characteristics of some of these 
other varieties are not as stable over a number of seasons.”  
The quality of the varieties developed by the research system also reflects the effectiveness of 
the NVRRC and the newly formed National Seed Council, who are the gatekeepers.  
4.5.4.2   Seed multiplication and certification 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, public sector seed multiplication and certification can lead to 
capacity and inefficiency problems. In the current system, the NARIs sell breeder seed upon 
request to GLDB as well as to private seed companies, as shown in Step 11 of Figure 4.2. 
The price at which the NARIs have to sell breeder seed to GLDB is subject to a pricing ratio 
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(1:2:4) set by the NVRRC,13 which starts with the determination of the commercial seed 
price.14 The foundation seed price is set at double that of commercial seed, and breeder seed 
price four times that amount. According to interview information, this pricing system does 
not cover the cost of breeder seed production. Moreover, GLDB often delays payments. 
Some local private seed companies have signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
NARIs to obtain inbred lines for hybrid seed production at a price that allows the NARIs to 
recover their costs. Given the capital-intensive nature of breeder seed production,15 the 
NARIs are often unable to supply adequate quantities of breeder seed. Related to this 
problem is the maintenance of breeder seed. The need to maintain a large number of different 
varieties also involves considerable costs, since the seeds must be stored under climate-
controlled conditions. Therefore, breeder seed of a number of the older maize varieties is no 
longer available. The research institutions cite financial and physical resource constraints as 
the main reasons for this problem. A NARI maize breeder expressed this concern as follows;  
“A lot of our released varieties are extinct now because if a variety is not 
demanded for 2 to 3 years, we cannot afford to keep producing seeds of 
those varieties every season. And unfortunately, we don’t have the 
capacity to store and maintain all the germplasm.”  
Breeder seed quality presents another challenge. Local private seed companies that obtain 
parental material directly from the NARIs for hybrid maize production reported to have 
experienced problems with breeder seed quality on several occasions.  
At present, GLDB still produces the bulk of foundation seed. Though domestic seed 
companies are now permitted to produce foundation seed for their own commercial seed 
production (Step 12), none of them has been sanctioned yet by the GSID to produce 
foundation seed for sale to other seed companies and producers. The information collected 
for this study as well as observation of facilities suggests that GLDB is overburdened with 
this role. This is due to financial constraints, a typical problem of publicly funded 
                                                          
13 The NVRRC essentially doubles up as the Seed Advisory Technical Committee which oversees seed pricing 
due to identical stakeholder representation on both committees. 
 
14 The seed producers association of Ghana (SEEDPAG) presents their cost of production at an annual 
stakeholder forum to set a standard seed price for OPVs and hybrids that is not mandatory but generally adhered 
to. 
 
15 Breeder seed production is an expensive process due to high production, testing and storage costs of ensuring 
varietal purity. 
 
117 
 
organisations. Visual inspection showed that the seed conditioning equipment is not state of 
the art. The seed threshing, drying and cleaning equipment used by GLDB is over 30 years 
old and frequently breaks down. GLDB also runs the only three existing large-scale cold 
storage rooms for seed in the country. These cold rooms have maximum capacities of 750, 
250 and 150 tons, respectively. Each of them is used to store foundation seed as well as 
commercial seed for some seed producers and local seed companies. Thus, GLDB only has 
the capacity to produce foundation seed in limited quantities. As a consequence, GLDB 
concentrates on a small number of maize OPVs, mainly Obatanpa, since this variety has the 
highest demand. GLDB generally avoids multiplying hybrid maize varieties, because its 
production is more onerous and expensive.  On occasion, GLDB must also ration foundation 
seed provision to seed producers when demand exceeds supply. 
The systemic problem of seed quality, which has been discussed in Section 4.2, is very much 
present at this stage of seed production as well. Seed producers have intermittently raised 
issues regarding the quality of foundation seed. This is obviously the consequence of the low 
capacity and antiquated seed conditioning equipment and facilities.   
GSID has the sole responsibility of quality assurance at all stages of seed production (Steps 
10, 13 and 16 of Figure 4.2). GSID is tasked with field inspections, monitoring of 
conditioning sites and undertaking seed tests.16 Under the new law, mandatory seed 
certification extends to foundation and breeder seed. Similar to GLDB, GSID is greatly 
under-resourced. As an industry expert revealed;  
“Currently, there are only 35 active seed inspectors nationwide. Many of 
them double up as seed samplers and seed analysts, as well. The division 
is also sorely lacking logistics such as essential seed laboratory 
equipment, vehicles for the inspectors and even computers.”  
As a consequence of this limited capacity for seed regulation, GSID’s regulatory oversight of 
source seed production (breeder and foundation seed) has become a mere formality. 
Interview information suggests that field inspectors readily certify breeder seed without 
proper testing. The NARIs are seen to be fully competent and well equipped with the 
expertise to ensure high breeder seed quality. However, even with the experience and 
expertise of the NARIs, the absence of effective regulation can lead to complacency. Quality 
                                                          
16 Ghana applies the International Seed Testing Association (ISTA) rules for seed testing. 
 
118 
 
assurance of foundation seed production by GLDB faces a similar challenge. The National 
Seed Council has the authority to sanction private seed companies to produce foundation seed 
for sale. However, GSID has concerns with authorising dispersed companies to commercially 
produce foundation seed as this will increase GSID’s regulatory responsibilities. The 
following statement of a respondent reflects this concern;  
“Private companies selling foundation seed will be challenging to 
regulate because GSID is even struggling to handle commercial seed 
certification as it is.” 
GSID is most active at the commercial seed stage of the production chain. Field inspectors 
are required to visit all the production fields of seed producers and seed companies at least 
five times during the certification process.17 However, this goal is seldom achieved. The small 
number of inspectors is simply unable to monitor all the dispersed seed production fields. 
Very often, the seed producers and local seed companies have to incur the cost of 
transportation of inspectors to ensure field visits. Seed producers and seed companies are 
already charged for each inspection. Thus, many seed producers operate with minimal 
supervision and quality assurance at the production stage. Another major concern is the 
conflict of interest arising from some GSID inspectors engaging in commercial seed 
production. This is forbidden by law, but not strictly enforced. A seed producer expressed 
concerns as follows;   
“Some of the seed inspectors themselves are seed producers. The 
referees are playing the game. So who is going to regulate the 
regulators? And these inspectors have an unfair advantage in securing 
breeder and foundation seed.” 
This conflict of interest is an empirical finding of state failure in seed multiplication and 
certification that is not covered under the theoretical considerations presented in Section 4.2.  
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Field inspections are to be done as part of the initial application process to become a registered seed 
producer/company; followed by a pre-planting inspection; two inspections at the pre-flowering and post 
flowering stages; and a final inspection during harvesting. 
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4.5.4.3   Seed marketing and promotion 
With reference to Section 4.2.4, market failure in seed marketing and promotion can be 
caused by seed adulteration, a free rider problem, and high transaction costs. State failure can 
also occur due to the transaction intensity and discretionary nature of these activities.  
A key duty of inspectors after seeds are produced is to supervise the filling and sealing of 
seed bags by seed producers and local seed companies. Certified maize seed is packaged in 
1kg polythene bags, which are subsequently placed in 45kg bags. The 1kg seed bags are 
produced in response to the small quantities of commercial seed purchased by most small 
scale farmers. Standard packaging material issued by GSID is used, except for five seed 
companies who use their own brands. This generic packaging material has proved easy to 
imitate. This practice is motivated by the fact that the price of certified commercial seed is 
approximately twice the price of maize grain for OPVs and five times the price of grains of 
hybrids. Thus, it is common that merchants sell maize grain packaged as certified seed. Field 
inspections at the time of harvest determine the number of packages issued to a producer. 
This could also lead to seed adulteration as the number of field inspectors is rather limited. 
However, unregistered seed dealers appear to be the main source of fraudulent commercial 
seed, rather than seed producers or even collusions between seed producers and merchants. 
This is reflected in the following statement by the owner of a local seed company;   
“Fake seed being sold by these unlicensed agro-input dealers 
everywhere has become the bane of the seed industry. A lot of farmers 
have grown disillusioned with the quality of certified seed and don’t 
want to invest.” 
There have been a number of cases where farmers who purchased sub-standard maize seed 
have lodged complaints with GSID. Yet, there is still no formalised procedure in place for 
addressing such complaints. The new law provides severer penalties for duplicitous activity 
in the commercial seed sector. There have been a few confirmed cases of incarcerations for 
seed adulteration following the passing of the new law. However, the monitoring system of 
seed dealers is rather limited, as GSID lacks the resources to implement effective regulation 
at sales points (Step 18 of Figure 4.2).    
In terms of varietal promotion, seed dealers usually lack sufficient information about the 
characteristics and management of varieties to effectively promote them. Many farmers do 
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not even have access to these seed dealers whose marketing channels fail to extend to most 
rural areas.18 Local seed companies and seed producers are also reluctant to invest in the 
promotion of products that can be sold by direct competitors, given the non-exclusivity rights 
of varieties developed by the NARIs. As a consequence, other than public sector AEAs, only 
NGOs have engaged in any significant varietal promotion.  
The commercial seed sector mainly depends on MoFA’s AEAs to promote the use of 
improved seed varieties amongst farmers (Step 19 of Figure 4.2). Yet, similar to GLDB and 
GSID, public extension services are grossly under-resourced to be able to effectively perform 
this function. The current extension-farmer ratio in Ghana is 1:1,500 as opposed to the 
recommended ratio of 1:500 (MoFA, 2015c). This human resource problem is coupled with a 
lack of logistics such as vehicles and working gear, as well as operational funds to carry out 
demonstrations, field days and farmer field schools. 
4.6   Discussion 
This study aimed to contribute to the literature on the governance challenges of developing 
seed systems in Africa, taking the chronic lack of varietal diversity in Ghana’s commercial 
maize seed system as an empirical example. From the theoretical considerations presented in 
Section 4.2, it is evident that each sector has its own governance challenges in seed supply. 
State failure in seed supply systems has motivated the liberalisation and restructuring of the 
African seed industry. However, our case study of Ghana suggests that these efforts have not 
been sufficient in ensuring an effective seed supply system. The reasons are discussed in the 
following sub-sections. 
4.6.1   Breeding strategies 
In spite of privatisation efforts, maize varietal development in Ghana has remained a purely 
public sector activity. The number of improved varieties that the public system released is 
comparable to that of other countries in the sub-region (Table 4.1). Yet, only Obatanpa 
remains popular among maize farmers. The demand for improved varieties is invariably 
linked, at least in part, to the performance of the research system. This is reflected in the high 
average influence level (influence level=7) assigned to the research system in the Net-Map 
exercise. This study indicates that the state failure of deficient farmer participation in the 
                                                          
18 Krausova and Banful (2010) identified a total of 3,425 agricultural input dealers in Ghana in 2009 ranging 
from small transient retailers to large input wholesalers. Most input dealers were concentrated in urban and peri-
urban areas with 59% of them selling seed.  
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NARIs’ breeding strategy has resulted in instances where varieties failed to meet farmers’ 
preferences. Some preferences were correctly identified; most notably increased yield and 
storability, but the new varieties did not outperform Obatanpa in this respect. This 
presumptive breeding approach has made maize varietal development a “hit or miss” 
exercise. However, without survey data on farmers’ evaluations, there is limited scope to 
accurately estimate the extent to which wrong priorities versus inefficiency in meeting 
priorities account for breeding shortfalls. Private sector involvement in varietal development 
can lead to more efficient outcomes as evidenced by the maize breeding efforts of domestic 
companies in countries like Kenya and Zambia (see De Groote et al., 2015). However, state-
managed breeding programs which emphasise participatory breeding strategies could also 
produce the varieties that farmers’ desire. Collective action by farmers can make such 
programs more accountable (cf. Sperling et al., 2001). 
4.6.2   Managing seed multiplication 
The production and management of source seed is another activity which has traditionally 
been the domain of the public sector in Ghana’s seed system. As the originators of maize 
varieties, the NARIs are also tasked with breeder seed production. Consistent with the 
findings of Tripp and Rohrbach (2001), this case study confirms that there are no specific 
budget allocations for breeder seed production. Breeding activities typically take priority 
when apportioning limited resources because varietal releases are a primary measure of the 
NARIs’ performance. This state failure of an incentive problem has led to the maintenance of 
only a restricted number of breeding lines with focus on Obatanpa. A solution to this problem 
could be that seed companies make in advance binding contracts with public research 
institutions for the amount of breeder seed that they want to purchase. 
GLDB mirrors the resource constraints of the NARIs in the production of foundation seed. 
The state failures of capacity and inefficiency problems have resulted in a focus on bulking a 
select number of OPVs that are comparatively cheaper to produce than hybrids and have 
significantly higher market demand. The influence level of 5 that was assigned by 
respondents to GLDB reflects the parastatal’s monopoly of this stage of seed multiplication. 
In many African countries, breeder seed will mostly come from the public sector, but there is 
no reason why private entities should not produce and market foundation seed, provided that 
the demand for commercial seed is sufficient to allow for full cost recovery of foundation 
seed production (Tripp, 2000). In Zambia, for example, foundation seed is produced entirely 
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by the private sector (World Bank, 2014). Despite the potential quality and efficiency gains 
of privatised foundation seed production as evidenced by Zambia’s seed system, this study 
finds that in Ghana, there is a reluctance of the public sector to relinquish control over this 
stage of seed production. This resistance appears to be stemming mainly from the increased 
regulatory responsibilities that would follow from foundation seed production by the private 
sector. There is also a need to better understand the political economy of this resistance, as 
there may be vested interests as well. 
4.6.3   Quality assurance  
Another key issue in the commercial seed system has been quality assurance. The mandatory 
certification of all classes of seed under the new law places GSID in a very influential 
position, as reflected in respondents’ perceptions (influence level=7). However, the findings 
reveal that this extended regulatory oversight does not appear to have substantially improved 
maize seed quality in Ghana. GSID is yet another government agency that is overburdened 
and under-resourced. As a consequence, GSID’s limited regulatory resources are mainly 
dedicated to commercial seed inspection and certification. Less attention is paid to source 
seed quality assurance and retail inspections. Previous studies have established the chronic 
market failures of poor quality commercial seed, seed adulteration and the regulatory 
challenges thereof (Langyintuo et al., 2010; Tahirou et al., 2009; Tripp & Louwaars, 1997). 
This paper further highlights the state failure of major seed quality issues with source seed 
production which invariably contributes to poor quality commercial seed. Charging official 
fees based on the costs of mandatory government-run seed certification can help to overcome 
the regulatory challenge of limited resources (World Bank, 2016). Another viable approach is 
finding an effective means by which public sector agencies share regulatory responsibilities 
with private seed companies. This could take the form of seed companies that are accredited 
to assume some certification responsibilities, as practiced in Zimbabwe where several seed 
companies are licensed to certify seed. Other options include a Quality Declared Seed 
System19 as practiced in Tanzania and Zambia, and authorising the sale of “truthfully labeled 
seed”20 (van Gastel et al., 2002; Tripp, 2000).   
                                                          
19 Under the system design, seed producers are tasked with meeting set quality standards. The system is 
particularly suited to countries with limited regulatory resources as it relies on randomised field and sales point 
inspections rather than general mandatory inspections (FAO, 2006; FAO, 1993). 
 
20 The seed producer must ensure that the seed is tested and the results indicated on the label. Seed producers are 
legally liable for stated seed quality. 
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4.6.4   Varietal promotion efforts  
The overreliance on a public extension system that has limited resources for varietal 
promotion has resulted in the problem that most farmers in Ghana are oblivious to varieties 
on offer in the seed system. Ragasa et al. (2013) reported that lack of awareness was the main 
reason cited by farmers for not purchasing certified maize seed varieties.  In line with these 
findings, respondents in this study identified extension services as having the highest 
influence level of 8. The study’s findings suggest that donor-sponsored projects have been the 
most effective channels of maize varietal promotion in Ghana in the past. Sasakawa Global 
2000 was the most extensive technology transfer program in Ghana in over a decade. As a 
consequence, Obatanpa, which was promoted by this program, has enjoyed an unrivalled 
level of promotion among farmers compared to other varieties. However, the seed system 
cannot remain reliant on external funding for promotional activities, especially given the 
central role extension agents play in the diffusion of agricultural innovations (Rogers, 2003). 
State failure in seed promotion can be overcome by increased financial and logistical support 
to public extension services. Public research institutions could also be more proactive in 
promoting their varieties by allocating resources to technology transfer activities. 
Alternatively, exclusive licensing of public sector varieties to seed companies provides an 
incentive for private sector investment in seed promotion. Such licensing would solve the 
market failure of a free-rider problem in seed promotion.   
Overall, the perceived levels of influence assigned by respondents to the various actors 
underline the fact that even in a liberalised seed system, public sector institutions continue to 
play a critical role in Ghana. Their deficiencies, which have persisted for many years, have 
not been overcome by the involvement of private actors. The aim that increased private sector 
participation would lead to increased maize varietal diversity in Ghana has, therefore, not 
been achieved thus far. To address the observed governance challenges, public institutions 
would require a more effective participation of farmers in their breeding programs, better cost 
recovery strategies and increased investment by the government. A pro-privatisation bias and 
a pro-hybrid seed bias may not be the only effective means of developing an effective seed 
supply system. The case of Obatanpa demonstrates that if an improved variety meets farmers’ 
needs and there is a concerted effort to promote it, diffusion among farmers can be very 
successful. Moreover, the development of effective community-based organisations that 
enable communities to manage their own seed production could also play an important role in 
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increasing the availability of improved seed varieties to farmers. Indeed, this is an aspect of 
the African seed industry that deserves further attention.    
Finally, the study provides some insights on research methods. Process Net-Map proved to be 
an effective tool for an empirical investigation of the governance challenges in seed supply 
that had been identified on a theoretical basis in the first part of this paper. The tool was 
especially useful in elucidating the complexities of the multi-stakeholder governance in 
maize seed supply. Process Net-Map relies on visualisation, which proved very useful in 
revealing implicit knowledge and identifying sensitive governance issues, which are not 
easily discovered in other types of interviews. However, the tool also has its limitations. In 
particular, it is better suited for analysing existing situations than for identifying untapped 
potentials, such as the potential role that community-based seed organisations could play in 
improving seed supply in Ghana. 
4.7   Conclusions  
In this paper, the governance challenges involved at the different stages of formal seed supply 
systems were analysed from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Ghana’s commercial 
maize seed sector was used as a case study. The analysis, which was based on Process Net-
Map and expert interviews, revealed that a combination of market and state failures account 
for the lack of varietal diversity in commercial seed provision. The theoretical concepts and 
the empirical findings provide instructive insights for seed system development, which are 
likely to be relevant for other African countries. 
The findings indicate that addressing state failure in varietal development greatly hinges on 
increased smallholder involvement in setting breeding priorities. Public sector source seed 
production and government-run mandatory certification systems, which are prevalent in 
Africa, are jeopardised by the lack of binding contracts and official fee schedules to enable 
cost recovery. This shortcoming perpetuates the state failure that occurs in the form of 
incentive problems as well as capacity constraints and inefficiency. Source seed production 
by the private sector continues to be limited and certification modalities appear to undermine 
the ongoing liberalisation efforts. State and market failures in seed promotion also persist due 
to a lack of adequate state investment in public extension services and due to the absence of 
exclusive licensing rights of public varieties to the private sector. These findings indicate that 
there is a need to pay more attention to the political economy of such seed sector reforms. 
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Overall, the findings indicate that more emphasis should be placed on exploiting the 
complementary roles that the public sector, the private sector and the yet underdeveloped 
third sector can play in ensuring that farmers in Africa get better access to improved seeds. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis set out to explore the policy and institutional environment needed to foster the 
development of biomass-based value webs in Ghana in the emerging bioeconomy. As part of 
the BiomassWeb project that focuses on the entire biomass production system of locally 
adapted crops in Sub-Saharan Africa, the study investigated the governance and institutional 
challenges related to the development of the emerging value webs of cassava and maize in 
Ghana. The thesis therefore addressed three main research objectives. First, it explored the 
policies and institutional arrangements needed to foster the development of a competitive and 
sustainable cassava value web. Second, it examined which contract conditions are sustainable 
for both farmers and agribusiness firms in cassava contract farming. Third, it empirically 
analysed the governance challenges of the commercial maize seed supply system. Each of 
these three main objectives constituted a separate chapter of the thesis. Ghana was chosen for 
the study on account of its high potential for biomass production and its relatively large 
investments in agribusiness (Duku et al., 2011; OECD, 2008). 
The academic relevance of this study lies in its contribution towards addressing the 
governance and institutional challenges of biomass value webs in the emerging bioeconomy 
in Africa. Guided by the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.1), this 
discussion chapter summarises the empirical findings and examines what this means for the 
institutions, processes and actors that are relevant for the development of biomass value 
webs. Accordingly, the chapter presents a summary of the main findings, discusses the 
academic and practical implications for governance of biomass value webs in the emerging 
bioeconomy, outlines the methodological limitations of the case studies and makes 
recommendations for future research and policy reforms.  
5.1   Summary of the main results 
Chapter 2 addresses the requisite policy and institutional environment needed to foster the 
development of a competitive and sustainable bioeconomy within an African context. The 
novel concept of ‘biomass-based value webs’ is combined with Porter’s Diamond model to 
analyse the extent to which Ghana is positioned to develop a competitive cassava value web. 
Empirical data collection involved mapping the physical biomass flows, applying the ‘Net-
Map’ tool to identify all the actors in the emerging value web and their linkages, as well as 
in-depth interviews with the identified actors.  
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The empirical results show that there are significant coordination problems between actors in 
the emerging cassava value web due to weak institutional linkages. Farmers have low 
incentive to increase production due to marketing challenges. This results in processors 
operating well below installed capacity due to insufficient supply of cassava from farmers. 
Industrial end-users in turn remain reluctant to use cassava based products due to inconsistent 
supply from processors. Public research institutions have been the driving force of innovation 
in the value web. The Food Research Institute has been instrumental in the development and 
application of cassava products. The primary crop breeding institutions and the public 
universities have also been effective in developing improved cassava cultivars. However, 
uptake among farmers has remained relatively low. The limited number of agricultural 
extension agents to promote these technologies has been a contributing factor to the low 
adoption rate. Access to formal sources of financing for farmers and processors also remains 
a critical challenge. Banks and microfinance institutions offer high interest rates for loans and 
credit facilities that make them inaccessible to most enterprises. These institutional 
challenges have inhibited the role supporting institutions are supposed to play in facilitating 
much needed investments in ‘factor upgrading’ in cassava production and processing in 
Ghana. Unsuccessful government initiatives such as the Presidential Special Initiative on 
cassava starch and the absence of legislation such as a composite flour policy or a biofuel 
blend policy have also been major contributing factors to the unrealised industrial potential of 
cassava in Ghana thus far. 
Chapter 3 addresses the increased importance of contract farming in Africa due to growing 
competition for biomass-based raw materials, emphasising the need for sustainable 
contractual arrangements. A comparative case study approach of a state-run and a private 
sector operated cassava outgrower scheme in Ghana is used to investigate which contract 
farming arrangements are equitable and sustainable for both farmers and agribusiness firms. 
A complementary combination of in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and primary 
survey data is employed to assess the sustainability of these institutional arrangements.  
The findings reveal that although cassava is a staple crop in Ghana that has traditionally been 
cultivated with minimal inputs, ad hoc or opportunistic investments that merely provide a 
marketing outlet for smallholders are not sufficient to ensure the success of outgrower 
schemes. The public firm’s outgrower scheme constitutes a low investment informal contract 
farming model. The firm does not invest resources in outgrowers’ cassava production and as 
such is not saddled with monitoring costs. There is also no prior commitment to buy from any 
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specific suppliers. The consequence however is limited control over the quantity and quality 
of produce supplied which increases the risk of the firm not meeting the specific needs of its 
off-taker. Thus the scheme, which initially aimed to improve the socioeconomic conditions of 
smallholders in the area, is ultimately not beneficial to either the firm or outgrowers. The firm 
receives an insufficient supply of cassava roots from outgrowers. Outgrowers’ productivity 
and revenue from cassava production also do not appear to have increased through the 
arrangement. The private firm’s outgrower scheme represents a more capital intensive and 
formalised contract farming arrangement. Due to the provision of inputs, technical assistance 
and crop transportation, the firm retains more control over the quality and volumes of 
outgrowers’ output. This makes for more efficient sourcing of cassava roots. Even though the 
firm offers a low contract price with a contestable price determination mechanism, they 
appear to be able to effectively enforce the contract and control side-selling. The firm is able 
to earn a profit from the arrangement. Outgrowers also have high farm productivity and earn 
comparatively higher returns from cassava production than other farmers. The evidence 
highlights the tendency of public sector schemes to be bureaucratic and lack financial 
autonomy. Private sector ventures on the other hand tend to adopt authoritarian management 
styles and can also be prone to opportunistic behaviour in contract arrangements with 
smallholders. Therefore, public-private partnerships in outgrower schemes can present a 
viable remedy that harnesses the strengths of both sectors and overcomes their institutional 
weaknesses. 
Chapter 4 addresses the governance challenges of commercial seed supply in Africa. The 
study applies theoretical concepts of New Institutional Economics to identify potential 
governance challenges involved in the different stages of the seed supply system. The 
commercial maize seed sector in Ghana is used for an empirical case study. For data 
collection, the participatory mapping technique known as Process Net-Map is applied, 
together with expert interviews involving a diverse set of stakeholders.  
The results from the analysis revealed that a combination of market and state failures account 
for the lack of varietal diversity in commercial maize seed provision in Ghana. The well-
known constraints caused by the dominance of public sector institutions in seed supply, have 
not been overcome by reform efforts that aimed to promote the private sector. The state 
failure of deficient farmer participation in the national agricultural research institutes’ 
breeding strategy has resulted in instances where varieties failed to meet farmers’ 
preferences. Some preferences were correctly identified; most notably increased yield and 
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storability, but the new varieties did not outperform the dominant variety, Obatanpa, in this 
respect. This presumptive breeding approach has made maize varietal development a “hit or 
miss” exercise. There is also the state failure of an incentive problem in breeder seed 
production. Breeding activities typically take priority when apportioning limited resources 
because varietal releases are a primary measure of the national agricultural research 
institutes’ performance. This has led to the maintenance of only a restricted number of 
breeding lines. The Grains and Legumes Development Board mirrors the resource constraints 
of the national agricultural research institutes in the production of foundation seed. The state 
failures of capacity and inefficiency problems have resulted in a focus on bulking a select 
number of open pollinated varieties that are comparatively cheaper to produce than hybrids 
and have significantly higher market demand. The Ghana Seed Inspection Division is yet 
another government agency that is overburdened and under-resourced. As a consequence, the 
limited regulatory resources are mainly dedicated to commercial seed inspection and 
certification. Less attention is paid to source seed quality assurance and retail inspections. 
This has led to the state failure of major seed quality issues with source seed production as 
well as market failures of poor quality commercial seed and seed adulteration. The 
overreliance on a public extension system that has limited resources for varietal promotion 
has resulted in the state failure of the poor promotion of improved seed varieties among most 
farmers in Ghana. There is also the market failure of a free-rider problem in seed promotion. 
Local seed companies and seed producers are reluctant to invest in the promotion of varieties 
developed by the national agricultural research institutes, given the non-exclusivity rights of 
these varieties. 
5.2   Contribution to the literature 
The thesis makes several contributions to the academic literature by engaging with the wider 
debates on biomass utilisation and new biomass demands, contact farming as a procurement 
system as well as commercial seed sector development in Africa.  
Chapter 2 contributes to the growing literature on diversified biomass utilisation in Africa. 
The chapter empirically investigated the role of government policy and institutional 
coordination between public, private and third sector actors in facilitating the effective 
utilisation of crop biomass in the emerging bioeconomy. The results emphasise how staple 
crops like cassava can have cascading utilisations beyond food that do not necessarily impact 
negatively on food security. This chapter contributes to the debate on the impact of the non-
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food uses of crop biomass on food security by applying the novel multidimensional concept 
of biomass-based value webs. The results show that bioeconomy strategies and ensuring food 
security need not be mutually exclusive. Therefore, the findings support the claim that such 
strategies have the potential to actually improve food security and economic development, 
particularly by utilising crop residues and by-products for economic gains (see Cardoen et al., 
2015; Johnson & Altman, 2014; Liu et al., 2008). The literature shows that very few policies 
in Africa have supported this approach of optimising the utilisation of bioeconomy crops (see 
BÖR, 2015; Jumbe et al., 2009). The study however underscores the need for bioeconomy 
strategies in Africa to be driven by the interests of economic actors such as farmers, 
agribusinesses and industrial end-users. This approach is exemplified by the excise tax on 
local content beers that has successfully promoted the production of cassava based beer in the 
brewery industry not only in Ghana but also in countries like Mozambique (see Parmigiani & 
Rivera-Santos, 2015). Past policy attempts such as the Presidential Special Initiatives on 
cassava in Ghana and Nigeria were greatly influenced by the African Union (AU). These 
policies were ultimately unsustainable because they were not demand-driven and failed to 
actively involve private and third sector actors from the onset (see Sanni, 2011). Thus, the 
study’s findings make the contribution of demonstrating that economic incentives rather than 
external political initiatives should be the impetus behind bioeconomy strategies in Africa to 
ensure sustainability. Further research is therefore required to delve into the political 
incentives that drive government policies aimed at developing the emerging bioeconomy in 
Africa.   
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on the importance and sustainability of contract 
farming in Africa. The chapter empirically investigated the role of contract design in 
facilitating sustainable contract farming arrangements between farmers and agribusinesses. 
This study complements the contract farming literature that has mainly focused on 
contractual relationships for high-value export products from Africa (see e.g. Balineau, 2013; 
Jones & Gibbon, 2011; Bolwig et al., 2009; Kherallah et al., 2002). It uniquely focuses on 
rapidly developing domestic value chains in the emerging bioeconomy. The findings add 
empirical weight to the argument that state-led contract farming schemes are generally not an 
effective government mechanism for overcoming market failures that inhibit the 
commercialisation of agricultural production by smallholders (see Ochieng, 2010; Dannson et 
al., 2004; Grosh, 1994). The results reveal that common contract provisions characteristic of 
the aim of promoting smallholder inclusion such as financial support for inputs and technical 
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assistance are absent in the state scheme. The evidence supports the claim that the continued 
existence of inefficient state-led schemes often signals the lack of an enabling environment 
for the private sector to effectively take over these functions (see Oya, 2012). The 
government has neglected public investments in extension, infrastructure and regulatory 
reforms that would reduce the costs and risks inherent in agricultural contracting. Instead, the 
state participates directly in the market. On the other hand the study also finds that the 
growing spot market for cassava in Ghana is actually contributing to more sustainable 
contract farming arrangements. This goes contrary to the argument that agricultural 
commodities with well-developed local markets are not suitable for contract farming because 
they are associated with a high risk of pervasive side-selling (see World Bank, 2014; Minot, 
2011; Minot, 2007). The results show that the competitive buying environment for cassava is 
leading agribusinesses to offer better contract conditions to farmers to reduce the incidence of 
side-selling. At the same time, contract terms that clearly detail the penalties for non-
compliance are being incorporated into these arrangements. This combination of favourable 
contract conditions and explicit penalties for contract breaches is promoting contractual 
arrangements within an increasingly competitive market context. This also raises the question 
of the extent to which innovations in contract design and operational modalities by the private 
sector can help overcome the legal, regulatory and institutional constraints of contract 
farming. 
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on seed system development in Africa. It empirically 
investigated the governance challenges in seed supply following the liberalisation of the 
commercial seed sector. The study uniquely applies a comprehensive theoretical overview of 
the potential governance challenges in seed supply to the empirical data. The evidence 
suggests that despite liberalisation efforts driven by donor initiatives, the public sector 
remains reluctant to fully relinquish control over seed production to the private sector. This is 
in line with past observations that the extent of actual seed sector reforms in Africa has 
generally been superficial (see e.g. Alemu et al., 2008; Muhhuku, 2002; Tripp & Rohrbach, 
2001). However, the findings also reveal that a public sector dominated seed supply system 
based on open pollinated varieties can be effective under the right conditions. This goes 
contrary to the overwhelmingly pro-privatisation and pro-hybrid seed literature on 
commercial seed sector development (see e.g. Abate et al., 2015; Mathenge et al., 2014; 
Smale & Mason, 2014; Ariga & Jayne, 2009). With respect to varietal development, the 
results suggest that the lack of a plant variety protection law has been an impediment to 
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private sector investment. This supports the literature claiming that enforceable intellectual 
property rights are necessary to stimulate private investment in crop improvement (see 
Kolady et al., 2012; Naseem et al., 2010; Kanwar & Evenson, 2003). In terms of regulation, 
the findings show that the government regulator does not have the capacity to ensure that 
certification regulations are consistently adhered to. This supports the claim that mandatory 
seed testing and certification has not been an effective means of ensuring high seed quality 
for farmers across Africa (see Yami & Asten, 2017; Guei et al., 2011; Tripp, 2006). Similar 
to other studies, the results of the study also reveal that such certification regulations tend to 
undermine liberalisation efforts by effectively restricting the distribution of new varieties and 
alternative methods of seed provision (see Wattnem, 2016; Rohrbach et al., 2003). Overall, 
the critical insights from this study emphasise the influence of public sector activities in the 
commercial seed sector even after reforms. This raises unanswered questions of the vested 
interests and policy beliefs (see Mockshell & Birner, 2015) behind the resistance by public 
officials to liberalisation efforts in commercial seed supply.  
5.3   Implications for governance of the bioeconomy   
In line with the conceptual framework in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.1), the empirical results of the 
thesis sheds light on the roles public, private and third sector actors are playing as the 
agricultural sector transitions from a food-supplying to a biomass-supplying and processing 
sector in the emerging bioeconomy. As shown in the framework, the development and 
functioning of biomass value webs (the lower domain) depends on the roles and various 
interactions between different international, public, private and civil society actors in the 
governance system (the upper domain). These interactions include policy processes, 
regulation, funding, knowledge transfer, exchange of goods and services as well as lobbying. 
5.3.1   The role of the public sector  
In developing the bioeconomy, it is important for the government to be committed to 
supporting both food production and new demands for the non-food uses of crop biomass as 
shown in the conceptual framework. The results from Chapters 2 and 4 of the thesis show 
that the government has retained significant control over emerging biomass value webs, 
focusing mainly on food production. Chapter 4 reveals that maize varietal development has 
remained a purely public sector activity with the national agricultural research institutes 
concentrating on developing a number of quality protein maize varieties for direct human 
consumption. There is however also growing demand for maize in other industries such as 
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the poultry and brewery industries that is currently not being met. Similarly, Chapter 2 
reveals that government support for the development of the cassava sub-sector in Ghana has 
been directed at improving farm productivity to ensure food security. There has been less 
emphasis on commercialisation and industrial development, even though this is also essential 
for developing biomass value webs. Accordingly, the interactions between the government 
and other actors such as knowledge institutions and farmers, as depicted in the upper domain 
of the conceptual framework, have centred on efficiency gains at the input supply and 
biomass production stages of the value web with food as the main output.  
An exception to the government’s focus on food production was found to be the Presidential 
Special Initiative (PSI) on cassava starch introduced in 2001. This initiative aimed at 
promoting new uses of cassava at the biomass trading and processing stage of the value web. 
However, as shown in the upper domain of the conceptual framework, such policy initiatives 
have largely been influenced by supranational organisations such as the African Union (AU) 
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It must be noted that the 
motivation behind such regional policy directions might be disguised donor initiatives as the 
system remains heavily dependent on donor funding. Even though the support of these 
external actors is certainly necessary for developing the bioeconomy, it will not be sufficient 
if the impetus only comes from them. The findings from Chapters 2 and 3 shows that the PSI 
on cassava starch, which involved the establishment of a government-owned starch 
processing factory, represents a top-down approach that has proved to be unsustainable due to 
coordination failures and a lack of complementary investments by private sector actors. 
Conversely, these case studies reveal that initiatives such as the excise tax on local content 
beers, influenced by the brewery industry, has successfully promoted the production of 
cassava based beer in Ghana. Therefore, integrated approaches to bioeconomy strategies 
based on the economic incentives of private and third sector actors prove to be more 
sustainable than strategies based on external political initiatives. Such ‘home-grown 
strategies’ foster increased institutional involvement in biomass demand and supply 
arrangements along the value web.       
5.3.2   The role of the private sector 
Vibrant private sector enterprises are a critical component to developing the bioeconomy. 
The results from Chapters 3 and 4 reveal that the roles of private sector actors along biomass 
value webs, as depicted in the upper domain of the conceptual framework, have thus far been 
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hampered by a less than conducive enabling environment. Chapter 3 shows that the state 
participates directly in cassava trading and processing instead of investing in extension, 
infrastructure and regulatory reforms to propel private sector dynamism. This observation not 
only applies to cassava but also to maize. Chapter 4 reveals that despite reform efforts aimed 
at privatising source seed production, the public sector retains significant control over maize 
breeder seed and foundation seed production. Thus, the shift from direct government 
involvement in economic activities along the value web to creating an enabling environment 
for the private sector to takeover has been slow.  
A knock on effect of the current business environment has been a lack of private sector 
investments. The results from Chapters 2 and 4 of the thesis show that there has been limited 
private sector participation at the input supply, the biomass trading and processing as well as 
the consumption stages of the value web as depicted in the lower domain of the framework. 
Chapter 2 reveals that medium and large scale cassava processors tend to struggle to compete 
with the price of imported goods due to the high costs of finance. Consequently, potential 
end-users of cassava products, such as the pharmaceutical and textile industries, are unwilling 
to switch from cheaper imported alternatives and commit resources to develop the needed 
domestic supply chains. Likewise, Chapter 4 indicates that private sector investment in maize 
varietal development has been discouraged by the lack of a plant variety protection law. 
Chapter 4 also demonstrates the reluctance of private seed companies to invest in the 
promotion of public maize varieties given the non-exclusivity rights of these varieties. The 
lack of investments by the private sector has limited the development of new markets and the 
industrial-scale utilisation of crop biomass for the non-food uses displayed in the lower 
domain of the framework. 
5.3.3   The role of the third sector 
The third sector can potentially play an important role in the development of the bioeconomy, 
especially if there are deficiencies in the public and private sectors. This would require strong 
farmer-based organisations. However, the results from Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis 
highlight the fact that farmers of staple crops are still not well organised. Thus, they are 
unable to effectively exert pressure on the public and private sectors to produce the needed 
productivity-enhancing technological and institutional innovations at the input supply and 
biomass production stages of the value web as shown in the lower domain of the framework. 
This is true both for cassava and maize. Chapter 3 shows that cassava smallholders have yet 
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to form strong farmer-based organisations that can help ensure that contracts with 
agribusiness firms are equitable. Similarly, Chapter 4 reveals the lack of collective action by 
farmers to ensure that the national agricultural research institutes are developing maize 
varieties that farmers’ desire by using participatory breeding strategies. 
NGOs can also play an important role in supporting both government and private sector 
activities for the development of the bioeconomy. Their interventions can help overcome 
market and state failures at the various stages of the value web. Towards that end, they can 
also help build the capacity of farmer-based organisations. As shown in the upper domain of 
the conceptual framework, these organisations are funded by donors. Their incentives may 
therefore be suboptimal because they are driven by foreign ideas. This can lead to 
unsustainable outcomes. Chapter 2 shows that the interventions of Sasakawa Global 2000 in 
maize breeding and seed production have not been very effective in the long run, even though 
they had a positive impact in the short run. NGOs may also have limited coverage in 
supporting activities along biomass value webs. The findings of Chapters 2 and 3 reveal the 
absence of any noteworthy interventions by NGOs in support of the development of the 
cassava value web. 
Overall, the thesis results demonstrate that growth of the private and third sectors are critical 
to developing the bioeconomy. Gradual state withdrawal must coincide with the government 
creating an enabling environment for the private sector to thrive. Collective action among 
farmers must also be encouraged and strengthened through the promotion of farmer-based 
approaches. Therefore, the driving force behind strategies for more efficient biomass 
production and utilisation in the emerging bioeconomy must come from private sector actors 
and community-based organisations in order to be sustainable. Donors can only play a 
supportive role for these coordinated public, private and third sector initiatives. 
5.4   Limitations of methods   
The thesis employed a range of analytical techniques and data collection methods in the 
empirical case studies. Each of these approaches has both strengths and limitations. The 
limitations of the methods are acknowledged with the aim of benefiting future empirical 
research. 
In Chapter 2, the Net-Map tool was applied to identify how all the actors in the emerging 
cassava value web are linked and elicit the challenges and opportunities of developing a 
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cassava based bioeconomy. Ideally, this participatory mapping exercise should be carried out 
with a representative group of knowledgeable stakeholders to facilitate comprehensive 
mapping (see Schiffer & Hauck, 2010). It however proved challenging to assemble 
stakeholders for the group exercise. To overcome this limitation, multiple Net-Map exercises 
were conducted on an individual basis with some of the stakeholders. This approach was 
further complemented with information from subsequent in-depth interviews with other 
stakeholders. 
In Chapter 3, the two case studies assessing the sustainability of cassava outgrower schemes 
were based on a mixed method approach. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions 
were combined with household surveys conducted at both study sites. Although there is not 
an established minimum sample size for rigorous probit analysis, larger sample sizes could 
have produced more robust results. The sample sizes of the surveys were the result of the 
availability of cassava farmers in relation to the time and resource constraints of the field 
research. It must also be noted that in the case of the survey for the private outgrower 
scheme, all 65 outgrowers were included in the study. Furthermore, though a mixed methods 
approach was employed, the study emphasised in-depth qualitative analysis of contract 
design rather than an impact assessment of the schemes. An econometric tool such as 
propensity score matching would have been better suited if the aim of the study was to carry 
out a rigorous impact evaluation.      
In Chapter 4, the Process Net-Map tool was applied to investigate the governance challenges 
in seed supply. Similar to the Net-Map tool used in Chapter 2, the ideal situation of 
assembling stakeholders for the exercise proved challenging. This necessitated the need for 
multiple Process Net-Map exercises with individual stakeholders which were complemented 
with information from subsequent in-depth interviews. Furthermore, within the context of the 
study, the Process Net-Map tool was especially useful in elucidating the existing complexities 
of the multi-stakeholder governance in maize seed supply. However, it proved less suitable in 
identifying untapped potentials, such as the potential role that community-based seed 
organisations could play in improving seed supply in Ghana. 
5.5   Policy recommendations 
In line with the main objective of this thesis, current governance and institutional challenges 
of emerging biomass-based value webs were evaluated. Accordingly, the results presented in 
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the three empirical chapters of the thesis provide a range of insights on the policy reforms 
needed to address these challenges. These broad-based policy reforms are proposed below.  
a) Strengthening the capacity and incentives of agricultural knowledge institutions 
The results from Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 highlight the need for increased government 
investment in agricultural knowledge institutions such as public research institutions and 
extension services. Public research institutions remain heavily reliant on donor funds to carry 
out their activities. This affects the autonomy of these institutions in setting their research 
priorities as donors have the political capital to greatly influence the research agenda (see 
Birner & Wittmer, 2003). This can contribute to research outcomes that have very little 
uptake or adoption as evidenced in Chapter 4. The government must therefore increase 
budgetary allocations to public research institutions to foster the context-specific demand-
driven research required for innovation and economic growth. Similarly, the public extension 
system requires increased financial and logistical support as well as manpower in terms of 
more agricultural extension agents. 
The results from Chapter 4 also reveal that the current incentive system for public research 
institutions mainly rewards the development of new technology such as improved seed 
varieties. There is therefore little incentive for these institutions to invest in technology 
transfer activities to validate the investments in research (cf. Tripp & Rohrbach, 2001). This 
calls for the government to design and implement a new incentive system that places more 
emphasis on technology transfer. This will encourage research institutions to be more 
proactive in promoting their research output, particularly in collaboration with other 
institutions in the public, private and third sectors.  
b) Promoting the use of local content across industries 
The results from Chapter 2 show that policies that encourage the use of local content can 
incentivise industrial end-users to switch from imports to local products. This has been 
exemplified by the increasing use of cassava as a raw material in the brewery industry in 
Ghana following a tax incentive policy. The government should similarly promote local 
content policies across other industries such as the confectionary, pharmaceutical and energy 
industries in order to incentivise investment and stimulate increased local demand (see Sanni, 
2011). This could lead to more efficient use of the entire crop biomass. Such policies would 
also help ensure better coordination between farmers, processors and industrial end-users. 
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Potential processors would be assured of a market for their products which would in turn 
incentivise farmers to increase their yield and production volumes. 
c) Fostering public-private partnerships 
The findings from the study suggest that public-private partnerships are an effective 
mechanism for facilitating the development of agro-industries. The results from Chapter 3 
show that the government can be more effective by limiting its role as an economic actor and 
focusing on creating an enabling environment for public-private partnerships. This includes 
infrastructural development, a strong legal system, common goals among participating 
entities and clarity concerning institutional roles. Public-private partnerships serve to promote 
the participation and development of the private sector (see e.g. Thangata et al., 2011). This 
strategy is also particularly useful in areas such as input supply where there might be partial 
or complete market failures. 
d) Strengthening the regulation of agricultural input markets  
The findings of the study highlight the need for more state support in regulating the quality of 
agricultural inputs such as commercial seeds, fertilisers and pesticides (whether locally 
produced or imported) that are available on the market. The results from Chapter 4 reveal that 
regulation of seed quality is mainly focused on commercial seed production and certification. 
Less attention is paid to retail inspections, where adulteration is prevalent, due to resource 
constraints. The government must therefore invest more resources in equipping state agencies 
to monitor the sales points of agricultural inputs. This would help curb chronic problems of 
poor quality and adulterated products. However, regulation should not just be a function of 
the state. Alternative regulation modalities that actively involve private sector participation 
such as trademarks and truth-in-labelling should also be explored with reference to best 
practices from other countries.  
e) Supporting the development of Farmer-Based Organisations 
The results from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 demonstrate the absence of strong organised groups 
of farmers in smallholder agriculture in Ghana. This is evidenced by the lack of collective 
action among farmers to demand better contract conditions from agribusinesses, and better 
varieties from the public research system. There is therefore the need for the government to 
support the formation and development of farmer-based organisations (FBOs) as a means of 
providing services to smallholders. This would help ensure cost-effective, inclusive and 
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community-driven development. Functional FBOs would also provide smallholders with 
increased bargaining power in their transactions with other agricultural actors (see e.g. 
Markelova et al., 2009). As part of efforts to sustainably develop such groups, the 
government, in collaboration with NGOs, should facilitate technical training and capacity 
building programs for FBOs.   
In conclusion, with African countries’ high potential to produce crop biomass, the transition 
to an economy centred on the use of bio-based resources holds great promise for sustainable 
economic development. This thesis underscored the critical role of policies, governance 
structures and institutional arrangements in fostering this process. It has shown that there are 
a number of governance and institutional challenges that need to be addressed en route to 
developing a vibrant bioeconomy in Africa. Thus, the transition remains a long road that has 
only been partially travelled.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 2.1:   Centrality measures of Fund flows 
 (Out)Degree 
Centrality 
(In)Degree 
Centrality 
(Out)Closeness 
Centrality 
(In)Closeness 
Centrality 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
World Bank 1 0 0.31 0.25 0 
IITA 1 0 0.26 0.25 0 
FAO 1 0 0.31 0.25 0 
BMGF 1 0 0.26 0.25 0 
IFAD 1 0 0.31 0.25 0 
Institute of Industrial Research 0 1 0.25 0.27 0 
Food Research Institute 0 2 0.25 0.28 0 
Aggregators 0 0 - - 0 
GRATIS 0 0 - - 0 
Input Suppliers 0 0 - - 0 
Soil Research Institute 0 1 0.25 0.27 0 
CRI/ SARI 0 2 0.25 0.28 0 
Ministry of Food & Agriculture 9 3 0.33 0.27 27 
Farmers 0 2 0.25 0.30 0 
Fabricators 0 0 - - 0 
Banks & microfinance institutions 2 2 0.27 0.28 3 
Micro-processors 0 2 0.25 0.29 0 
Universities 0 1 0.25 0.27 0 
Stakeholders’ platform 0 0 - - 0 
Outgrower & Value Chain Fund 1 0 0.27 0.25 0 
EximBank 1 0 0.26 0.25 0 
Medium & Large scale processors 1 3 0.26 0.30 3 
Bakeries 0 0 - - 0 
Piggeries 0 0 - - 0 
Supermarkets 0 0 - - 0 
Breweries/ Distilleries 0 0 - - 0 
Plywood manufacturers 0 0 - - 0 
Packaging companies 0 0 - - 0 
Traders 0 0 - - 0 
 
 
 
 
150 
 
Appendix 2.2:   Centrality measures of Knowledge flows 
 (Out)Degree 
Centrality 
(In)Degree 
Centrality 
(Out)Closeness 
Centrality 
(In)Closeness 
Centrality 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
World Bank 0 0 - - 0 
IITA 2 2 0.35 0.34 0 
FAO 0 0 - - 0 
BMGF 0 0 - - 0 
IFAD 0 0 - - 0 
Institute of Industrial Research 6 5 0.38 0.36 7.57 
Food Research Institute 12 12 0.41 0.40 119.13 
Aggregators 0 0 - - 0 
GRATIS 2 2 0.33 0.33 0 
Input Suppliers 0 0 - - 0 
Soil Research Institute 3 3 0.34 0.33 0 
CRI/ SARI 8 7 0.39 0.37 21.50 
Ministry of Food & Agriculture 9 9 0.39 0.38 27.97 
Farmers 6 6 0.38 0.37 12.13 
Fabricators 0 2 0.25 0.33 0 
Banks & microfinance institutions 0 0 - - 0 
Micro-processors 3 3 0.36 0.35 0 
Universities 8 8 0.39 0.38 19.83 
Stakeholders’ platform 2 2 0.32 0.32 0 
Outgrower & Value Chain Fund 0 0 - - 0 
EximBank 0 0 - - 0 
Medium & Large scale processors 7 7 0.38 0.37 15.87 
Bakeries 1 1 0.34 0.33 0 
Piggeries 0 0 - - 0 
Supermarkets 0 0 - - 0 
Breweries/ Distilleries 1 1 0.34 0.33 0 
Plywood manufacturers 1 1 0.34 0.33 0 
Packaging companies 1 1 0.34 0.33 0 
Traders 0 0 - - 0 
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Appendix 2.3:   Centrality measures of Business linkages 
 (Out)Degree 
Centrality 
(In)Degree 
Centrality 
(Out)Closeness 
Centrality 
(In)Closeness 
Centrality 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
World Bank 0 0 - - 0 
IITA 0 0 - - 0 
FAO 0 0 - - 0 
BMGF 0 0 - - 0 
IFAD 0 0 - - 0 
Institute of Industrial Research 0 0 - - 0 
Food Research Institute 0 0 - - 0 
Aggregators 2 2 0.33 0.33 0 
GRATIS 2 2 0.33 0.33 1.25 
Input Suppliers 2 2 0.33 0.33 0 
Soil Research Institute 0 0 - - 0 
CRI/ SARI 0 0 - - 0 
Ministry of Food & Agriculture 0 0 - - 0 
Farmers 5 5 0.35 0.35 11.25 
Fabricators 3 3 0.34 0.34 2.75 
Banks & microfinance institutions 0 0 - - 0 
Micro-processors 5 5 0.33 0.33 6.5 
Universities 0 0 - - 0 
Stakeholders’ platform 0 0 - - 0 
Outgrower & Value Chain Fund 0 0 - - 0 
EximBank 0 0 - - 0 
Medium & Large scale processors 11 11 0.37 0.37 57 
Bakeries 2 2 0.33 0.33 0 
Piggeries 2 2 0.33 0.33 1.25 
Supermarkets 1 1 0.32 0.32 0 
Breweries/ Distilleries 1 1 0.32 0.32 0 
Plywood manufacturers 1 1 0.32 0.32 0 
Packaging companies 1 1 0.32 0.32 0 
Traders 2 2 0.32 0.32 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
Appendix 2.4:   Net-Map Interview Guide for the Cassava Value Web 
 
Application: The aim of this discussion is to develop a shared understanding of the current 
institutional structure of the various interconnected cassava value chains in Ghana (the 
cassava value web). 
 
 
A. Mapping the institutions in the Cassava Value Web 
1. Who are the actors involved in the cassava sub-sector in Ghana, accounting for all 
existing commodity chains? 
 
2. What are the actors’ respective roles in the cassava value web? 
  
3. How are the actors linked? Specifically in terms of; 
 
a. Fund Flows: Money or financing meted out for particular activities 
b. Knowledge Flows: Linkages involving the transfer of information, technical 
know-how, training and capacity building 
c. Business Linkages: Transactions involving the exchange of goods and services 
(service delivery). 
 
B. Identification of Potential Bottlenecks/Problems 
1. Please identify where there are bottlenecks/problems/challenges in the current 
functioning of the cassava value web.  
 
2. Please give reasons for the identified bottlenecks/challenges/problems. 
 
3. Please identify where there are opportunities specifically in terms of promoting 
innovative use of cassava biomass in the value web.  
 
4. Are there any additional actors who had not been considered in the Net-Map that 
could potentially play an important role in the development and production of new 
cassava based products? 
 
C. Suggestions to Improve the process 
1. What strategies can be employed to overcome the current bottlenecks in the value 
web? 
 
2. What strategies can be employed to fully exploit the existing opportunities for the 
innovative use of cassava biomass in the value web? 
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Appendix 3.1:   Contract Farming Household Questionnaire  
 
Household Identifiers 
 
 
 
 
 
                        Region:                     __________________                                                                                                                           
                        District name:           __________________                   
                  Community name:       __________________                    
                 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
Enumerator’s Name:           ______________________    Date Completed: ____/_________/______ 
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Section A: General Information 
ID Question Answer  
A1 Name of Respondent   
  
 
A2 Contact (eg. Phone number)   
  
 
A3 Gender 1 2   
A4 Age (in years)   
  
 
A5 What is your position in the household (relationship to 
head of the household)? 
1  
2  
3  
4 -in-law 
5  
6 Other unrelated 
 
 
A6 What is the highest level of education you have 
completed? 
0 None 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  (______________) 
  
 
A7 Can you read and write in English?  1_ 2  
  
 
A8 What is your marital status? 1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
 
  
 
 
 
A9 What is the size of your household? Male (over 18 years) ………………….. 
Female (over 18 years) …………….  
Children (under 18 years)…………… 
Total …………….. 
 
  
A10 How many dependents do you have (with no labor or 
money contribution to the household)? 
  
  
 
Note: The household is defined as a group of people who share expenses and live and eat together most of the time, that is, more than 6 months of the year or more than                                        
three days of the week. 
Note:  The head of household is defined as the household member who makes most of the economic decisions. You may accept the judgment of the respondent.  
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What is your main economic 
activity? 
How many years 
have you been 
engaged in this 
activity? 
What proportion of 
your annual income 
was from this activity 
last year? 
(%) 
What is your second most 
important economic activity? 
[Go to A17 if A14= 7] 
How many years 
have you been 
engaged in this 
activity? 
 
What proportion of 
your annual income is 
from this activity last 
year?  
(%) 
 
Do you belong to a 
farmer based 
organisation? 
1. Crop production 
2. Livestock 
3. Commerce 
4. Other business 
5. Employee 
6. Others (Specify……….) 
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
1. Crop production 
2. Livestock 
3. Commerce 
4. Other business 
5. Employee 
6. Others (Specify……….) 
7. None 
  1. Yes 
 
2.  No 
A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 
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Section B: Assets 
 HOUSING 
B1.Type of dwelling (current)  
  
1 
Several Huts/Buildings (Same 
Compounds) 
2 
Several Huts/Buildings (Diff. 
Compounds) 
3 Room(s) (Compound house) 
4 
Single family house 
 
5 
Apartment/Flat 
 
6 
Others (specify) 
 
 
 
B2. How many rooms does this household occupy? (Do not 
include bath, toilet, kitchen)   ________ 
 
 
 B3. Do other households share this dwelling with you?   
 
1 Yes 2 No 
 
B4. If yes, how many?  
B5. What is the material of the roof of the house? 
 
1 Mud 
2 Thatch 
3 Wood 
4 Iron Sheets 
5 Cement/Concrete 
6 Roofing Tiles 
7 Asbestos 
8 Other (Specify) 
   
 
B6. What is the material of the walls of the house? 
 
1 Mud/Mud bricks 
2 Stone 
3 Burnt bricks 
4 Cement/Concrete 
5 Wood/Bamboo 
6 Iron Sheets 
7 Cardboard 
8 Other (Specify) 
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How many of the following 
goods does your household 
own in working condition? 
 
Number        
(0= none) 
What year 
acquired   
(four digits) 
  How many of the 
following types of farm 
equipment does your 
household own? 
Number 
[0=none] 
 
 How long does it take to get to […], using the 
usual forms of transport from your household?   
 
 
 
Other building/ house 
     
B7 
  
Cutlass 
  
B18 
  Mode 
1 Car 
2. Motorbike 
3. Bicycle 
4. Walking 
Mins.  
Improved charcoal/wood stove     B8 Axe/pick-axe   
B19 
 the nearest 
motorable road? 
  B31 
Kerosene stove     B9 Sprayer 
  B20 
 the nearest weekly 
market place? 
  B32 
Gas stove      B10  Water Pump   B21 
 the nearest daily 
market place? 
  B33 
Radio     B11  Irrigation pipe 
   B22 
 the district capital 
[give name]? 
  B34 
Electric fan     B12  Plough 
   B23 
     
Refrigerator     B13  Yoke 
   B24 
     
Land-line phone     B14  Harrow 
   B25 
     
Mobile phone     B15  Shovel 
   B26 
     
Bicycle     B16  Hoe 
   B27 
     
Car or truck     B17 Animal cart 
   B28 
     
 Power tiller    B29      
Tractor    B30      
If they own more than one, record most recent purchase 
 
158 
 
Section C: Contract Farming Arrangements for CASSAVA PRODUCTION 
Are you 
participatin
g in a 
contract 
farming 
arrangemen
t? 
[Have you 
supplied 
Ayensu 
with 
cassava 
this year] 
If NO, WHY 
 
[Move to C19] 
What is the 
form of this 
arrangement? 
How many years 
have you 
participated in the 
contract farming 
arrangement? 
[How many years 
have you 
supplied Ayensu 
with cassava] 
What is the 
duration of the 
contract/ 
arrangement?  
How did you 
learn about the 
arrangement? 
Do you 
market all 
your cassava 
produce 
through the 
arrangement 
If YES, WHY If NO, WHY  If C9=NO, what 
proportion of your 
produce do you market 
through the contract 
arrangement? 
[proportion usually 
sold to Ayensu] 
(%) 
1. Yes 
2. No 
1. Lack of trust in 
the relationship 
 
2. Farmer 
selection criteria 
 
3. Low contract 
price 
 
4. Selling 
restrictions 
 
5. Other 
(Specify…….) 
1. Written 
(formal) 
 
2. Oral 
(informal) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
1. One harvest 
(one crop cycle) 
 
2. Six (6) 
months 
 
3. One (1) year    
 
4. Over 1 year  
5. 2-5 years 
 
1. Ayensu 
Factory 
2. Caltech 
3. Cooperative 
4. Another 
farmer 
5. Extension 
officer 
6. Government 
official 
7. Other 
(Specify……) 
1. Yes 
2. No 
1. Terms of the 
contract/arrange
ment 
2. Lack of 
alternative 
marketing 
options 
3. Favorable 
price 
4. Other 
(Specify…….) 
1. Terms of the 
contract/arrange
ment 
 
2. Alternative 
marketing 
options 
 
3. Favorable 
prices through 
other outlets 
 
4. Other 
(Specify…….) 
 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
              
 
159 
 
How was the 
sales price 
determined for 
your produce at 
your last harvest 
under the 
arrangement?  
[How was the 
sales price 
given by 
Ayensu 
determined at 
your last 
harvest] 
Has your income 
from cassava 
production 
increased since 
engaging in this 
arrangement? 
[Since you 
started supplying 
Ayensu] 
Does the contract 
specify the standards 
for the cassava?  
 
[If yes] What is the 
main characteristic it 
specifies? 
Have you 
encountered any 
conflict with your 
trading partner 
(buyer)?   
 
 
[If yes]  What is the 
nature of the conflict  
What is the main 
benefit of participating 
in this arrangement? 
What is the main challenge 
you have experienced in 
participating in this 
arrangement? 
1. Prior 
negotiation with 
buyer 
 
2. Determined 
by buyer 
 
3. Market price 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
1.Yes 
 
2. No 
1. Size 
2. Maturity  
3. Starch content  
4. Healthy 
appearance 
5. Other 
(specify……….…..)  
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
1. Cheating 
(Opportunistic 
behaviour) 
  
2. Violating the contract 
terms  
3. Price  
4. Quality 
5. Other 
(specify……….) 
1. Ready Market for 
Produce 
 
2. Better Prices for 
Produce 
3. Increase in Yields 
4. Better Access to 
Inputs 
5. Better Access to 
Extension Service 
6. Access to credit 
7. Access to land 
8. Transport of 
produce 
9.  Cash loans  
10. Other 
(Specify……………..) 
 
1. Dependence on the 
processing company as a 
market outlet 
 
2. Price of produce 
3. Price of inputs 
4. Quality standards for 
produce 
5. Transport of produce 
6. Other 
(Specify……………..) 
C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17 C18 
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Which features of the contract farming arrangement influenced your decision of 
whether or not to participate in the scheme? 
 
 
Features 
   
  
Yes 
 
  
  
  
No 
  
  
  
  
 
Nature of the contract   C19 
 Pricing arrangement    C20 
 Payment procedure    C21 
 Product quality specification    C22 
 Input supply arrangement    C23 
 Technical assistance    C24 
 Crop delivery arrangement     C25 
 Conflict resolution procedure     C26 
 Sanctions     C27 
 
C28. Do you intend to participate in this arrangement at your next harvest?   1. Yes        2. No 
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Section D: Agricultural Land and Crop Production (All crops) 
D1. How much land do you use for farming activities………………………..acres/hectares? 
Plot 
number 
What crop 
was planted 
on plot [##] 
during the 
last season? 
How large is each of 
these plots of land 
that is used in the 
arrangement?   
How large is each of these 
plots of land that is NOT 
used in the arrangement?   
How much [crop] was 
harvested from this plot 
during the last season? 
Does this plot belong to your 
household?  [either 
purchased land or allocated 
by traditional authorities] 
[If D7=1] How did your 
household obtain this 
plot? 
[If D7=2]   
How much did your 
household pay in rent 
for this plot? 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 Area Area unit Area         Area unit Quantity 
 
1. Tonnes 
2. Kg 
3. Maxibag  
4. Minibag 
5. Crate  
6. Bowl 
7. Piece 
8. Basket 
1. Yes  
2. No, household rents it  
from others  
3. No, provided by Ayensu/ 
Caltech 
 
4. No, borrowed at no cost 
 
5. No, household  
sharecrops land  
1  Allocated by family  
2  Allocated by chief 
3  Allocated by govt. 
4  Purchased 
5  Gift 
6  Inherited  
7  Other 
Value 
in  
GHc 
  
  
  
Time unit 
1 month 
2 season 
3 year 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
1 Acre 
2 Hectare 
 
 1 Acre 
2 Hectare 
 
D2 D3 D4a D4b D5a D5b D6a D6b D7 D8 D9a D9b 
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
   Crop codes; 12 - Cassava// 13 - Maize// 14 - Plantain// 15 - Yam// 16 - Okro// 17- Tomatoes// 18 – Pepper// 59 – Other Fruit//  69 – Other Vegetable// 79 - Other crop  
 
162 
 
What is the main source of water for this 
plot? 
How long does it take you to go 
from your house to this plot by 
walking?  
What is the quality* of the soil on this 
plot? 
D13. Which cassava varieties do you grow? 
1  Rainfed 
2 Rain & water harvesting 
3  Surface irrigation 
4  Groundwater irrigation 
5  Other 
  
  
Minutes  
 
  
  
  
1  Poor 
2  Average 
3  Good 
  
  
  
  
D10 D11 D12 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
* Explanation of soil quality:  "Poor" means low yield in a normal rainfall year because sandy, rocky, or weed-infested.   
"Medium" means average yield with normal rainfall.   
"Good" means good yield with normal rainfall because soil is dark, soft-textured, and weed-free. 
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Section E: Crop Inputs (For All Crops) 
Enumerator:  Copy each unique crop code from D3 into E1, then complete E2 to E10.  This table is at the crop level for the last major season 
For the [crop] grown, how much  .. . . . . . . . . did this household use in the last harvest? Was any seed/pm or 
agro-inputs provided 
on credit to this 
household for 
[crop]?                 
1  Yes, seed/pm 
2 Yes, agro-inputs 
3  Yes, both 
4 Neither 
[If E8=yes] Who 
provided these 
inputs on credit?               
1. Input dealer 
2. Ayensu/Caltech 
3. Ag trader 
4.  Processor 
5.  NGO 
6.  Govt, MoFA 
7.  Other 
[If E8=yes] 
Were you 
required to sell 
all or part of the 
harvest to the 
provider?  
1.  Yes all 
2.  Yes part 
3.   No 
...seed/planting 
material (pm) saved 
from harvest.. 
…purchased seed/ 
planting material… 
(state the unit price 
below) 
…chemical 
fertiliser.. 
… pesticides, herbicides, 
& spraying services… 
...tractor 
hire.. 
…. 
manure  
 
Quantity 
  
  
  
  
Unit 
1 Acre 
2 Hectare 
3 Poles 
4 Ropes 
5 Plots 
6 kg 
Quantity 
  
  
  
  
Unit 
1 Acre 
2 Hectare 
3 Poles 
4 Ropes 
5 Plots 
6 kg 
 
Value 
in 
GHc 
  
  
  
Qty in 
  
 Kg 
or 
litres 
  
  
Value 
in GHc 
  
  
  
Value 
in GHc 
Value 
in GHc 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
   
E1a E1b E2a E2b E2c E3a E3b E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
              
  
            
              
  
            
              
  
            
              
  
            
              
  
            
              
  
            
Note:  For fertiliser, if the response is given in bags, please convert to kg.  A standard fertiliser bag is 50 kg. 
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Section F: Labour Inputs for CASSAVA production 
F1. Labour inputs for cassava plot(s) of ………. acres 
Farm activity (where applicable) Code Family Labour  Hired and Exchanged Labour  Contract  
Number of workers # of days Daily Wage 
(GH¢) 
Number of workers # of days Daily Wage 
(GH¢) 
Price 
(GH¢) 
Acres 
Activity F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
Land clearing/ stumping 101         
Ploughing 102         
Harrowing 103         
Ridging  104         
Planting/ seeding 105         
1st Herbicide /weedicide application 106         
1st weeding: Manual  107         
2nd Herbicide /weedicide application 108         
2nd weeding: Manual 109         
Fertiliser application  110         
3rd weeding: Manual 111         
Harvesting 112         
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Section G: Crop Utilisation and Sales (For all crops) 
How much [crop] was last harvested?  
(can be calculated from D6, sum 
across plots for each crop) 
 
How much of this was 
consumed by the 
household? 
 
[same unit as G1c] 
How much was 
sold?  
 
 
[same unit as G1c] 
[If sales] Was 
market access 
easy? 
 
[If sales] What was the main 
outlet? 
 
How promptly were you 
paid?  
 
Who bore the 
transportation 
costs of the 
produce? 
Crop 
Code 
Qty 1. Tonnes 
2. Kg 
3. Maxibag  
4. Minibag 
5. Crate  
6. Bowl 
7. Piece 
8. Basket 
  1 Very easy 
 
2 Easy 
 
3 Difficult 
 
4 Very difficult 
1 Ayensu Factory 
2 Caltech 
3 Market trader 
4 Processor 
5 Consumer 
6 Cooperative 
7 Other (specify………..) 
1 Paid before  harvest 
 
2 At time of Sale/delivery 
 
3 Within 1 week of sale 
 
4 Within 2 weeks of sale 
 
5 Within 1 month of  sale 
 
6 Over 1 month 
1 Farmer 
2 Buyer  
 
G1a G1b G1c G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 
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What was the 
quantity of 
the sales 
through this 
outlet at your 
last harvest? 
 
[same unit as 
G1c] 
What was the selling price 
of the produce through this 
outlet? 
 
Was any quantity 
sold through 
another outlet 
 
If NO move to 
G14 
[If yes] What was 
the outlet 
What was the 
quantity of the sales 
through this outlet at 
your last harvest? 
 
 
[same unit as G1c] 
What was the selling price 
of the produce through this 
outlet? 
 
Was any of 
the crop lost? 
 
 
 
[If Yes] What 
was the 
amount lost? 
 
 
 
[same unit as 
G1] 
 
What was the 
cause? 
 
 
 
 GHc 
per 
unit 
1. Tonnes 
2.  Kg 
3.  Maxibag  
4. Minibag 
5. Crate  
6. Bowl 
7. Piece 
8. Basket 
 
1 Yes 
 
2 No 
1 Ayensu Factory 
2 Caltech 
3 Market trader 
4 Processor 
5 Consumer 
6 Cooperative 
7 Other 
(specify………..) 
 GHc per 
unit 
1. Tonnes 
2. Kg 
3. Maxibag  
4. Minibag 
5. Crate  
6. Bowl 
7. Piece 
8. Basket 
 
1 Yes 
 
2 No 
 1 No market 
outlet 
 
2 Pest and 
diseases 
 
3 Lack of 
storage 
 
4 Other 
G8 G9a G9b G10 G11 G12 G13a G13b G14 G15 G16 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
           
 
 
167 
 
Section H: Other Income 
Other income activity 
  
  
  
  
Code 
  
  
  
  
In the past 12 months, 
have you received 
income from 
[activity]?   
  
1. Yes   2. No 
If G2="yes". Complete G3 and G4. 
How many months out of 
the past 12 months did you 
receive income from 
[activity]?  
  
Months  
For each of these months that you were 
involved in [activity], how much 
MONTHLY INCOME did you take 
home?  
   
GHc/month 
  Activity H2 H3 H4 
Firewood & other forest products 101     
  
  
Agricultural trading 102     
  
  
Other trading 103     
  
  
Grain milling 104     
  
  
Local beer brewing & malting 104     
  
  
Agricultural processing business 106     
  
  
Tailoring and textiles 107     
  
  
Artisanal (mason, carpenter, etc) 108     
  
  
Other business 109     
  
  
Other wage laborer (paid by hour or day) 110     
  
  
Public-sector employee 111     
  
  
Other salaried employee (paid by month or yr) 112     
  
  
Pension 113     
  
  
Remittances from family members or friends 114     
  
  
Other assistance programs 115     
  
  
Other (specify) __________________ 116     
  
  
Note: "Other" could include land rental income, interest income, or property rental income 
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Section I: Information and Advisory Services 
Do you have 
access to 
extension 
services?  
 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
[If Yes] For how many 
years have you had 
access to extension 
services? 
How often did you get the 
service in the past 12 
months? 
 
1. Once per week  
2. Several times per week  
3. Once per month  
4. Several times per month  
5. Once per year  
6. Other (specify)   
 
Who provides these services? 
 
1. Government, MoFA 
2. NGO 
3. Caltech 
4. Ayensu 
5. Other 
For which crops have 
you received assistance? 
 
 [Crop Code] 
What was the major crop concern 
addressed?  
 
1. Use of fertiliser/ other agro-
chemicals   
2. Irrigation  
3. Plant  in rows  
4. Plant on Ridges  
5. New Seed varieties/pm  
6. Pest infestation  
7. Weather related issues 
8. Blight/Crop Disease   
9. General Information  
10. Other (specify)  
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 
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Appendix 4.1:   Process Net-Map Interview Guide for the Maize Seed Supply System 
 
Application: The aim of this discussion is to develop a shared understanding of the current 
structure of Ghana’s commercial seed system with regards to maize varietal development and 
seed dissemination under the new seed law (Plants & Fertiliser Act 2010).  
 
 
A. Mapping of Step by Step process of varietal development and seed dissemination 
1. Who are the actors involved in the generic process of developing an improved maize 
variety and its dissemination in the commercial seed system under the new law? 
 
2. Where does the process start? Please describe the process step by step. 
  
3. How are the actors linked? (information transfer, funds, service delivery, resource 
supply, technology,  etc.) 
 
B. Power /Influential Ranking of Actors  
1. Which of the actors do you perceive to have influence on the intended outcome that a 
new maize variety is widely adopted? 
 
2. Kindly rank the influence of these actors on the process using a scale of 0-8. 
 
3. Please give reasons as to why you ascribe different influence levels to these actors.  
  
C. Identification of Potential Bottlenecks/Problems 
1. Please identify where there are bottlenecks/problems/challenges in this process.  
 
2. Please give reasons for the identified bottlenecks/challenges/problems. 
 
D. Suggestions to Improve the process  
1. What strategies can be employed to overcome these bottlenecks? 
 
2. What should be changed in the current system to bring about needed improvements? 
 
 
 
 
 
